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836 F.2d 1292·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-01
·cited 730×
The court held that a subsequent order terminating litigation cures a premature notice of appeal from an order regarding attorney's fees, and that the lodestar approach, calculated by reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the presumptive method for determini
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604 So. 2d 807·
Fla.·
1992-07-23
·cited 304×
The Florida Supreme Court held that the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney's fees is the party that prevails on the significant issues in the litigation, rather than the party recovering the largest monetary award. The court approved the trial judge's discretion t
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863 F.2d 759·
11th Cir.·
1988-12-27
·cited 259×
The court held that cost-of-living adjustments for fees prior to 1985, fees for specialized knowledge like immigration law, and the government's litigious position do not justify exceeding the $75 statutory cap under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
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746 F.2d 4·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-09-28
·cited 98×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in its interpretation of attorney fee statutes by tying reasonable hourly rates too closely to historical billing rates and by misapplying the standard for contingency multipliers.
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758 F.2d 897·
3d Cir.·
1985-03-26
·cited 75×
The court vacated the district court's fee award and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the district court's determination of prevailing party status and calculation of fees required reconsideration.
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786 F.2d 320·
7th Cir.·
1986-03-17
·cited 61×
The dissenting judge argues that the district court's fee award calculation, based on a contingent fee contract reflecting market value, was reasonable and that the majority failed to provide adequate guidance.
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719 F.2d 1496·
10th Cir.·
1983-10-24
·cited 60×
A section 1988 attorney's fee award should not be limited by a contingent fee agreement between the client and attorney, and the client's contingent fee obligation should be adjusted to match the court-awarded fee.
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851 F.2d 983·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-13
·cited 56×
The court held that attorney's fees awarded in civil rights cases can exceed damages, and that the appellate court can directly adjust fee awards to avoid further litigation.
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796 F.2d 1205·
9th Cir.·
1986-08-15
·cited 56×
The court vacated the district court's attorney's fee award due to lack of specificity and granted in part the motion for attorney's fees on appeal, reducing the requested amount.
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768 F.2d 1148·
9th Cir.·
1985-08-19
·cited 50×
The court held that while an award of interest on attorney fees against the USPS is permissible under 39 U.S.C. § 401(1), the district court must recalculate the attorney fees in light of recent Supreme Court precedent and correct the method of interest compounding.
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877 F.2d 1497·
11th Cir.·
1989-07-21
·cited 46×
The court affirmed judgments for retaliatory discharge and battery, vacated a defamation damages award for a new trial, and affirmed other judgments notwithstanding the verdict.
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923 F. Supp. 1546·
S.D. Fla.·
1996-03-12
·cited 41×
The court held that the Attorney General and the Florida Bar are liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with specific apportionment, and that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable costs.
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808 F.2d 1242·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-06
·cited 41×
The court held that the district court's award of attorney's fees was excessive and remanded for recalculation based on the relatedness of claims and the reasonableness of hours expended, considering the contingent fee agreement and overall relief obtained.
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755 F.2d 455·
5th Cir.·
1985-03-21
·cited 40×
The court held that Dr. Davis's letters were not protected speech, reversing his First Amendment claim, but affirmed his procedural due process claim. It also reversed his libel claim due to the jury finding the statements true and remanded for nominal damages on his equal protec
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789 F.2d 540·
7th Cir.·
1986-04-24
·cited 38×
The court held that the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act's exclusivity provision barred state tort claims against the employer and supervisors, but reversed the denial of attorneys' fees for the successful Title VII claim, remanding for a determination of a reasonable fee.
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751 F.2d 924·
8th Cir.·
1984-12-28
·cited 38×
The court should affirm the denial of attorneys' fees and expenses because the EAJA does not apply to condemnation cases.
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732 F.2d 495·
6th Cir.·
1984-04-13
·cited 35×
The court held that a prehire agreement in the construction industry is enforceable in a § 301 suit for monetary obligations incurred before repudiation, and that attorney fees under FLSA are not limited by a contingent fee agreement but must be reasonable.
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728 F.2d 1030·
8th Cir.·
1984-02-23
·cited 34×
A plaintiff is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if they succeed on any significant issue that achieves some of the benefit sought, even if not all claims are won.
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821 F.2d 22·
1st Cir.·
1987-06-12
·cited 30×
The court held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties, but current hourly rates could not be used to compensate for delay due to Eleventh Amendment immunity; historical rates must be applied, and a deduction is made for duplicative fee litigation hours.
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811 F.2d 1129·
7th Cir.·
1987-02-10
·cited 27×
The court affirmed the district court's substantial reduction in attorney's fees but remanded for an award of specific paralegal fees and witness costs, finding the district court's calculation method for attorney's fees, while potentially procedurally flawed, was not an abuse of
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820 F.2d 873·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-26
·cited 26×
The Court held that the plaintiffs' pursuit of an advisory opinion on constitutional law, after settling their monetary claims, did not constitute a "prevailing" party status for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as there was no longer a justiciable controversy.
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767 F.2d 153·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief should have been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction due to insufficient Article III standing, as past wrongs do not establish a real and immediate threat of future injury.
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763 F.2d 485·
1st Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 25×
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of retaliation for First Amendment activity, and that the punitive damage awards and attorney's fees were not excessive or unwarranted.
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953 F.2d 1152·
9th Cir.·
1992-01-13
·cited 24×
The Rombergs are prevailing parties entitled to a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they succeeded on a significant issue that altered the legal relationship with the defendants.
