-
451 F.2d 800·
2d Cir.·
1971-10-29
·cited 176×
The dissent argues that a liability limitation valid under the Harter Act, after cargo discharge, should not be deemed invalid simply because it was void under COGSA while the cargo was on board.
-
483 F.2d 1098·
5th Cir.·
1973-08-07
·cited 76×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish a jury question regarding the requisite degree of control for the instrumentality doctrine.
-
618 F.2d 1373·
10th Cir.·
1980-03-21
·cited 67×
The court held that genuine issues of fact remained regarding Bethlehem Steel's control over its subsidiary's operations and potential liability, precluding summary judgment. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims against Bethlehem Singapore due to lack of personal juris
-
540 F.2d 681·
4th Cir.·
1976-05-13
·cited 62×
The court held that the district court's finding to pierce the corporate veil was not clearly erroneous, imposing individual liability on the defendant.
-
127 F.2d 344·
2d Cir.·
1942-04-27
·cited 56×
The court held that triable issues were created by allegations that the subsidiary corporation was a mere instrumentality of the parent, and that representations were made that the subsidiary's liabilities were the parent's obligations, thus reversing summary judgment.
-
232 F.2d 294·
5th Cir.·
1956-04-19
·cited 48×
The court held that the allegations in the creditor's petition were insufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil and ordering a turnover of assets, and that the bankruptcy court lacked summary jurisdiction over property in the custody of a state court receiver without cons
-
768 F.2d 686·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-16
·cited 41×
The court held that a subsidiary corporation was the alter ego of its parent company, making the parent liable for the subsidiary's tortious acts.
-
282 F.2d 231·
2d Cir.·
1960-08-01
·cited 40×
A party can be compelled to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act even if it did not sign the arbitration agreement, if it is the alter ego of the signatory party.
-
632 F.2d 413·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-08
·cited 35×
The court held that the warranty disclaimer in the lease was conspicuous and valid, but that the issue of whether FMC Finance and FMC Corporation should be treated as a single entity under the piercing the corporate veil doctrine presented a jury question.
-
127 F.2d 284·
4th Cir.·
1942-04-13
·cited 34×
The court held that when a subsidiary corporation is a mere instrumentality of its parent, has no separate existence, and both are insolvent, the bankruptcy proceedings should be consolidated to ensure equitable treatment of all creditors.
-
511 So. 2d 336·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1987-06-17
·cited 31×
The court reverses judgment against individual shareholder Milton Steinhardt for breach of contract, holding that under the Sykes standard, piercing the corporate veil requires proof of "improper conduct" beyond merely establishing that the corporation is the shareholder's alter
-
453 F.2d 991·
5th Cir.·
1972-01-10
·cited 29×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the subsidiary corporation (Films) was merely an instrumentality of the parent corporation (CBS) under New York law, thus the corporate identities could not be disregarded.
-
490 F.2d 916·
5th Cir.·
1974-03-08
·cited 24×
The court denied the petition for rehearing, finding that alleged factual errors in the original opinion were not substantial or controlling.
-
275 F.2d 97·
10th Cir.·
1960-01-26
·cited 24×
The court held that a surety seeking indemnity from its principal can recover costs incurred in completing the contract, even if performance dates were extended or advances were made, provided the principal's own actions caused the default and the surety acted in good faith. The
-
433 So. 2d 33·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1983-06-16
·cited 22×
The court affirmed forfeiture of the pickup truck used to transport controlled substances but reversed forfeiture of $1,007.83 found on the appellant because there was insufficient evidence that the money was employed as an instrumentality of a felony.
-
504 F.2d 104·
7th Cir.·
1974-09-16
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court erred in finding Allegheny contributorily negligent, dismissing GECC as a real party in interest, and applying collateral estoppel against Forth and Carey's estate. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Brookside.
-
799 F.2d 1523·
11th Cir.·
1986-09-24
·cited 18×
The court affirmed the district court's findings on liability for race discrimination and interference claims, but reversed the award of attorney's fees for some appellees.
-
242 So. 2d 185·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1970-11-18
·cited 17×
The court held that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury as there was no showing of gross negligence, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove a merger between IT&T and Sheraton America, thus reversing the judgment against IT&T.
-
540 F.2d 258·
7th Cir.·
1976-07-23
·cited 16×
The court held that the Parkhill companies were not denied due process by the seizure of their assets, as they made a tactical choice not to participate in the hearings, and that the assets of all three companies could be used to satisfy the tax liabilities of one under the alter
-
121 F.2d 112·
8th Cir.·
1941-06-24
·cited 15×
The court held that service of process was valid because the defendant corporation was doing business in Iowa and was the alter ego of another corporation, thus subject to Iowa's registration and service statutes.
-
895 F.2d 725·
11th Cir.·
1990-03-01
·cited 11×
The court held that payments made by a debtor holding company for its subsidiary's loan, where the debtor received no direct or indirect economic benefit and the subsidiary's corporate veil was not pierced, did not constitute reasonably equivalent value and could be voided by the
-
826 F.2d 725·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-18
·cited 10×
The court held that Florsheim failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of control or misuse of the corporate form to pierce Lytton's corporate veil and that it did not establish entitlement to additional discovery under Rule 56(f).
-
208 F.2d 13·
6th Cir.·
1953-12-04
·cited 10×
The court held that the intercompany contract and property purchase were not unfair to Kentucky, and the refusal to appoint an independent trustee or counsel was proper.
