565 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 717 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
935 F.2d 775·
6th Cir.·
1991-06-07
The court held that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a conviction for criminal recklessness under the applicable statute.
-
The court held that even if the Jefferson County juvenile statute was unconstitutional, the appellant suffered no prejudice and his prior convictions were validly used for sentence enhancement.
-
The court held that the amended penalty statute for the firearm offense was effective upon enactment, and therefore the Parole Commission correctly computed the petitioner's parole eligibility date.
-
The court held that the trial judge's excessive admonitions to a prosecution witness did not violate the petitioner's due process rights because the witness testified and the testimony was not rendered less material or favorable due to the judge's actions.
-
The court held that the district court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief, affirming the lower court's decision.
-
The government has a right to appeal a sentence reduction granted under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the conviction for intimidation under Illinois law qualifies as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
-
The court held that modifying a sentence to be consecutive rather than concurrent, when the overall punishment was not increased, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Furthermore, collateral estoppel does not apply to sentencing modifications.
-
The court held that assigning international extradition proceedings to a magistrate does not violate Article III or the Fifth Amendment.
-
The court held that the petitioner's claim that a child witness must testify in the physical presence of the trier of fact constitutes a 'new rule' that is not retroactively applicable on federal habeas review.
-
915 F.2d 892·
4th Cir.·
1990-10-01
The dissenting judge believes a new trial was warranted due to insufficient inquiry into potential racial prejudice among jurors.
-
The court held that the district court announced a new constitutional rule and applied it retroactively, violating the Teague v. Lane precedent.
-
The court held that the jury instructions on premeditation and intoxication, as well as the evidentiary rulings, did not violate due process and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
The court held that California, not being a party to the treaty, is not bound by its provisions regarding consent to prisoner transfer and has the power to deny consent.
-
905 F.2d 314·
10th Cir.·
1990-05-25
The modification of the appellant's sentence by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not violate the Due Process Clause, as the state appellate court had the authority under state law to exercise its discretion and modify the jury's sentence.
-
554 So. 2d 1233·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1990-01-11
-
The court held that a defendant's plea of 'true' to prior felony convictions for sentence enhancement purposes waives any prior complaints about those convictions, and that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must meet the Strickland standard.
-
The court held that the appellant's claims regarding disproportionate sentencing and lack of judicial awareness of sentencing alternatives were without merit.
-
The court held that while the Parole Commission's discretion is broad, it is bound by its own regulations, allowing review for violations of those regulations.
-
The court held that a prisoner's civil rights claims challenging parole supervision fees as an ex post facto violation should not be dismissed prematurely and may require a stay or dismissal without prejudice pending habeas corpus exhaustion.
-
The court held that a state prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to good-time credits awarded under statutes later declared unconstitutional as applied to previously sentenced individuals, even if those credits accelerated discharge dates.
-
846 F.2d 1161·
8th Cir.·
1988-05-23
A habeas petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice resulting from that deficiency to warrant relief.
-
844 F.2d 456·
7th Cir.·
1988-04-13
The court held that the petitioner's claim that inaccurate charts in his presentence report prejudiced his parole chances did not warrant vacating his sentence, as the original sentencing was not fundamentally unfair and the primary concern was parole eligibility, not sentence le
-
838 F.2d 1145·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-29
A defendant proceeding pro se does not have an automatic right to a continuance, and the denial of such a continuance does not violate constitutional rights.
-
835 F.2d 1101·
5th Cir.·
1988-01-07
The sentencing judge had the authority to impose a split sentence for armed robbery, consisting of a period of incarceration followed by probation.
-
The court held that statements made during a prayer session with a police officer, following a lawful recording of conversations, were voluntary and not a violation of due process, thus denying habeas corpus relief.
-
828 F.2d 487·
8th Cir.·
1987-09-10
The court held that while the Parole Commission acted without authority in withdrawing an executed parole violator warrant, the appellant was not prejudiced by this action and thus not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
-
827 F.2d 313·
8th Cir.·
1987-08-24
The court held that time spent at liberty pending appeal of a sentence reduction order is not considered time 'in custody' and therefore is not credited against the sentence.
-
The court held that a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief was not denied due process when a plea bargain was not strictly adhered to, because the prisoner was aware of the deviation and remained silent.
-
817 F.2d 37·
7th Cir.·
1987-04-20
The court held that the jury instruction created a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, and was therefore not constitutionally offensive.
-
A fugitive from justice is disentitled from pursuing post-conviction relief, and the court vacates its prior order granting such relief, reinstating the guilty plea and sentence.
-
The court held that the lack of notice to the juvenile offender's parents regarding his arrest and arraignment violates due process and renders his guilty plea involuntary, requiring the conviction to be vacated.
-
The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation regarding the grand jury's fair cross-section or due process claims, affirming the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
-
800 F.2d 1024·
11th Cir.·
1986-09-09
The court held that despite the Supreme Court's clarification on harmless error, the specific jury instruction in this capital case could not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
797 F.2d 344·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-05
The court held that a juror's voir dire statements did not demonstrate bias and a prosecutor's rebuttal argument did not improperly comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
-
The court held that the identification procedures used were not impermissibly suggestive and did not violate due process, and other claims of error did not rise to constitutional harm.
-
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district director's denial of employment authorization because it involved factual issues requiring initial district court review, but affirmed the deportation order which was factually supported.
-
-
786 F.2d 362·
8th Cir.·
1986-03-13
The court held that the defendant violated the terms of his plea agreement by failing to appear for sentencing, and therefore the court was justified in imposing a harsher sentence and the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea.
-
The court held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of Rape in the Third Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, thus reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus.
-
783 F.2d 397-401·
4th Cir.·
1986-01-31
The court held that the jury instruction regarding malice did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. However, the judge writing separately believes the death sentence procedure violated constitutional rights.
-
798 F.2d 119·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-16
The court denied the application for a certificate of probable cause, finding no substantial showing that the appellant was denied a federal right. Issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.
-
781 F.2d 83·
6th Cir.·
1986-01-15
The court held that the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, Fourth Amendment claims were properly litigated, emergency wiretaps were justified under statute, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed to meet the required prejudice standard.
-
772 F.2d 666·
11th Cir.·
1985-08-27
-
The court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to the presence of counsel at a post-lineup interview between witnesses and police. Therefore, denial of counsel at such an interview does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
-
739 F.2d 403·
8th Cir.·
1984-07-30
The court held that the Parole Commission did not abuse its discretion in setting a parole date above the applicable guidelines, as it established good cause for its decision.
-
733 F.2d 1557·
11th Cir.·
1984-06-11
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer and that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim was meritless.
-
734 F.2d 390·
8th Cir.·
1984-05-17
The court held that convictions for rape and kidnapping do not violate the double jeopardy clause, and the district court did not err in refusing to appoint counsel for a habeas corpus petition.
-
The court held that a voluntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a) completely terminates the prior litigation, and a dismissed action cannot be reactivated.
-
707 F.2d 155·
5th Cir.·
1983-06-13
The federal district court's handling or mishandling of a habeas corpus petition cannot serve as a basis for setting aside an otherwise valid state court conviction.
-
693 F.2d 591·
5th Cir.·
1982-12-17
The court held that the district court erred by granting habeas relief without considering the presumption of correctness afforded state court factual determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).