565 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 717 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the claim of right defense is eliminated for robbery by statute and that no theft instruction was warranted due to lack of supporting evidence.
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810 F.2d 1078·
11th Cir.·
1987-02-23
·cited 18×
The Due Process Clause does not require a state court to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses in a noncapital murder case.
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The court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the second-degree murder conviction, the prosecutor's comments were not an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment, the trial court's handling of jury transcript requests did not deny due process,
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763 F.2d 821·
6th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 18×
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, holding that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim was barred by Stone v. Powell and that his other claims were procedurally defaulted without a showing of cause and prejudice.
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The court held that the majority erred in treating the voluntariness of a confession as a question of fact, thereby deferring to state court findings, when Supreme Court precedent establishes it as a mixed question of law and fact requiring independent federal review.
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689 F.2d 533·
5th Cir.·
1982-10-18
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant's constitutional rights were not violated during her state trial, and thus federal habeas corpus relief was properly denied.
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646 F.2d 1268·
8th Cir.·
1981-04-20
·cited 18×
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642 F.2d 276·
9th Cir.·
1981-03-16
·cited 18×
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to grant civil relief for alleged violations of tribal laws, as the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) only permits habeas corpus relief, and claims arising under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) do not inherently present a federal question unless
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The court held that a defendant sentenced under a mandatory statute, when entitled to discretionary sentencing under state law, is denied due process.
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591 F.2d 53·
9th Cir.·
1979-01-31
·cited 18×
The court held that the Parole Commission did not abuse its discretion by considering the severity of the offense and by setting the parole hearing at the one-third point of the sentence, as its regulations allowed for such actions.
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553 F.2d 1219·
10th Cir.·
1977-03-03
·cited 18×
The court held that the reasons provided for denying parole release satisfied the Administrative Procedure Act and due process requirements, and that the application of parole guidelines was permissible under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
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544 F.2d 894·
5th Cir.·
1977-01-03
·cited 18×
The admission of evidence of prior convictions solely to show general criminal disposition, if not objected to contemporaneously, does not warrant habeas corpus relief due to procedural default.
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508 F.2d 322·
3d Cir.·
1975-01-28
·cited 18×
The court held that a juvenile's confession, obtained after Miranda warnings and considering the totality of the circumstances, was voluntary and admissible, and that the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing.
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The court held that the district court properly disregarded the state court's findings regarding Miranda warnings and that the subsequent confessions were inadmissible due to incomplete warnings.
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435 F.2d 125·
5th Cir.·
1970-11-17
·cited 18×
The court held that a federal court cannot decline jurisdiction over a civil rights complaint based on the exhaustion doctrine, and the allegations of extreme maltreatment warrant adjudication on the merits.
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The court held that a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 is a collateral attack, and objections to the indictment's sufficiency, if not raised at trial or on direct appeal, are waived unless the indictment is fundamentally defective.
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The court held that the trial court's order granting a rehearing was void because it was not made within the time prescribed by Rule 59(d) for sua sponte action, and thus the original order discharging the petitioner was reinstated.
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J.D. Moon was arrested for violating Orlando's zoning ordinance by operating a tourist camp in a residential zone. The Florida Supreme Court held that the zoning ordinance was invalid and unenforceable because the required district map was never attached to the ordinance, making
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954 So. 2d 93·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2007-04-20
·cited 17×
J.D., a juvenile, appealed his indirect contempt conviction and the imposition of consecutive fifteen-day secure detention sentences for multiple violations of a behavior order. The Fifth District reversed, holding that section 985.216, Florida Statutes prohibits stacking consecu
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12 F.3d 1012·
11th Cir.·
1994-01-11
·cited 17×
James Agan was convicted of murdering fellow inmate Dana DeWitt and sentenced to death after pleading guilty. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas corpus relief, holding that Agan's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Wa
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888 F.2d 112·
11th Cir.·
1989-11-14
·cited 17×
The court held that the petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to impeach the key eyewitness with her prior inconsistent testimony, and this failure likely affected the outcome of the trial.
