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758 F.2d 1486·
11th Cir.·
1985-04-29
·cited 116×
The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Amey had standing to sue under the antitrust laws and that the statute of limitations did not bar the claims.
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655 F.2d 627·
5th Cir.·
1981-09-08
·cited 114×
The court affirmed the district court's judgments, finding sufficient evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy, proper jury instructions, and appropriate discovery sanctions.
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600 F.2d 1148·
5th Cir.·
1979-08-17
·cited 107×
The court held that while Illinois Brick generally bars indirect purchasers from suing for antitrust damages, an exception exists for 'cost-plus' pricing, and that plaintiffs adequately pleaded claims for injunctive relief. The court also reversed partial summary judgments on fra
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596 F.2d 573·
3d Cir.·
1979-03-26
·cited 58×
Indirect purchasers are generally barred from suing for treble damages under the Clayton Act, but may still seek injunctive relief. Purchasers from competitors of antitrust violators also lack standing to sue for treble damages due to the speculative nature of causation and the r
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601 F.2d 1269·
3d Cir.·
1979-07-10
·cited 42×
The court held that contempt adjudications without imposed sanctions are not appealable, that the district court correctly refused to dissolve the permanent injunction, and that the modification of the injunction to exempt certain FASH members was an error.
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669 F.2d 228·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-01
·cited 41×
The court held that the interclass allocation of the settlement proceeds was fair, adequate, and reasonable, despite claims of attorney conflicts of interest and the inclusion of indirect purchasers.
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836 F.2d 1063·
7th Cir.·
1987-12-31
·cited 37×
The court held that a district court must impose sanctions under Rule 11 for frivolous filings and cannot vacate an award based on the defendant's inefficiency or the complexity of the fee request itself.
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639 F.2d 1278·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-19
·cited 25×
The dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of Rule 15(a) is an unwarranted judicial amendment that improperly restricts a party's ability to amend a complaint.
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579 F.2d 13·
3d Cir.·
1978-03-06
·cited 24×
The court held that a factual assertion made in a post-opinion affidavit, not presented to the district court, would not be considered on rehearing. The court also declined to address new legal issues not raised below or on appeal.
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632 F.2d 1081·
3d Cir.·
1980-10-02
·cited 23×
The court held that New York had standing to object to the settlement's impact on the national class status and that Washington's partial assignments were valid and could be addressed through joinder or interpleader.
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729 F.2d 1208·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-03
·cited 20×
The court held that consumers are not estopped from asserting a retail price-fixing conspiracy theory to avoid the Illinois Brick bar, as it presents distinct issues from a wholesale conspiracy and does not pose a significant risk of duplicative recovery or undue complexity.
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817 F.2d 1435·
9th Cir.·
1987-05-27
·cited 14×
The court affirmed the district court's approval of the settlement fund distribution plan, including its offset provision, and rejected various challenges to the plan.
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617 F.2d 478·
7th Cir.·
1980-03-19
·cited 14×
The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the plaintiff's claims of competitive injury, as part of a broader conspiracy, were not directly barred by Illinois Brick and genuine issues of material fact regarding motive and intent remained.
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852 F.2d 891·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-18
·cited 10×
Indirect purchasers can sue for antitrust damages under a cost-plus pricing exception to the Illinois Brick rule when public utility regulation effectively mandates a 100% pass-through of costs, even without a fixed quantity contract.
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628 F.2d 971·
6th Cir.·
1980-08-29
·cited 10×
The court held that the indirect-purchaser doctrine, as established in Illinois Brick, bars an antitrust suit brought by a hospital against mechanical subcontractors when the hospital purchased the work indirectly through a general contractor.
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588 F.2d 1270·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-28
·cited 10×
The court held that state antitrust claims, even if based on facts that could potentially implicate federal law, do not arise under federal law for removal purposes if they are exclusively pleaded under state statutes and would be barred under federal law.
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581 F.2d 1308·
8th Cir.·
1978-08-21
·cited 10×
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660 F.2d 754·
10th Cir.·
1981-08-06
·cited 8×
The court held that the Illinois Brick rule, which bars indirect purchasers from bringing antitrust treble damage claims, applies equally to indirect sellers, precluding their claims unless a narrow exception is met.
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621 F.2d 323·
9th Cir.·
1980-04-28
·cited 8×
The court held that the Illinois Brick rule barring indirect purchasers from suing does not apply when the direct purchaser is a division or subsidiary of a co-conspirator, due to the minimal risk of multiple liability and the need to preserve antitrust enforcement.
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995 F.2d 425·
3d Cir.·
1993-05-18
·cited 7×
A general assignment of a contract does not include an assignment of antitrust claims unless expressly stated, and the validity of such assignments is governed by federal common law. Furthermore, an antitrust plaintiff is entitled to a trial to establish liability for mandatory a
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S.D. Fla.·
2022-01-21
The court held that the City sufficiently alleged standing under the indirect purchaser rule for its Florida Antitrust Act claim and plausibly alleged a price-fixing conspiracy with sufficient 'plus factors' to survive a motion to dismiss against both Manufacturer and PBM Defenda