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808 F. Supp. 1561·
S.D. Fla.·
1992-12-03
·cited 224×
The court affirmed its prior order, holding that the parties contractually extended the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) to the shipment, thereby limiting the carrier's liability to $500 per package.
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451 F.2d 800·
2d Cir.·
1971-10-29
·cited 176×
The dissent argues that a liability limitation valid under the Harter Act, after cargo discharge, should not be deemed invalid simply because it was void under COGSA while the cargo was on board.
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422 F.2d 7·
2d Cir.·
1969-10-30
·cited 76×
The dissenting judge argues that the shipper's agent had a duty to examine the bill of lading, and the containers should be considered the 'packages' for the $500 limitation under COGSA.
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202 F.2d 850·
5th Cir.·
1953-03-12
·cited 70×
The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the Tug Dispatch was solely at fault for the collision, and that The Texas Company was entitled to recover cargo damages from C. J. Dick Towing Company.
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182 F.2d 322·
2d Cir.·
1950-05-16
·cited 68×
An employer covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act cannot be held liable for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor, as the Act provides exclusive liability for the employer to its employee.
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339 F.2d 295·
2d Cir.·
1964-12-09
·cited 57×
The court should give effect to clear exculpatory language in a contract between sophisticated parties.
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404 F.2d 422·
5th Cir.·
1968-11-05
·cited 54×
The court held that the vessel was unseaworthy due to an inadequate crew, making the owner liable for cargo damage on the first voyage. However, the court reversed the finding of unseaworthiness regarding stowage for the fourth voyage, finding insufficient evidence of damage caus
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540 F.2d 629·
3d Cir.·
1976-08-05
·cited 52×
The court held that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA intended to provide federal coverage for maritime employees injured in the course of their employment, regardless of the specific situs of the injury, as long as there is a functional nexus to maritime commerce.
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285 F.2d 381·
8th Cir.·
1960-12-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the government bill of lading constituted the contract for through carriage, making the Barge Line liable for damages under common law principles, and that the Carmack Amendment's applicability was a jurisdictional issue to be determined by the district court.
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559 F.2d 1173·
9th Cir.·
1977-08-30
·cited 36×
A bill of lading provision limiting carrier liability is invalid if the shipper is not afforded a fair opportunity to declare a higher value and pay a correspondingly higher freight charge.
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827 F.2d 859·
1st Cir.·
1987-09-03
·cited 34×
The court held that the defendant's $50 limitation of liability was unenforceable because the agreed-upon rate was not based on the value of the trailer, but rather on a special arrangement for the trailer's use.
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253 F.2d 922·
5th Cir.·
1958-04-09
·cited 34×
A common carrier's tariff provision relieving it from liability for negligence, if approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, is not automatically void as against public policy and must first be challenged before the Commission.
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259 F.2d 458·
9th Cir.·
1957-05-31
·cited 32×
The court held that the shipowner failed to meet its burden of proving lack of privity or knowledge, and thus was not entitled to limitation of liability due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel caused by the negligence of its managing officers.
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398 F.2d 204·
5th Cir.·
1968-03-18
·cited 31×
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232 F.2d 750·
5th Cir.·
1956-04-20
·cited 29×
The court held that prior decisions did not establish an inflexible 'double towage' rule for low-order salvage, and that salvage awards must be based on a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors.
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799 F.2d 697·
11th Cir.·
1986-09-15
·cited 28×
A domestic shipment that is a continuation of foreign commerce is subject to the Carmack Amendment, and a statute of limitations incorporated by reference in a bill of lading, even if non-mandatory, is enforceable if the shipper's agent prepared the bill of lading and the limitat
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537 F.2d 1272·
5th Cir.·
1976-08-30
·cited 28×
LASH barges are considered 'ships' under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) when engaged in foreign commerce, even when part of an integrated transportation system with a mother ship.
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507 F.2d 68·
2d Cir.·
1974-12-03
·cited 26×
The court held that gross negligence or wilful misconduct in tendering an unseaworthy ship does not constitute an "unreasonable deviation" that would void the liability limitations under COGSA § 4(5).
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197 F.2d 893·
5th Cir.·
1952-06-27
·cited 26×
A corporate stevedore is liable for its own negligence, and limitations on a carrier's liability do not shield the stevedore from such responsibility.
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155 F.2d 780·
2d Cir.·
1946-06-05
·cited 26×
The owner of a barge is liable for cargo loss due to unseaworthiness, even with a due diligence clause, if they fail to prove they exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
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447 F.2d 35·
5th Cir.·
1971-07-08
·cited 24×
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562 F.2d 938·
5th Cir.·
1977-11-10
·cited 23×
The court held that federal courts have admiralty jurisdiction over pre-loading bailments and that a carrier's unilateral cancellation of a shipment voids contractual liability limitations, making the carrier fully liable as a common law bailee.
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353 F.2d 113·
5th Cir.·
1965-11-23
·cited 20×
The court held that the tug owner was negligent in grounding the barge and that the Harter Act defense was not properly invoked. Surveyor's fees were partially allowed.
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155 F.2d 48·
5th Cir.·
1946-04-26
·cited 20×
The court held that a charter provision exempting the vessel owner from liability for cargo loss due to necessary repairs exceeding 48 hours, even if caused by negligent stranding, is enforceable as it does not violate public policy.
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133 F.2d 781·
2d Cir.·
1943-01-25
·cited 20×
The court held that the ship owner and bareboat charterer were entitled to exoneration from liability for cargo damage caused by fire, as the fire was not caused by their 'design or neglect' under the Fire Statute.
