-
935 F.2d 135·
8th Cir.·
1991-05-30
·cited 15×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony, that the Allen charge was properly given, and that the evidence was sufficient for conviction. However, it found that admitting officers' opinion testimony on a witness's truthfulness
-
538 So. 2d 1296·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1989-02-10
·cited 15×
Kenneth Stallworth appeals convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property arising from the sale of a stolen television set. The court reversed the grand theft conviction while affirming the dealing in stolen property conviction, holding that Florida law prohibits dual
-
757 F.2d 1093·
10th Cir.·
1985-03-22
·cited 15×
The court held that prosecutorial cross-examination and argument regarding a defendant's post-arrest silence, when not used for impeachment of prior inconsistent statements, violates due process and is not harmless error in a case hinging on the defendant's credibility.
-
662 F.2d 177·
2d Cir.·
1981-11-04
·cited 15×
The court held that the state trial judge's ex parte communication with the jury, instructing them to continue deliberations without notice to the defendant or counsel, constituted a violation of the defendant's due process right to be present, and this error was not harmless.
-
591 F.2d 391·
7th Cir.·
1979-01-08
·cited 15×
A prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument comments on a defendant's silence during police custody, even before Miranda warnings, violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and are not harmless error.
-
450 F.2d 599·
5th Cir.·
1971-10-08
·cited 15×
The court held that even if the co-defendant's guilty plea before the jury violated the petitioner's confrontation rights, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.
-
927 F.2d 999·
7th Cir.·
1991-03-20
·cited 14×
The court held that while the district court erroneously admitted a co-conspirator's statement, the error was harmless because other substantial evidence proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
888 F.2d 1220·
8th Cir.·
1989-10-30
·cited 14×
-
874 F.2d 746·
10th Cir.·
1989-05-12
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court's failure to fully admonish pro se defendants regarding the dangers of self-representation was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no reasonable possibility the defendants would have been acquitted had they been repres
-
872 F.2d 745·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-14
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error by submitting the case to an eight-member jury, nor did it abuse its discretion on the other claims of error raised by the plaintiff.
-
828 F.2d 257·
5th Cir.·
1987-09-14
·cited 14×
-
811 F.2d 689·
1st Cir.·
1987-02-12
·cited 14×
The court held that the convictions of Donald Stackpole and Ray Norton, Jr. for their involvement in an arson conspiracy were supported by sufficient evidence and that no reversible errors occurred during their trials.
-
801 F.2d 252·
6th Cir.·
1986-09-18
·cited 14×
A jury instruction that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on mens rea, violating Sandstrom v. Montana, is subject to the Chapman harmless error standard and is not automatically reversible if the defendant contested intent.
-
739 F.2d 1360·
8th Cir.·
1984-07-30
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that value was a material element of attempted theft by deception was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
659 F.2d 745·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-27
·cited 14×
The dissent argues that under Jenkins v. Anderson, the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's pre-arrest silence, and even post-Miranda silence, constitute harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
-
604 F.2d 1252·
9th Cir.·
1979-09-24
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant was released pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, as any error in not submitting the factual component to the jury was harmless.
-
555 F.2d 56·
2d Cir.·
1977-05-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the victim's identification at a pre-indictment arraignment was not a violation of due process or the Sixth Amendment, and any error in admitting the other witness's identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
529 F.2d 1125·
9th Cir.·
1976-01-26
·cited 14×
The court held that the nondisclosure of a confession constituted a Brady error that was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring reversal.
-
476 F.2d 845·
9th Cir.·
1972-05-24
·cited 14×
The court found that any alleged error in the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
-
436 F.2d 290·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-11-12
·cited 14×
The court held that while the precinct identification procedure was potentially suggestive, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the extensive independent evidence and the victim's clear observation during the crime.
-
422 F.2d 652·
7th Cir.·
1970-02-10
·cited 14×
The court held that a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence, while improper, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given defense counsel's prior remarks and the court's curative instructions. The court also held that a warrantless search of a locker was permissible under
-
407 F.2d 10·
1st Cir.·
1969-02-14
·cited 14×
The court held that while arraignment in Massachusetts may have been a critical stage, the absence of counsel did not cause prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt, thus the writ of habeas corpus was properly denied.
-
56 F.4th 1291·
11th Cir.·
2023-01-05
·cited 12×
The court held that the jury instruction for substantive drug charges inadequately conveyed the required mens rea, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for those convictions. However, the error was harmless as to other convictions.
-
872 F.2d 217·
7th Cir.·
1989-04-18
·cited 12×
The court held that the appellant's mail fraud conviction was valid because the scheme defrauded Cook County of a property right (the security interest in the bail bond refund), even though the indictment and jury instructions also mentioned intangible rights.
-
806 F.2d 1421·
9th Cir.·
1986-12-30
·cited 12×
The court held that while evidentiary errors were harmless, the defendant was entitled to acquittal on false certification counts because he was not a 'transferor' under the statute without an ownership interest in the vehicles.
-
758 F.2d 441·
9th Cir.·
1985-04-18
·cited 12×
The court held that the admission of certain hearsay statements was a Confrontation Clause violation but harmless error, and that Arizona's death penalty statute is constitutional as applied.
-
692 F.2d 658·
10th Cir.·
1982-07-06
·cited 12×
The court held that aggregating the value of stolen goods to meet the $5000 jurisdictional amount is permissible, and the trial court's refusal to give a specific jury instruction regarding addict informant testimony was not prejudicial error in this case.
