1,384 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,569 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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Although the deputy commissioner erred by finding Section 440.14(l)(c) inapplicable merely because Anstead had worked substantially the 13 weeks preceding his injury, the error was harmless because competent substantial evidence supported the finding that Anstead was not a season
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The court held that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction regarding intent was harmless error because the evidence overwhelmingly established the petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the instruction did not affect the verdict. The court also held that the pet
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The court held that the trial court's curative instruction was not fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as referring adversely to the defendant's failure to testify.
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a Third District Court of Appeal decision that had reversed a criminal conviction due to a Fifth Amendment violation from an impermissible comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence. The court held that a harmless error analysis rather than
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The court held that the district court's entry of judgment was not inconsistent with substantial justice, as the collective polling procedure adequately ensured verdict unanimity under the circumstances, and the jury's finding on proximate cause supported the judgment.
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782 F.2d 1353·
5th Cir.·
1986-02-21
·cited 4×
The admission of evidence from an uncounseled pre-trial lineup identification, and the subsequent in-court identification without a hearing to determine independent origin, constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment and requires reversal.
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778 F.2d 59·
1st Cir.·
1985-11-27
·cited 4×
The court held that admitting evidence of prior bad acts, which was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, constituted reversible error because it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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478 So. 2d 1092·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-09-27
·cited 4×
Timothy Kirkland appeals his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress an incriminating statement and refusal to instruct the jury on unnecessary killing. The appellate court affirms the conviction, finding no constitutional vi
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476 So. 2d 245·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-09-24
·cited 4×
Brannin appeals his convictions for two counts of first degree murder, armed burglary, kidnapping, and sexual battery, challenging the trial court's denial of his mistrial motion after a witness commented on his right to remain silent and the trial court's method of retaining jur
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477 So. 2d 609·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-09-12
·cited 4×
Dennis Brown was convicted of two counts of DUI/manslaughter following a jury trial and sentenced to three years imprisonment. On appeal, Brown challenged the admission of expert testimony and the trial court's refusal to reopen evidence for rebuttal testimony, but the court affi
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772 F.2d 401·
8th Cir.·
1985-08-23
·cited 4×
The court held that while the district court's denial of intervention may have been an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless because the appellants were allowed to participate as amici curiae and had ample opportunity to present their arguments.
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468 So. 2d 444·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-05-07
·cited 4×
The court held that while the trial court erred in admitting the appellant's deposition statements, the error was harmless because other sufficient evidence of guilt existed.
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The admission of co-conspirator statements under Ohio Rule of Evidence 801(D)(2)(e) does not violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, and any such violation would be harmless error given overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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Marshall Long appealed his probation sentence for burglary on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, challenging improper comments by the prosecutor regarding his failure to confess and testify. The court affirmed the conviction but certified a constitutional question to the Florid
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468 So. 2d 335·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-04-15
·cited 4×
The court held that even if the trial judge erred by refusing the jury's request for written instructions without notifying counsel, the error was harmless and did not require reversal.
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469 So. 2d 151·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-03-26
·cited 4×
A trial court's comment, fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as referring to a defendant's failure to testify, constitutes reversible error requiring a new trial.
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The court held that the imposition of court costs and costs for the Crimes Compensation Fund was improper without determining the defendant's ability to pay after notice, and that while the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony about a witness's prior convictions, this did not
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The court held that the trial court's failure to articulate reasons for compelling the defendant to wear manacles during trial violated his due process rights, and this error was not harmless.
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The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendants' motion to read depositions of unavailable witnesses.
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The court held that while the trial court erred in refusing a curative instruction regarding the defendant's request for counsel, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that questioning the defendant about her ability to pay for counsel was permiss
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455 So. 2d 473·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1984-08-09
·cited 4×
Improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument that attacked the credibility of the defense and defense counsel constitute harmless error when the trial record contains substantial independent evidence of guilt, including direct testimony from undercover agents and a tap
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The court held that the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes did not violate due process, and any instructional error regarding malice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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739 F.2d 172·
4th Cir.·
1984-07-18
·cited 4×
Any error in the jury instruction regarding intoxication's effect on specific intent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the totality of the instructions and the record.
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734 F.2d 378·
8th Cir.·
1984-05-15
·cited 4×
The court held that even if witness intimidation occurred, its impact was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, thus affirming the denial of the habeas corpus petition.
