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461 F.2d 1009·
2d Cir.·
1972-05-16
·cited 78×
The court held that World Bulk, as the COGSA carrier, is liable for cargo damage due to unseaworthiness and improper stowage, and that Jordan, under the voyage charter, is ultimately responsible for indemnifying World Bulk and Atlantic for such damages. The court also affirmed th
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656 F.2d 173·
5th Cir.·
1981-09-14
·cited 57×
The court held that Raymond could not escape liability for the unseaworthiness of its vessel, even if it had attempted a bareboat charter to an affiliated foreign corporation, as such a charter was void by regulation and the owner's duty is non-delegable.
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557 F.2d 438·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-12
·cited 52×
The court held that the Limitation Act of 1851 is inapplicable to a civil action by the United States to recover wreck removal expenses from a party that negligently caused a vessel to sink, obstructing a navigable waterway under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
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608 F.2d 160·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-12
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the lower court's apportionment of fault and finding of liability, including the State of Florida's comparative negligence for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the collision.
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282 F.2d 271·
5th Cir.·
1960-06-29
·cited 48×
The dissent argues that the Florida Death Statute, by its plain language, allows recovery for maritime death if the decedent could have recovered in admiralty, and that the majority incorrectly applied prior case law instead of the statute.
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419 F.2d 230·
5th Cir.·
1969-07-09
·cited 45×
The court held that a vessel owner's right to limit liability under the federal Limitation Act is a personal defense unavailable to its insurer in a Louisiana direct action suit. The court also affirmed the district court's findings regarding liability and the insurer's inability
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457 F.2d 815·
5th Cir.·
1972-03-23
·cited 41×
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744 F.2d 677·
9th Cir.·
1984-10-03
·cited 33×
The court held that the Alaska Owner Responsibility Statute may apply to a commercial fishing skiff used for recreational purposes, and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. The court also reversed the dismissal of the in rem claim against the
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202 F.2d 910·
2d Cir.·
1953-03-27
·cited 28×
A prior decree in personam against the owner is not a bar to a subsequent in rem action against the vessel if the in rem remedy was not available at the time of the first suit. Interest accrues until the entry of the decree, not the reorganization petition date.
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319 F.2d 512·
9th Cir.·
1963-06-19
·cited 24×
Statutory framework limits owner liability for sunken vessel removal costs to the value of the vessel itself, especially after abandonment.
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510 F.2d 1184·
7th Cir.·
1975-02-10
·cited 22×
The Limited Liability Act of 1851 does not apply to limit liability under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 for damages caused to U.S. property, and an indemnity agreement substitutes for the vessel itself.
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443 F.2d 1144·
5th Cir.·
1971-05-26
·cited 22×
A prohibition-against-liens clause in a preferred ship mortgage does not preclude the owner or authorized agent from creating valid maritime liens subordinate to the mortgage. The Bankruptcy Act preserves the liability of co-debtors.
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551 F.2d 717·
6th Cir.·
1977-03-02
·cited 21×
The later-enacted Rivers and Harbors Act amends the earlier Limitation of Liability Act, meaning a vessel owner cannot limit liability for damages caused by negligent sinking or injury to government works, even if the owner lacked privity or knowledge.
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419 F.2d 536·
4th Cir.·
1969-10-31
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court's finding that the mate's use of an unapproved flashlight caused the fire was clearly erroneous, and that Crown was solely responsible for the incident due to an unreasonable accumulation of gasoline vapors.
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885 F.2d 584·
9th Cir.·
1989-09-12
·cited 17×
The court held that the magistrate did not err in enforcing the maritime lien and entering judgment against the owner in personam, but erred in denying prejudgment interest.
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595 F.2d 943·
4th Cir.·
1979-03-30
·cited 16×
The owner of a vessel is not liable in personam for the misdeeds of the time charterer in issuing a bill of lading, even if the master signed it 'For the Master,' if the charter party clearly divides responsibilities and the charterer held itself out as the principal contracting
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290 F.2d 812·
1st Cir.·
1961-05-29
·cited 16×
A vessel owner is not liable in personam for unseaworthiness if the defect arose after the owner surrendered possession via a demise charter, and the vessel cannot be charged in rem if no underlying personal liability exists.