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875 F.2d 330·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-05-23
·cited 24×
The court held that a quality enhancement for attorney's fees was appropriate based on specific evidence of superior legal service, but a contingency enhancement was not warranted due to a misinterpretation of controlling legal standards.
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944 F.2d 949·
1st Cir.·
1991-04-26
·cited 21×
An unreasonably high fee demand by a plaintiff's attorney does not automatically forfeit the plaintiff's right to any fee award.
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884 F.2d 1468·
1st Cir.·
1989-09-07
·cited 21×
The court held that time spent litigating an EAJA fee application against government opposition is not compensable under the Act.
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818 F.2d 226·
2d Cir.·
1987-04-21
·cited 21×
The court held that using national hourly rates in exceptional, multi-party, national-scope litigation is permissible to balance fairness and administrative simplicity, and that quality multipliers may be awarded when national rates skew the lodestar analysis. However, the court
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744 F.2d 946·
3d Cir.·
1984-09-17
·cited 21×
The court held that the prisoner's prolonged administrative segregation, reviewed through subjective evaluations by prison officials, did not violate his due process rights, and thus the damages award was reversed.
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596 So. 2d 696·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-02-05
·cited 20×
In a dispute over homeowner's association election procedures, the court reversed the trial court's denial of costs and attorney's fees to the appellants, holding that the appropriate test is whether the party succeeded on significant issues and achieved substantial relief, not w
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892 F.2d 1177·
3d Cir.·
1990-01-04
·cited 20×
The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's attorney fee award, remanding for further explanation on certain reductions.
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798 F.2d 519·
1st Cir.·
1986-08-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the lower court erred in its calculation of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, finding the claimed hours and multiplier unjustified and the delay in payment attributable to the plaintiff.
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762 F.2d 1093·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-06-04
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court's approval of a settlement, which included a waiver of attorneys' fees negotiated simultaneously with the merits, was not an abuse of discretion given the specific facts of the case.
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947 F.2d 374·
9th Cir.·
1991-10-16
·cited 17×
A district court may not reduce an attorney's fee award simply because the plaintiff did not prevail against all named defendants when the claims are related and the plaintiff achieved substantial relief.
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849 F.2d 731·
2d Cir.·
1988-06-10
·cited 14×
The court held that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the Handicapped Children's Protection Act (HCPA) with retroactive attorney's fees, but that the plaintiff did not prevail against the local defendants, thus reversing the fee award against them.
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738 F.2d 1425·
5th Cir.·
1984-08-16
·cited 14×
The court held that prior Fifth Circuit precedent, requiring plaintiffs to prove the 'central issue' or 'primary relief sought' to recover attorney's fees, is an unduly restrictive rule that may conflict with Supreme Court precedent and congressional intent under Title VII.
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864 F.2d 734·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-30
·cited 13×
The court held that in a § 1983 wrongful death case, federal courts must apply state law for damages unless inconsistent with federal law, and the district court's award was inadequate.
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806 F.2d 1556·
11th Cir.·
1987-01-06
·cited 13×
The court affirmed the district court's determination that $75 per hour was a reasonable rate for attorney's fees in a Title VII case, and that fees for work on a related criminal proceeding were not recoverable under Title VII.
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920 F.2d 525·
8th Cir.·
1990-12-04
·cited 12×
The court held that a consistent pattern of negligent or reckless conduct can constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, and that a district court has discretion to reduce attorney fees based on limited success.
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867 F.2d 1063·
8th Cir.·
1989-01-27
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to award backpay based on a speculative claim of earlier promotion and affirmed the attorney fee award as modified to reflect only enhancement for the risk of loss.
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752 F.2d 553·
11th Cir.·
1985-02-04
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not applying the proper standard when awarding attorney's fees for monitoring compliance with a prior court order.
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732 F.2d 383·
4th Cir.·
1984-04-19
·cited 12×
Attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not recoverable for litigation interpreting a consent judgment when the parties did not prevail on those interpretation issues, as such litigation is distinct from the original civil rights claims. Fees for monitoring compliance with the
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712 F.2d 379·
8th Cir.·
1983-07-28
·cited 12×
A plaintiff is not a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they do not succeed on any significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought.
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837 F.2d 190·
5th Cir.·
1988-02-08
·cited 11×
Appellants were not eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they did not prevail on the central issue of their lawsuit, despite achieving partial success.
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827 F.2d 967·
4th Cir.·
1987-08-26
·cited 11×
The court held that the Credit Union and Ryan were liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for willfully obtaining a consumer report for impermissible purposes, and that Ryan was liable to indemnify the Credit Union.
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715 F.2d 254·
6th Cir.·
1983-08-29
·cited 11×
Attorney's fees are not recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for services rendered in optional state administrative proceedings when exhaustion of those remedies is not required.
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944 F.2d 1416·
7th Cir.·
1991-10-08
·cited 10×
The court held that reducing lead counsel's hourly rate without specific justification was an abuse of discretion, and that applying two separate reductions to the fees-on-fees award for the same reason constituted an improper double reduction.
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935 F.2d 1050·
9th Cir.·
1991-06-07
·cited 10×
A prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees for an unsuccessful stage of litigation if that stage was a necessary step toward the ultimate victory.
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566 So. 2d 352·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1990-09-05
·cited 10×
A party who recovers something, even less than sought, is the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under section 83.49(3)(c), Florida Statutes.
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887 F.2d 408·
2d Cir.·
1989-10-10
·cited 10×
The court held that the USFL was entitled to attorney's fees under the Clayton Act despite nominal damages, and that paralegal fees are compensable at market rates.