1,075 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 32 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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234 F.2d 847·
5th Cir.·
1956-06-08
·cited 26×
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action for want of indispensable parties when the plaintiff sought only a money judgment and injunctive relief, not affecting the rights of absent parties.
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181 F.2d 269·
8th Cir.·
1950-04-25
·cited 26×
A patentee who assigns an undivided part of a patent must join the assignee as a co-plaintiff in a suit for infringement committed after the assignment.
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692 F.2d 1239·
9th Cir.·
1982-11-02
·cited 25×
The Ninth Circuit held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to join indispensable parties.
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322 So. 2d 74·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1975-11-04
·cited 25×
A partnership doing business under a fictitious name must register that name to maintain a suit in Florida courts, and must sue in the names of its individual partners.
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270 F.2d 365·
2d Cir.·
1959-09-09
·cited 25×
The dissenting judge would hold that a beneficiary of trusts holding corporate stock has standing to bring a shareholder derivative action, even if the trustees have not sued.
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456 So. 2d 556·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1984-09-26
·cited 24×
A reduction in state Medicaid inpatient hospital days, even if it disproportionately affects the handicapped, does not violate §504 of the Rehabilitation Act if it provides meaningful access to the services offered and does not deny benefits based on handicap.
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717 F.2d 1251·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-15
·cited 24×
The court held that the 1857 Executive Order conveyed title to the riverbed to the Puyallup Tribe and that the 1948-50 river rechannelization was an avulsive change, leaving title with the Tribe.
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653 F.2d 1378·
10th Cir.·
1981-07-14
·cited 24×
The court held that the appeal was timely and that the district court properly dismissed the employer to preserve diversity jurisdiction, affirming the jury's allocation of fault.
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563 F.2d 1287·
8th Cir.·
1977-10-25
·cited 24×
The court held that while removal of a domestic relations case involving a federal officer is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal court's jurisdiction is limited to addressing the federal defense, and the remainder of the case should be remanded to state court.
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546 F.2d 1227·
5th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 24×
An assignment retaining a significant interest in the assignor is collusive and cannot be used to manufacture diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1359.
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503 F.2d 1138·
9th Cir.·
1974-09-12
·cited 24×
The court held that the Navajo Tribe's appeals lacked merit, affirming the district court's Order of Compliance and implementation plan, as prior rulings on jurisdiction and equitable relief were binding and the arguments raised were either foreclosed or without merit.
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478 F.2d 1016·
9th Cir.·
1973-05-16
·cited 24×
An Indian tribe can sue to protect its interest in restricted land without joining the United States as an indispensable party, and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 grants federal jurisdiction for such suits.
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444 F.2d 210·
7th Cir.·
1971-05-07
·cited 24×
The court held that Blonder-Tongue's abrogation of the mutuality requirement in patent litigation does not apply when there has been no prior determination of patent invalidity, and that the estoppel defense was not timely raised.
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410 F.2d 1179·
9th Cir.·
1969-05-09
·cited 24×
A federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus application from a state prisoner in its district of confinement, even if the challenged conviction is from another state.
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202 F.2d 442·
10th Cir.·
1953-02-09
·cited 24×
The court held that an oil and gas lease terminated as to plaintiffs' interests when a well commenced during the primary term was completed as a dry hole, despite a second well being completed as a producer.
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162 F.2d 598·
3d Cir.·
1947-06-19
·cited 24×
The court held that heirs of a grantor are not indispensable parties in an ejectment action if their interests are not joint and would not be affected by the judgment, and that deeds with ambiguous descriptions are locatable with extrinsic evidence under New Jersey law.
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145 F.2d 377·
D.C. Cir.·
1944-10-16
·cited 24×
The court held that a derivative action could not be maintained in the District of Columbia against individuals domiciled elsewhere, even if temporarily present, if the indispensable corporate party could not be properly served within the court's jurisdiction.
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128 F.2d 846·
9th Cir.·
1942-06-05
·cited 24×
The court held that the Postmaster General was an indispensable party, and the trial court correctly dismissed the action for his absence.
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125 F.2d 971·
7th Cir.·
1942-02-10
·cited 24×
An appellate court cannot permit amendments to cure jurisdictional defects; such amendments must be made in the trial court. Federal jurisdiction requires diversity of citizenship and sufficient amount in controversy for all plaintiffs.
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126 F.2d 625·
D.C. Cir.·
1942-02-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the property owners' prior action on a bond did not preclude their claim for an equitable lien on a special rent account, and that other property owners might be indispensable parties requiring remand.
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West Coast Lumber Company appealed a decree canceling deeds to 360 acres of Florida land and removing clouds on the appellee's title. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the evidence regarding possession and the source of title was insufficient and conflicting
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837 F.2d 380·
9th Cir.·
1988-01-15
·cited 23×
The court held that the Plan was not an indispensable party because it was identified in the complaint, its representatives were named, and a judgment was entered against it.
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525 F.2d 1318·
9th Cir.·
1975-11-05
·cited 23×
The court held that the trial court correctly denied the Teamsters' motion for summary judgment, but erred in its modification of the seniority structure by failing to adequately consider the seniority rights of non-minority road drivers who had transferred from terminal position
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454 F.2d 871·
1st Cir.·
1972-01-10
·cited 23×
The court held that the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice on the grounds of res judicata was proper because the cause of action had been fully and finally adjudicated in a prior Commonwealth court proceeding.