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166 F.2d 479·
2d Cir.·
1948-03-01
·cited 16×
The court held that the United States was not liable in personam for cargo damage because the vessel was operated under a demise charter, and the suit could not be maintained in rem because the vessel was not within United States jurisdiction when the libel was filed and proper n
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258 F.2d 718·
5th Cir.·
1958-09-05
·cited 14×
The court held that Nardelli, as a bareboat charterer with an insurable interest, was covered under the collision clause of the insurance policy to the extent of the named assureds' potential loss.
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836 F.2d 129·
2d Cir.·
1988-01-04
·cited 12×
The court held that the criminal forfeiture provision of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 imposes joint and several liability, not limited to an individual's ownership interest.
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479 F.2d 61·
4th Cir.·
1973-06-07
·cited 12×
The owner of a vessel under a demise charter is not liable for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness or negligence that arises after the charter begins, and an exculpatory clause in the transportation agreement can shield the vessel from liability.
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529 F.2d 921·
8th Cir.·
1976-01-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the plaintiff's claim for equitable subrogation was a factual question for the jury, not subject to summary judgment, but that the written assignment was invalid because the assignor had no remaining interest after a prior release.
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198 F.2d 369·
2d Cir.·
1952-07-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the steamship, not the assisting tugs, was liable for the collision due to the pilot's fault, and personal liability could not be imposed on the tug claimant without proper jurisdiction and pleadings.
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778 F.2d 670·
11th Cir.·
1985-12-16
·cited 8×
A mere failure of the non-moving party to create a factual dispute does not automatically authorize summary judgment; the moving party must still demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact. However, no genuine issues of fact existed in this case.
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287 F.2d 852·
5th Cir.·
1961-03-15
·cited 8×
The court held that the pilot's negligence in dropping anchor on pipe lines made him and his employer liable, and that a pilotage clause attempting to limit the towing company's liability was invalid.
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241 F.2d 819·
4th Cir.·
1957-01-25
·cited 8×
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286 F.2d 523·
2d Cir.·
1961-02-07
·cited 6×
The court held that a party cannot be relieved from a stipulation based on a mistaken assessment of evidence after the arrangement proceeding has been consummated.
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131 F.2d 907·
2d Cir.·
1942-12-07
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and that the Jones Act, not the Suits in Admiralty Act, was the proper avenue for the seaman's claim.
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253 So. 3d 8·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2018-08-01
·cited 4×
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only personal liability, not a mortgagee's in rem foreclosure rights, and each subsequent default after discharge constitutes a new default that restarts the statute of limitations period for foreclosure actions.
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613 F. Supp. 1428·
M.D. Fla.·
1985-07-19
·cited 4×
The court held that both the pilot and master of the Robert Watt Miller were negligent, and the dredge Alaska violated navigation rules, contributing to the collision and deaths. Chevron Transport's failure to ensure proper dissemination of navigational information meant it could
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418 So. 2d 445·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1982-08-25
·cited 4×
Buyers of real property sought to rescind purchase money mortgages due to the seller's breach of a covenant to deliver the building in compliance with municipal building codes. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that buyers who do not seek rescission
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573 F.2d 993·
8th Cir.·
1978-03-30
·cited 4×
The court held that Section 408 of the Rivers and Harbors Act should be interpreted broadly to cover impairment of a U.S. structure's usefulness, not just physical damage, and that this claim is not mutually exclusive with Section 409 wreck removal claims.
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510 F.2d 451·
4th Cir.·
1975-01-16
·cited 4×
The court held that the German judgment, being in rem and not in personam, did not provide a basis for the attachment of another vessel owned by the defendant.
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310 So. 3d 1275·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2021-01-29
·cited 2×
The appellate court reversed a deficiency judgment against a guarantor because the original complaint did not include a claim against him on the guaranty. This ruling emphasizes the importance of proper pleading for due process.
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931 F.2d 1073·
5th Cir.·
1991-05-28
·cited 2×
The court held that the notice of appeal was timely filed and reversed the summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of asset distribution to the defendant under the Trust Fund Doctrine.
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M.D. Fla.·
2023-01-26
The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint adequately pleaded claims for unseaworthiness, negligence, and Jones Act negligence, and therefore denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.
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114 F. Supp. 2d 1301·
M.D. Fla.·
2000-09-08
The Park System Resource Protection Act (PSRPA), being later enacted and in direct conflict with the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act), supersedes the Limitation Act for claims arising under the PSRPA.
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267 F.2d 875·
4th Cir.·
1959-05-28
Virginia law does not recognize a cause of action for creditors to recover the value of a husband's gratuitous services rendered to his wife's business, absent a showing that the business itself was a fraudulent scheme or that profits were accumulated.