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750 F.2d 970·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-12-06
·cited 117×
The court held that the statement regarding the plaintiff's professional status was not absolutely privileged opinion and could be the basis for a defamation claim.
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627 F.2d 1287·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-03-31
·cited 62×
An individual who actively advocates for and shapes controversial policies of a prominent organization, thereby thrusting themselves into public controversies, can be considered a limited-purpose public figure for defamation purposes.
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539 F.2d 882·
2d Cir.·
1976-06-30
·cited 62×
The court held that statements in a book labeling a public figure as a 'fellow traveler' of fascism, or as a 'deceiver' in purveying such material, constitute protected opinion rather than factual assertions of libel, especially given the imprecise nature of political labels.
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710 F.2d 549·
9th Cir.·
1983-07-12
·cited 55×
The court held that negative inferences in a magazine article, based on true and disclosed facts, are constitutionally protected as opinion and cannot form the basis for a defamation claim. It also held that the federal rules regarding jury trial demands apply to removed cases, a
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431 So. 2d 627·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1983-04-20
·cited 55×
Jack Boyles, a private individual employed at a facility for mentally retarded patients, appealed the dismissal of his multi-count defamation action against a television station and reporter for broadcasts falsely characterizing him as a repeated child abuser and rape suspect. Th
-
578 F.2d 1197·
7th Cir.·
1978-05-22
·cited 55×
The court held that the Village of Skokie's ordinances prohibiting the dissemination of materials inciting hatred and prohibiting demonstrations by political parties in uniform were unconstitutional as applied to the National Socialist Party of America's planned demonstration.
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623 F.2d 264·
3d Cir.·
1980-04-24
·cited 49×
The court held that the plaintiff, Steaks Unlimited, Inc., is a public figure for the purposes of this defamation litigation and failed to present evidence that the defendants entertained subjective serious doubts about the truth of their broadcast, thus affirming the grant of su
-
586 F.2d 1108·
6th Cir.·
1978-10-19
·cited 45×
The court held that the newspaper's article was substantially true and protected by the actual malice standard under both Michigan common law and the First Amendment, thus vacating the judgment against the newspaper.
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680 F.2d 527·
7th Cir.·
1982-06-16
·cited 38×
The court held that the "law of the case" doctrine did not preclude relitigation of actual malice and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice.
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633 F.2d 583·
1st Cir.·
1980-10-17
·cited 38×
A corporation is not automatically a public figure for defamation purposes simply because it sells products; public figure status requires voluntary thrusting into a specific public controversy that predates the defamation.
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580 F.2d 859·
5th Cir.·
1978-09-25
·cited 37×
The court held that the plaintiff was a public figure and that there was no evidence of actual malice, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
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467 So. 2d 282·
Fla.·
1985-03-07
·cited 33×
The Florida Supreme Court held that while Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. changed defamation liability standards, a private person may still bring a libel per se action against a media defendant if the complaint adequately alleges the required elements of negligence and actual malice
-
626 F.2d 1238·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-02
·cited 30×
The court held that both plaintiffs were public figures and that the evidence did not support a finding of actual malice, thus precluding recovery under the First Amendment standards.
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619 F.2d 932·
2d Cir.·
1980-03-19
·cited 28×
The court held that the plaintiff, a public figure, failed to present sufficient evidence of actual malice to overcome summary judgment in his libel action.
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443 So. 2d 1042·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1983-12-30
·cited 23×
The Smiths appealed the dismissal of their libel suit against a competing newspaper and its editor. The court affirmed dismissal of claims regarding a letter to the editor and a news story, but reversed as to an editorial column that made factual assertions about violent incident
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788 F.2d 1300·
8th Cir.·
1986-04-10
·cited 22×
The court's decision, by broadly defining opinion, tips the balance further in favor of the media, potentially dismissing libel cases before actual malice can be proven.
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777 F.2d 1403·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-22
·cited 20×
The court held that the school board and its members in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the actual malice standard applies to defamation claims brought by public officials against non-media defendants.
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562 F.2d 626·
10th Cir.·
1977-09-22
·cited 20×
The court held that a publisher's republication of defamatory statements taken out of context can constitute libel, and a settlement with a joint tortfeasor requires a reduction in the award against the remaining tortfeasor.
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578 F.2d 427·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-05-23
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff was a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his involvement in espionage, and that there was no genuine issue of actual malice, thus affirming summary judgment for the defendants.
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754 F.2d 1072·
3d Cir.·
1985-02-06
·cited 17×
The court held that the plaintiff was not a limited purpose public figure and that the defendant failed to prove actual malice, thus reversing the lower court's decision.