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Terry Lee Coley appeals his conviction for robbery with a firearm, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on the truthfulness of his testimony during closing argument. The appellate court affirms, holding that where a defendant testifies contrary
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The court held that cross-examining a defense witness about her invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege is trial error, but found the error to be harmless in this case.
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443 So. 2d 192·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-12-13
·cited 4×
Andrew Roberts' burglary conviction was reversed because the prosecutor's opening statement comment that there was evidence the defendant "will not be able to explain" was impermissibly susceptible to interpretation as a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent, violatin
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720 F.2d 1255·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-05
·cited 4×
The court held that the notice provided to the defendant sufficiently complied with the particularity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) and that the placement of the notice in a sealed envelope did not violate the statute's proscription on notice.
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The court concurred that while the oral reply hearing might have been perfunctory, the employee's own conduct foreclosed any firm conclusion to that effect, thus justifying the agency's action.
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448 So. 2d 509·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-11-15
·cited 4×
The appellate court reversed a defendant's convictions for manslaughter, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The court found that the prosecutor's indirect comment on the defendant's failure to testify during closing arguments constituted reversible error.
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The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Weir v. Fletcher narrowly limited Doyle v. Ohio, vacating prior Sixth Circuit precedent that had granted habeas corpus relief based on an expansive reading of Doyle.
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The court held that the district court erred in placing the burden of proof on the petitioner to show harm from counsel's incompetence, rather than on the state to show the error was harmless.
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701 F.2d 17·
2d Cir.·
1983-02-16
·cited 4×
A criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to make an opening statement, and the granting and timing of such statements are within the trial court's discretion.
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427 So. 2d 775·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1983-02-11
·cited 4×
Verdie Williams was charged with first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Williams challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on third-degree murder, arguing the omission was error under prior case law requiring instruction on all degre
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The court held that the landowner's expert's valuation testimony, based on a speculative lot method without sufficient evidence of demand, was inadmissible and prejudiced the jury verdict.
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689 F.2d 7·
1st Cir.·
1982-09-24
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding no constitutional error in the state court's denial of a new trial.
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683 F.2d 712·
2d Cir.·
1982-06-30
·cited 4×
A petitioner's failure to object at trial does not preclude federal habeas review if the state appellate court considered the merits, but the failure to object remains a factor in the federal court's analysis.
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653 F.2d 828·
3d Cir.·
1981-07-09
·cited 4×
The court held that the petitioner's constitutional rights to a speedy trial and confrontation were not violated, affirming the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
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The court held that the Standby Advisory Board (STAB) was improperly constituted due to overlapping membership, rendering its decisions void and entitling the plaintiff to back pay and record correction.
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661 F.2d 618·
7th Cir.·
1981-04-14
·cited 4×
The dissenting judge believes the defendant was prejudiced by the introduction of constitutionally invalid and outdated prior convictions, arguing that the trial counsel's decision to introduce them was incompetent and not harmless error.
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The admission of a codefendant's extrajudicial statement that inculpated the appellant, even with a limiting instruction, violated the appellant's confrontation rights and was not harmless error given the weakness of the prosecution's case.
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The court held that the district court's failure to provide a perjury admonition and adequately inquire about promises outside the plea bargain constituted harmless error, and thus the guilty plea was valid.
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The court held that the district court's failure to fully inform the defendant of the perjury risk under Rule 11(c)(5) was harmless error because the defendant suffered no prejudice and was not being prosecuted for perjury.
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The court held that a prosecutor's racially prejudicial remarks in closing argument, which appealed to stereotypes and created a probability of jury impairment, violated the petitioner's due process rights.
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The court held that admitting depositions without satisfying Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3) was error, but the error was harmless and did not warrant reversal.
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The dismissal of parties claiming an interest in condemned land without determining their interest was error, but did not prejudice their substantial rights, thus the judgment is affirmed.
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603 F.2d 1118·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-03
·cited 4×
The court held that while it was error not to instruct the jury on the Canal Zone Code's corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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599 F.2d 684·
5th Cir.·
1979-07-27
·cited 4×
The court held that a taxpayer cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in lieu of supplying required tax information and that any prejudicial comments made during trial were harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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590 F.2d 1324·
5th Cir.·
1979-03-07
·cited 4×
The court held that even if evidence was admitted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming independent evidence of guilt.