-
661 F.2d 239·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-08-20
·cited 12×
A prior inconsistent statement made to a postal inspector, even if sworn, does not qualify as substantive evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) because it was not made in a "trial, hearing, or other proceeding."
-
394 So. 2d 500·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1981-02-18
·cited 12×
In this probation revocation appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that defendants have a right to discovery under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.220 in violation of probation proceedings, but decline to apply the per se reversal rule from Richardson v. Sta
-
419 F.2d 810·
6th Cir.·
1969-12-30
·cited 12×
The court held that the denial of continuances did not prejudice the defendant and the jury instruction on consent to search was proper.
-
595 So. 2d 1046·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-03-11
·cited 11×
Desilien was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and felony murder. On appeal, he challenged a jury instruction on willful blindness and a denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court found the willful blindness instruction was error but harmless beyond a reasonable
-
625 F.2d 1175·
5th Cir.·
1980-09-15
·cited 11×
The court held that any error in failing to address the appellant personally regarding her admission of probation violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
924 F.2d 561·
5th Cir.·
1991-02-13
·cited 10×
A district court's complete failure to inform a defendant of the possibility of supervised release, when the defendant is ultimately sentenced to supervised release, mandates vacating the sentence and allowing the defendant to plead anew, regardless of harmless error.
-
916 F.2d 1310·
8th Cir.·
1990-09-24
·cited 10×
The court held that the state court's factual finding that no deal existed between the prosecutor and a key witness was supported by the record and thus presumed correct, meaning no knowing use of perjured testimony occurred. The court also held that the defendant's waiver of Mir
-
900 F.2d 842·
5th Cir.·
1990-05-11
·cited 10×
The court held that a defendant's Rule 35(a) motion, treated as a collateral attack, could not establish an illegal sentence based on a failure to warn about restitution when the restitution amount was less than potential fines and the promissory note was a pre-existing civil obl
-
525 So. 2d 957·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1988-05-11
·cited 10×
Leif Tollefson appeals his convictions for manslaughter, DUI-manslaughter, leaving the scene of accidents, DUI-property damage, and resisting an officer with violence. The appellate court found harmless error in the admission of prior DUI evidence and the jury instruction limitin
-
798 F.2d 18·
1st Cir.·
1986-08-12
·cited 10×
The court held that the materiality of a false statement in a perjury case is a question of law, not fact, and that any prosecutorial comment on the defendant's silence was harmless error.
-
785 F.2d 1172·
4th Cir.·
1986-02-27
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the result based on prior precedent, finding that contradictory jury instructions on self-defense rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
-
782 F.2d 443·
3d Cir.·
1986-02-04
·cited 10×
The court held that the majority misapplied the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby increasing the burden on petitioners and wrongly changing the outcome of the case.
-
762 F.2d 796·
9th Cir.·
1985-06-06
·cited 10×
The court held that the defendant's bail jumping conviction was supported by sufficient evidence of willfulness and that an erroneous jury instruction on insanity was harmless error. The court affirmed the conviction.
-
683 F.2d 152·
6th Cir.·
1982-07-14
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief must be vacated and the case remanded because the record was inadequate to determine if the constitutional error was harmless.
-
433 F.2d 659·
4th Cir.·
1970-11-09
·cited 10×
The Supreme Court's ruling in Coleman v. Alabama, requiring counsel at preliminary hearings, should not be applied retroactively to cases predating the decision.
-
429 F.2d 164·
9th Cir.·
1970-07-10
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding the arrest lawful and the admission of prior testimony admissible on most counts, while remanding one count for failure to exhaust state remedies.
-
402 F.2d 495·
10th Cir.·
1968-10-24
·cited 10×
The denial of a pre-trial sanity hearing transcript to an indigent defendant, when the transcript is necessary for effective defense preparation, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
-
344 So. 3d 369·
Fla.·
2022-06-09
·cited 9×
Granville Ritchie was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery of a child under twelve, and aggravated child abuse in connection with the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl left in his care, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed all convictions and the death sentenc
-
273 So. 3d 63·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2018-12-26
·cited 9×
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company appeals a wrongful death judgment in favor of Diane Schleider and her daughter following Andrew Schleider's death from lung cancer and COPD. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District affirms the judgment, holding that the closing arguments
-
85 So. 3d 532·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2012-04-11
·cited 9×
Defendant Espute was convicted of aggravated battery and battery arising from a violent altercation. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his mistrial motion based on the prosecutor's improper comment on his right to remain silent. The Fourth District Court of App
-
831 F.2d 1547·
11th Cir.·
1987-11-13
·cited 9×
The court held that limiting cross-examination into a witness's potential deal with the state violated the Confrontation Clause and was not harmless error.
-
904 So. 2d 601·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2005-06-20
·cited 8×
Eric Smallridge appeals his convictions for two counts of DUI manslaughter, challenging the jury instruction, denial of his motion to suppress blood-alcohol test results, admission of photographs, restitution order, and the constitutionality of Florida's Criminal Punishment Code.
-
998 F.2d 1426·
8th Cir.·
1993-07-15
·cited 8×
The court held that the harmless error standard from Chapman v. California applies to this habeas case because the state courts did not have an opportunity to review the constitutional error. The court found the error harmless as to Richley and Holmes, but remanded for further co