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860 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1988-10-25
·cited 22×
The court held that diversity jurisdiction was properly established and that the trial court did not err in its rulings regarding jurisdiction, evidence, or trial conduct.
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668 F.2d 76·
1st Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 22×
The court held that Acton, as an indispensable party whose joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction, could not be joined, and therefore the action should be dismissed under Rule 19(b).
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603 F.2d 1319·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-13
·cited 22×
Dismissal of an entire action for improper venue is too severe without first considering the severance or transfer of claims against non-indispensable parties.
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495 F.2d 1095·
3d Cir.·
1974-04-18
·cited 22×
The court held that the petitions to intervene were untimely and therefore properly denied, meaning the school districts are not parties and cannot appeal the district court's judgment.
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132 So. 2d 608·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1961-09-07
·cited 22×
The Dade County Port Authority, as lessor, was not an indispensable party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings because the litigation concerned rights between the assignee of the lease and the mortgagee, not the lessor's rights under the lease.
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283 F.2d 462·
9th Cir.·
1960-10-26
·cited 22×
A decree affecting title to property is improper if indispensable parties who own or claim interests in that property are not joined in the lawsuit.
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254 F.2d 817·
5th Cir.·
1958-05-07
·cited 22×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to preserve any reversible error for appeal due to lack of timely objections and exceptions.
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242 F.2d 45·
5th Cir.·
1957-03-01
·cited 22×
The appellate court affirmed the interlocutory injunction, finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting it to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm.
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236 F.2d 853·
8th Cir.·
1956-09-11
·cited 22×
The court held that the statute of limitations barred claims based on transactions occurring before March 19, 1947, but claims 6 and 18, and any claims based on transactions after March 19, 1947, not discovered until after February 15, 1948, were not barred.
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199 F.2d 426·
10th Cir.·
1952-10-22
·cited 22×
An action to restrain a federal official exercising valid governmental authority is a suit against the United States to which it has not consented and must fail.
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194 F.2d 469·
6th Cir.·
1952-02-14
·cited 22×
The court held that diversity jurisdiction existed because a party who was initially indispensable but disclaimed interest and was dismissed became an unnecessary party, allowing the court to proceed on the merits.
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159 F.2d 219·
5th Cir.·
1947-01-08
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claims and cross-claims, that its findings of fact regarding the survey were supported by substantial evidence, and that the admission of certain evidence was harmless error.
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142 F.2d 575·
5th Cir.·
1944-05-08
·cited 22×
A suit in equity against court officers to annul a money judgment against the United States is improper; the proper remedy is a motion to quash or similar motion directed against the United States itself.
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141 F.2d 984·
2d Cir.·
1944-04-04
·cited 22×
The court held that the lower court erred in dismissing the stockholder actions based on indispensable party issues and insufficient pleading of stock ownership and reasons for not making a demand.
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133 F.2d 273·
8th Cir.·
1943-02-08
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction and correctly found that the contract had been legally cancelled, affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit.
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790 So. 2d 1042·
Fla.·
2001-07-12
·cited 21×
The City of Oldsmar sought to use Florida's bond validation statute (chapter 75) to invalidate a fully executed Joint Project Agreement with the Florida Department of Transportation, arguing the agreement violated the Florida Constitution's restrictions on pledging ad valorem tax
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637 F.2d 496·
7th Cir.·
1980-12-23
·cited 21×
The court held that Alan Croxford was not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) because potential prejudice to him or the defendants could be managed, and the plaintiff's interest in the federal forum was significant.
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368 F.2d 516·
10th Cir.·
1966-11-17
·cited 21×
The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as neither diversity nor federal question jurisdiction was established.
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A city is a necessary or indispensable party in a court proceeding to review its administrative decision regarding a permit, and failure to join the city requires reversal of the judgment.
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166 F.2d 690·
2d Cir.·
1948-03-16
·cited 21×
The court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking because the plaintiff's claims were based on common law rights and an insufficient allegation of actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the joinder of resident defendants destroyed diversity jurisdiction.
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4 Fla. 11·
Fla.·
1851-01-01
·cited 21×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a lower court decree overruling a demurrer in an equity suit to enforce a lien on land for unpaid purchase money. The Court held that certain parties—the original vendors who remained bound to convey title upon payment—were indispensable parties
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777 F. Supp. 2d 1322·
S.D. Fla.·
2011-03-28
·cited 20×
The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion to strike affirmative defenses, striking some for legal insufficiency and treating others as specific denials.
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770 F. Supp. 2d 1261·
S.D. Fla.·
2011-03-09
·cited 20×
The court held that Magnolia's counterclaims for conversion and unjust enrichment against CSS were dismissed, but civil theft and piercing the corporate veil claims survived; the interpleader action would not be dismissed, and the case would be stayed.
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38 So. 3d 796·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2010-06-09
·cited 20×
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a negligence judgment against a deceased defendant's estate because the trial court failed to abate proceedings and properly substitute the estate as a party after the defendant's death, violating Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(
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739 So. 2d 684·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1999-09-01
·cited 20×
The court affirmed the denial of a motion for relief from judgment but reversed an award of attorney's fees, finding the fees were improperly awarded under statutory grounds not properly pleaded and that the dismissal of the shareholder derivative action was due to indispensable
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929 F.2d 1220·
7th Cir.·
1991-04-12
·cited 20×
A premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to enter a final judgment, and a default judgment for failure to comply with discovery orders is permissible when the non-compliance is willful.