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742 F.2d 1335·
11th Cir.·
1984-10-01
·cited 192×
The court held that marijuana offenses can be the subject of a RICO charge and that wiretap applications, even if amended, are valid if probable cause exists independently of challenged information.
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706 F.2d 42·
2d Cir.·
1983-04-14
·cited 176×
The court held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) applies to enterprises with mixed political and economic motives, as long as there is a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise, and the conduct implicates RICO's remedial purposes.
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755 F.2d 748·
11th Cir.·
1985-03-19
·cited 156×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana and attempted importation, and that various procedural challenges raised by the appellants were without merit.
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738 F.2d 847·
7th Cir.·
1984-06-29
·cited 102×
The court held that the arrest of Robert Covelli was based on probable cause, and the admission of certain evidence, including details of the murder and prior weapon possession, was not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed Covelli's convictions.
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402 F.2d 79·
2d Cir.·
1968-10-18
·cited 101×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for wilful misapplication of bank funds and that the indictment was not fatally vague. The court also found that the appellant received a fair trial.
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705 F.2d 603·
2d Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 78×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the defendants were predisposed to commit the crimes charged, rejecting claims of entrapment as a matter of law and outrageous government conduct.
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765 F.2d 890·
9th Cir.·
1985-07-10
·cited 57×
The court held that the use of a trained canine to sniff the interior of a private residence constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
-
355 F.2d 999·
9th Cir.·
1966-01-27
·cited 55×
The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2) applies to single acts of extortion and that the trial court did not err in denying motions for mistrial due to publicity or in its handling of a juror's undisclosed badge status.
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171 F.2d 800·
D.C. Cir.·
1948-11-08
·cited 52×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of suborning perjury on three counts, finding that the alleged perjured statements were indeed made, were false, and were suborned by the appellant.
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179 F.2d 644·
5th Cir.·
1950-01-10
·cited 46×
The dissenting judge believes the conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 241) is constitutional and sufficiently definite, and the indictment was valid, thus the conviction should be affirmed.
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750 F.2d 1354·
7th Cir.·
1984-12-14
·cited 44×
The court held that while the judge personally doubts the interpretation, precedent dictates affirming the conviction based on the statute's application to conversion of services.
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676 F.2d 1165·
7th Cir.·
1982-04-29
·cited 42×
The court held that the superseding indictment was sufficient, the denial of a continuance did not violate the Speedy Trial Act, the jury instructions were proper, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the imposition of two sentences for two victims was corr
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833 F.2d 1068·
1st Cir.·
1987-11-24
·cited 40×
The court held that the CCE statute does not require the jury to unanimously agree on the identities of the five subordinates, and that the indictment for conspiracy to impede the IRS was sufficiently specific.
-
970 F.2d 1490·
6th Cir.·
1992-07-21
·cited 36×
The court errs in narrowly prescribing factors district courts may consider in sentencing, misinterpreting Congress's language regarding the sentencing guidelines.
-
439 F.2d 751·
2d Cir.·
1971-02-19
·cited 28×
The court held that deliberately providing evasive answers, feigning forgetfulness, before an administrative agency can constitute obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, and that a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice to establish a Sixth Amendment speedy trial vio
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822 F.2d 1191·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-07-07
·cited 27×
The court affirmed convictions, finding that the trial court did not err in denying a bill of particulars, severance, or a good faith jury instruction, and that a juror's improper contact with a defendant was harmless.
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791 F.2d 1120·
4th Cir.·
1986-04-22
·cited 26×
The court affirmed the conviction for continuing criminal enterprise but vacated forfeiture orders based on a general jury finding, affirming forfeiture of specifically identified assets.
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723 F.2d 1234·
6th Cir.·
1983-12-16
·cited 24×
The indictment was insufficient because it lacked the specificity required to link the grand jury's concerns to the evidence presented at trial.
-
343 F.2d 176·
6th Cir.·
1965-03-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that any error in admitting a co-defendant's statement without a prompt admonition was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant.
