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321 F.2d 788·
9th Cir.·
1963-08-22
·cited 91×
The court held that Perrault's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and his procedural challenges lacked merit, but Lyda's conviction was reversible error due to the improper admission of evidence of prior arrest.
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438 F.2d 441·
8th Cir.·
1971-02-17
·cited 52×
The court held that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about his association with individuals convicted of drug offenses, as this was unduly prejudicial and exceeded the scope of direct examination. The court also found that admitti
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720 F.2d 519·
8th Cir.·
1983-11-08
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge holds that the prosecutor's cross-examination exceeded the bounds permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 609, improperly painting the defendant as having bad character.
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498 F.2d 409·
6th Cir.·
1974-06-20
·cited 21×
The court held that the admission of fingerprint evidence, implying prior criminal history, was not harmless error and required reversal.
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5 So. 3d 734·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2009-02-25
·cited 16×
Leo Berube was convicted of first-degree murder for strangling a prostitute. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in admitting Williams rule testimony regarding two prior rape victims, though the evidence o
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987 So. 2d 822·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2008-08-15
·cited 10×
Armando Alcantar appeals his trafficking in cocaine conviction and five-year sentence. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly admitted hearsay and prejudicial character evidence that buttressed a weak eyewitness identification
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917 So. 2d 968·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2005-12-28
·cited 9×
Santiago Villanueva was convicted by jury of attempted second degree murder with a firearm after a bathroom confrontation at a bar. The appellate court affirmed the conviction despite improper character evidence introduced by prosecution witnesses, finding that curative instructi
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605 So. 2d 1329·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1992-10-14
·cited 8×
Roy Dawkins appeals his conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm, arguing that the prosecution improperly introduced evidence of an uncharged crime—possession of a firearm by a convicted felon—which violated his right to a fair trial. The appellate court agreed and revers
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931 So. 2d 187·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2006-06-09
·cited 4×
Armstrong was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a habitual offender to 30 years imprisonment. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting Armstrong's statement to law enforcement made during
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496 So. 2d 215·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1986-10-21
·cited 4×
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711 So. 2d 105·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1998-04-17
·cited 2×
Wayne Steinard appealed his aggravated assault conviction, challenging the admission of character evidence and the trial court's failure to ensure his presence during peremptory challenges. The court affirmed the conviction but struck two probation conditions that were not orally
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461 F.2d 282·
8th Cir.·
1972-06-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte due to improper testimony, and that the defendant's constitutional claims regarding self-incrimination were foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.
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275 So. 3d 257·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2019-07-10
Multiple improper references to a narcotics search warrant targeting the defendant's residence constituted prejudicial collateral crimes evidence implying prior illegal drug activity, and curative instructions were insufficient to remedy the prejudice where the jury's deliberatio
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256 So. 3d 935·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2018-08-24
A defendant charged with falsely acting as a public officer "in connection with or relating to" filing fraudulent legal documents may be convicted based on evidence of deceptive acts taken to facilitate that filing, even if the prosecution's closing argument emphasizes those prel
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202 So. 2d 225·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1967-09-12
The appellate court affirmed the conviction of the appellant, finding that the State Attorney's remarks during trial, which the appellant argued constituted improper comments on his silence and bad character, were not prejudicial.