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The court held that the trial court's inquiry into the defendant's decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se was inadequate, violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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788 F.2d 85·
2d Cir.·
1986-04-15
·cited 17×
The court held that the Parole Commission's procedures were not untimely and that any potential delay did not warrant habeas relief absent prejudice or bad faith. The court also denied the request for assigned counsel.
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The court held that a district court's failure to conduct a colloquy with a defendant before accepting a written jury trial waiver does not automatically constitute reversible error.
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719 F.2d 1443·
9th Cir.·
1983-11-08
·cited 17×
Failure to disclose information already known to the defense at trial does not constitute reversible error, and a remand for further discovery is unnecessary.
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Federal courts cannot grant habeas corpus relief for state court convictions based on alleged violations of federal statutory law if the state courts provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims, unless the violation constitutes a fundamental defect resulting in
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David Cabberiza was indicted for first-degree murder and entitled to a twelve-person jury under Florida law, but his attorney agreed to a six-person jury without an on-the-record waiver. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, holding th
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The court concurs in the judgment, finding the standard for harmless constitutional error in collateral review is settled law in the circuit.
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A state's violation of its own procedural speedy trial deadline does not automatically constitute a federal constitutional speedy trial violation, and counsel's agreement to a continuance, absent prejudice to the defense, does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
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935 F.2d 145·
8th Cir.·
1991-06-04
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus, finding that the defendant's life sentence was a fundamentally unjust incarceration due to constitutional violations, allowing an exception to the cause-prejudice rule.
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870 F.2d 285·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-17
·cited 16×
A federal prisoner's failure to demonstrate prima facie constitutional error in his guilty plea proceedings, even with a lost transcript, warrants denial of habeas corpus relief.
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The court held that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case for a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation because young adults and college students are not distinctive groups, and the underrepresentation of women was not shown to be the result of systematic excl
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833 F.2d 1165·
5th Cir.·
1987-12-15
·cited 16×
The court held that the petitioner's habeas petition was properly dismissed under Rule 9(b) for abuse of the writ, as he failed to provide a sufficient excuse for not raising the claims in a prior petition.
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The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions for felony-murder and an underlying felony if the underlying felony is not the sole basis for the felony-murder prosecution, nor is it implicated by considering a crime as an aggravating circumstance during sentencin
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The court holds that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's finding of fact regarding the prosecutor's questioning is entitled to deference, and the jury instruction given is sufficiently different from that in Francis v. Franklin to warrant affirmance.
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The court held that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and its determination of dangerous special offender status was not an abuse of discretion.
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757 F.2d 1463·
4th Cir.·
1985-03-20
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding that the petitioner's claims were without merit and that the state court's factfinding procedures were adequate.
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The court held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent, and that a claim for denial of compulsory process was procedurally defaulted and not preserved.
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738 F.2d 168·
7th Cir.·
1984-05-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the habeas corpus petition because the petitioner failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation regarding the admission of flight evidence or the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges, and procedural defaults barr
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The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, finding the jury instruction constitutional and the defendant not prejudiced by any alleged defect.
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720 F.2d 1423·
5th Cir.·
1983-12-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and the denial of his habeas corpus petition is affirmed.
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718 F.2d 979·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-13
·cited 16×
The court held that a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney actively represents conflicting interests and fails to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, and prejudice is presumed in conflict of interest cases.
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The court held that the petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted under state law and thus unreviewable in federal habeas corpus proceedings without a showing of cause and prejudice.
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690 F.2d 1078·
4th Cir.·
1982-09-30
·cited 16×
The court held that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process due to insufficient statistical evidence and improper methodology.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing, as the fragmented record required further fact-finding on the speedy trial claim. The 11.5-month delay for a simple robbery was presumptively prejudicial.
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The court held that the petitioner demonstrated both cause for his procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the jury selection method, satisfying the standard for collateral review.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the respondent's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on the conflict of interest and waiver issues.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus. The majority held that the petitioner's failure to comply with the Texas contemporaneous objection rule barred federal habeas review of his claim that the prosecut
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547 F.2d 1226·
5th Cir.·
1977-03-02
·cited 16×
The court held that the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and cruel and unusual punishment were without merit.
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The Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner was provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, precluding federal habeas relief under Stone v. Powell.