-
872 F.2d 60·
4th Cir.·
1989-03-23
·cited 9×
The court held that the retiree medical and life insurance benefits were contractually obligated to survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the parent company, Porter, was liable for financing these benefits by piercing the corporate veil.
-
700 F.2d 994·
5th Cir.·
1983-03-21
·cited 9×
The court held that under Texas law, a subsidiary's corporate veil can be pierced if it exists as a mere conduit or instrumentality of the parent, even without a showing of fraud or injustice.
-
957 So. 2d 2·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2007-01-05
·cited 8×
The State appeals a suppression order in a child sexual abuse case, challenging the trial court's decision to suppress two used condoms obtained by officers. The court affirmed the suppression, holding that the defendant's daughter acted as a government agent when she retrieved t
-
878 F.2d 1259·
10th Cir.·
1989-06-19
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the directed verdicts for Pioneer and Nuclear on piercing the corporate veil, fraudulent conveyances, and misrepresentation claims, and affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest.
-
631 F.2d 536·
7th Cir.·
1980-10-07
·cited 8×
-
341 F.2d 1022·
8th Cir.·
1965-03-08
·cited 8×
The court held that the trial court's findings that Lincoln Park Buick Company was not an alter ego of General Motors Corporation were supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.
-
175 F.2d 58·
6th Cir.·
1949-06-01
·cited 8×
The court held that the bankruptcy reorganization bar order, along with Section 77(f) of the Bankruptcy Act, barred the trustee's claim against the reorganized railroad company because the claim should have been filed during the reorganization proceedings.
-
446 So. 2d 190·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1984-02-15
·cited 7×
The Church of Scientology of California appealed a defamation judgment, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to find it liable for statements made by CPPR based on a theory of corporate veil piercing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff failed t
-
805 F.2d 561·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 6×
A parent corporation cannot insulate its vessel from maritime liens by transferring title to a wholly-owned subsidiary and taking back a sham mortgage, even if statutory procedures are followed.
-
247 F.2d 178·
4th Cir.·
1957-07-11
·cited 6×
The court held that claims arising from a parent corporation's investment in an inadequately capitalized subsidiary, controlled for the parent's benefit, should be subordinated to the claims of general creditors.
-
907 F.2d 1026·
10th Cir.·
1990-07-11
·cited 4×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to raise genuine issues of material fact to justify piercing the corporate veil and enforcing a judgment against parent companies.
-
150 F.2d 486·
5th Cir.·
1945-07-13
·cited 4×
The court held that the district judge did not err in allowing claims for additions and betterments or in denying modification of operating orders, and that purchased bonds were not subject to subordination.
-
133 F.2d 819·
6th Cir.·
1943-02-10
·cited 4×
A federal court receiver may bring an ancillary suit to enjoin parties from attacking the validity of rights and contracts related to a subsidiary corporation, especially when the subsidiary is deemed an instrumentality of the receivership estate.
-
129 F.2d 512·
5th Cir.·
1942-06-30
·cited 4×
The court held that accumulated earnings and profits of wholly owned subsidiaries cannot be attributed to the parent corporation for tax purposes, nor can loans between them be treated as dividends.
-
907 F.2d 1012·
10th Cir.·
1990-07-09
·cited 3×
The court held that the district court erred in asserting personal jurisdiction over Valdes-Fauli and the corporate defendants, but that jurisdiction over Rafael Tudela was likely proper based on his use of judgment debtors as instrumentalities. The preliminary injunction was dis
-
873 F.2d 109·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-21
·cited 3×
The court affirmed the damage award for fraudulent conveyance and disregard of the corporate entity, but vacated the award of Rule 11 sanctions due to insufficient findings and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.
-
619 F. Supp. 2d 1242·
M.D. Fla.·
2009-03-27
·cited 2×
Summary judgment is granted for defendants on the repudiation claim and certain other claims, but denied on the negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims due to genuine issues of material fact. Unum's motion to dismiss breach of c
-
851 So. 2d 768·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2003-06-27
·cited 2×
The court held that summary judgment as to liability and damages was proper, but the imposition of an equitable lien on homestead property and awards for attorney's fees and costs were erroneous.
-
565 F.2d 1157·
10th Cir.·
1977-11-21
·cited 2×
The court held that a bankruptcy referee may disregard the fiction of separate legal entities and order the turnover of assets when one entity is found to be a sham or alter ego of the debtor, even if ostensibly formed in the public interest.
-
491 F.2d 813·
2d Cir.·
1974-01-22
·cited 2×
The court held that the August 14, 1963 agreement was not unambiguous and remanded the case for further findings regarding the parties' intent and the agreement's surrounding circumstances. The court also found that Talcott's general lien on the routes extended to the cash procee
-
870 F.2d 1022·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-25
The court held that avoiding a preferential transfer and equitably subordinating a lender's claim are complementary, not duplicative, remedies that can be used together to ensure fair distribution of assets in bankruptcy.
-
511 So. 2d 620·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1987-07-08
-
495 So. 2d 226·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1986-09-17
A vehicle may be forfeited under Florida Statutes sections 932.701-932.704 when the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it was employed as an instrumentality in the commission of or in aiding or abetting the commission of a felony.
-
132 Fla. 307·
Fla.·
1938-03-31
Miakka Estates, Inc. appealed from an interlocutory order denying its motion to strike affirmative defenses alleging that B.L.E. Realty Corporation was a fraudulent shell corporation controlled by the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. The Florida Supreme Co