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527 F.2d 502·
3d Cir.·
1975-12-16
·cited 19×
The court held that the one-year COGSA statute of limitations did not apply to Canal, a third-party contractor, as the contract did not expressly extend its benefits. The court affirmed the judgment for Ashland.
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775 F.2d 476·
2d Cir.·
1985-10-15
·cited 18×
An ocean carrier is liable for misdelivery of goods when it releases cargo without requiring the presentation of the original order bill of lading, even if local custom or a 'carta declaratoria' is involved.
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607 F.2d 322·
4th Cir.·
1979-09-19
·cited 18×
When the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) is incorporated by reference into a domestic contract of carriage, it is treated as a contractual term, allowing parties to define terms like 'package' in a manner that may differ from judicial interpretation.
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374 F.2d 813·
7th Cir.·
1967-01-04
·cited 18×
In admiralty law, when both parties are found at fault for property damage, the damages are to be equally divided, and the non-appealing party is entitled to half of its damages.
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204 F.2d 384·
3d Cir.·
1953-05-11
·cited 18×
The court held that the carrier failed to prove constructive delivery of the entire shipment, and thus remained responsible for the undelivered portion.
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167 F.2d 334·
3d Cir.·
1948-03-18
·cited 18×
The dissenting judge holds that the appellee (carrier) failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the cause of loss, and the decree dismissing the libel should be reversed.
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616 F.2d 619·
2d Cir.·
1980-02-22
·cited 17×
The court held that both the ocean carrier (Export) and the inland carrier (Maislin) were negligent and jointly liable for the spoilage of the fish, reversing the lower court's decision that Export was solely liable.
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603 F.2d 1327·
9th Cir.·
1979-03-08
·cited 16×
The court held that the appellees (owner and charterer) failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy and properly man it, thus forfeiting the fire exemption under COGSA and the Fire Statute.
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510 F.2d 628·
9th Cir.·
1974-09-30
·cited 16×
The court held that the doctrine of estoppel applies to bills of lading issued under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Cogsa), even for shipments from foreign ports, and that the carrier is estopped from impeaching the weight stated in the bill of lading when the holder has reaso
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270 F.2d 345·
5th Cir.·
1959-08-12
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge believes the majority erred in reversing the district court's judgment, arguing the district court correctly applied the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
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581 F.2d 268·
1st Cir.·
1978-07-25
·cited 13×
A shipping carrier cannot limit its liability below the $500 per package or customary freight unit provision of COGSA by contractually agreeing to a lower amount, even if filed with the FMC.
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704 F.2d 1305·
4th Cir.·
1983-04-11
·cited 12×
The court held that the "pier-to-pier" designation on the bill of lading controlled, meaning delivery was not complete when the cargo was damaged, thus the COGSA one-year statute of limitations, incorporated into the bill of lading and extended to terminal operators like Clark, a
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646 F.2d 166·
5th Cir.·
1981-05-26
·cited 12×
The court held that delivery occurred when the container was unloaded onto the dock and taken into the custody of the port authority, thereby discharging the carrier's responsibility.
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290 F.2d 486·
9th Cir.·
1961-05-02
·cited 12×
The carrier remains responsible for the safe arrival of goods under maritime carriage law, even when using independent contractors for lighterage.
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267 F.2d 276·
2d Cir.·
1959-06-01
·cited 12×
The court held that a bill of lading provision requiring suit to be brought and jurisdiction obtained within one year of delivery is valid, even if the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act's one-year limit is interpreted differently.
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702 F.2d 1252·
5th Cir.·
1983-04-22
·cited 10×
The court held that the carrier fulfilled its duty of proper delivery under the Harter Act by releasing the cargo to Nigerian Port Authority stevedores as mandated by Nigerian law, and was not liable for damage occurring thereafter due to circumstances beyond its control.
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324 F.2d 835·
2d Cir.·
1963-11-20
·cited 10×
The court held that the shipowner is not liable for damage caused by the chief officer's error in management, as this is an exception under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
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256 F.2d 946·
4th Cir.·
1958-06-16
·cited 10×
A stevedore's independent negligence does not entitle them to the carrier's statutory limitation of liability under Cogsa.
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190 F.2d 394·
3d Cir.·
1951-07-20
·cited 10×
The court held that a moderate gale and cross-sea do not constitute an exceptional peril of the sea excusing a carrier's liability for an unexplained sinking, and the presumption of unseaworthiness applies to private carriage.
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149 F.2d 692·
9th Cir.·
1945-05-21
·cited 10×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority misconstrued the facts and ignored the wartime necessity, concluding the government was justified in its actions.
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800 F.2d 27·
2d Cir.·
1986-08-25
·cited 8×
The court held that while the initial deviation to Malta was reasonable, the subsequent negligence in handling the cargo did not constitute an unreasonable deviation that would void the COGSA liability limitation.
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647 F.2d 985·
9th Cir.·
1981-06-12
·cited 8×
Foreign forum selection clauses are enforceable in international trade when the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) is incorporated contractually and does not apply by its own force.
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260 F.2d 181·
9th Cir.·
1958-10-10
·cited 8×
A bill of lading clause limiting carrier liability to the shipper's invoice value, plus freight, insurance, and duties, is void under Cogsa § 3(8) as it lessens liability below the destination value.
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814 F.2d 84·
2d Cir.·
1987-03-12
·cited 7×
The court held that the carrier retained custody of the cargo until it was picked up by the consignee's trucker, establishing a prima facie case for damage during that period, and that on-deck stowage was not an unreasonable deviation, thus the COGSA liability limitation applied.
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426 F.2d 1372·
9th Cir.·
1970-05-20
·cited 7×
The court held that the ocean carrier was not estopped from denying liability for rust damage because the bill of lading contained a qualifying clause that negated any representation of the goods being free from rust or moisture.