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437 F.2d 1195·
5th Cir.·
1971-01-28
·cited 23×
The court held that while the trial court has discretion regarding the timing of challenges to an indictment, the indictment in this case was insufficient because it did not adequately inform the defendant of the charges.
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556 F.2d 479·
10th Cir.·
1977-06-03
·cited 22×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court did not err in denying motions to dismiss, for a bill of particulars, or to suppress evidence of a prior conviction.
-
422 F.2d 647·
7th Cir.·
1970-02-05
·cited 18×
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilt for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and that the ticker tape machine and blackboard were properly admitted into evidence.
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533 F.2d 699·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-03-18
·cited 14×
The court held that the false pretense counts in the indictment were fatally defective for failing to specify the false representations made, and thus should have been dismissed.
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648 F.2d 512·
9th Cir.·
1980-09-17
·cited 12×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was not reversible due to publicity, admission of statements, indictment specificity, denial of a second attorney, or prosecutorial remarks.
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590 F.2d 564·
4th Cir.·
1979-01-16
·cited 12×
While the court agrees that an instruction mentioning plea bargaining was not improper, it believes such instructions, especially those citing the Supreme Court, should be discouraged as potentially dangerous.
-
206 F.2d 64·
6th Cir.·
1953-07-21
·cited 12×
The court held that the government must prove the specific false statements alleged in the indictment, but proof of any one of them is sufficient, and summaries of voluminous records are admissible if accurate.
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23 Fla. 316·
Fla.·
1887-06-01
·cited 11×
Edward Dansey was convicted of selling spirituous liquors without a license in Alachua County, Florida. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, holding that a single sale of liquor without a license constitutes a complete offense, and that the indictment was sufficient
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573 F.2d 335·
5th Cir.·
1978-05-22
·cited 10×
The court held that the defendants' conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1006 was valid, rejecting claims of jurisdictional error, insufficient evidence, and double jeopardy.
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243 F.2d 546·
6th Cir.·
1957-04-08
·cited 10×
The indictment was not defective for failing to specify the exact manner of illegal firearm manufacture, as it sufficiently informed the defendant of the charge by referencing the relevant statute section.
-
696 F.2d 1162·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-04
·cited 8×
The court held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed due to a vague indictment and insufficient jury instructions that failed to connect the law to the specific facts of the case. The court also remanded for resentencing on the possession and distribution counts due to
-
448 F.2d 390·
4th Cir.·
1971-09-24
·cited 8×
The court held that an indictment for theft from an interstate shipment is valid even without specifying the exact facility from which the goods were stolen.
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120 F.2d 592·
7th Cir.·
1941-05-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the alleged trial errors did not prejudice the defendants.
-
193 F.2d 945·
9th Cir.·
1951-12-17
·cited 6×
-
691 F. Supp. 1394·
S.D. Fla.·
1988-08-10
·cited 4×
The court held that the indictment was sufficiently specific, the money laundering statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and the counts were not multiplicious.
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605 F. Supp. 730·
S.D. Fla.·
1985-02-20
·cited 2×
The court held that the defendants' motions to dismiss and suppress were denied, finding that the United States had jurisdiction over the criminal conduct and that the search and seizure were lawful.
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364 F.2d 497·
2d Cir.·
1966-08-09
·cited 2×
An indictment for statutory rape is not defective under West Virginia law for failing to specify the date of the offense, as long as time is not of the essence and the conviction would bar subsequent prosecution.
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2010-12-03
The Court denied Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, finding that neither his trial counsel nor his appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. The Court applied the Strickland standard, requiring proof of deficient performance and prejudice, and found that the
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417 So. 2d 1006·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1982-06-22
Melvee Tucker was convicted of first-degree murder in the 1974 killing of a convenience store employee and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Tucker challenged his conviction on six grounds, including claims regarding venue, prosecutorial delay, grand jury composition, co
-
153 F.2d 469·
D.C. Cir.·
1946-02-18
The court held that the indictment was properly demurred to due to misjoinder of defendants under common law and vagueness regarding statutory or regulatory violations.