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637 F.2d 375·
5th Cir.·
1981-02-19
·cited 17×
The court held that while the plaintiff was a public figure, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory article, precluding summary judgment on that issue.
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539 F.2d 1026·
4th Cir.·
1976-08-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the jury instructions on punitive damages were erroneous because they allowed recovery without proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
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182 So. 3d 881·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2016-01-06
·cited 13×
In this defamation case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed judgment for attorney Ann-Marie Giustibelli against internet reviewers Copia Blake and Peter Birzon, holding that their posted reviews contained actionable false statements of fact rather than protected opinion
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738 F.2d 660·
5th Cir.·
1984-08-13
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in affirming the jury's finding of negligent reporting and defamatory falsehoods, asserting the article was substantially truthful and protected by the First Amendment.
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713 F.2d 838·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-08-05
·cited 12×
The court concurred in the judgment, remanding for further consideration of the article's context and privilege.
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925 F.2d 703·
4th Cir.·
1991-02-05
·cited 10×
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518 F.2d 638·
2d Cir.·
1975-06-16
·cited 10×
The court held that a plaintiff with a criminal history so extensive that recovery of more than nominal damages is unlikely can be considered libel-proof, warranting dismissal of a libel suit due to First Amendment considerations.
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847 F.2d 1069·
3d Cir.·
1988-05-16
·cited 8×
The court held that plaintiffs were public figures and not libel-proof as a matter of law, reversing the grant of summary judgment on those grounds.
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829 F.2d 403·
3d Cir.·
1987-09-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of actual malice to overcome the defendant's First Amendment privilege, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
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745 F.2d 1006·
6th Cir.·
1984-09-17
·cited 8×
The court held that statements concerning a private individual's personal finances are not shielded by Michigan's qualified privilege for reporting on matters of public interest, even if related to a privileged subject.
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900 F.2d 1085·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-24
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with actual malice, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
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769 F.2d 1100·
5th Cir.·
1985-09-03
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice for a conditionally privileged statement and that the relevant market for Sherman Act Section 2 purposes was broader than the single hospital.
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639 F.2d 1076·
4th Cir.·
1981-01-27
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants on the libel claim because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the defamatory meaning and truth of the statements, and also erred in granting summary judgment on the other c
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965 F.2d 38·
5th Cir.·
1992-07-13
·cited 5×
The court held that exemplary damages are not recoverable when only nominal actual damages are awarded, but affirmed compensatory damages for Micro-Bac and reversed exemplary damages for Brown. The court also affirmed the finding of actual malice and defamation.
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828 F.2d 921·
2d Cir.·
1987-09-04
·cited 5×
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862 F.2d 1495·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-11
·cited 4×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding the Town liable under Section 1983 as the Town Manager's actions did not constitute official policy, and that the Town Manager was not liable under Section 1983 or for defamation as his actions were not taken under color of sta
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642 F.2d 371·
6th Cir.·
1981-04-16
·cited 4×
The court held that a private plaintiff in a defamation case must prove the falsity of the defamatory statement as part of proving fault, and that evidence of prior lawsuits was admissible to impeach a witness's testimony.
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639 F.2d 634·
10th Cir.·
1981-01-13
·cited 4×
A plaintiff's involvement in a political campaign, even in a background role, does not automatically transform them into a public figure for defamation purposes.
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656 F.2d 323·
8th Cir.·
1981-08-11
·cited 3×
The court holds that the Missouri service letter statute, as interpreted by the majority, requires proof of actual malice to recover punitive damages, which is the minimum standard to withstand a First Amendment challenge.
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983 F.2d 459·
3d Cir.·
1992-12-17
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge argues that punitive damages awards against municipalities, where indemnification is required, must be supported by evidence of the individual defendants' net economic worth. The judge contends that without such evidence, the punitive and deterrence purposes
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960 F.2d 896·
9th Cir.·
1992-04-06
·cited 2×
The court held that the incremental harm doctrine is not part of California libel law, and that a jury could find The New Yorker acted with actual malice, but Knopf did not.
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842 F.2d 612·
2d Cir.·
1988-03-16
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiffs were limited purpose public figures and failed to present sufficient evidence of actual malice, thus affirming the dismissal of their defamation claims.
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557 F.2d 824·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-10-06
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff, a private individual, was not required to prove actual malice to recover for defamation, and the New York Times standard does not apply.
-
538 F.2d 699·
5th Cir.·
1976-09-13
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on liability in the second trial without first determining whether the plaintiffs were public or private figures, which impacts the applicable First Amendment standard for defamation.
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538 F.2d 588·
4th Cir.·
1976-06-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the newspaper article, on its face, constituted defamation per se under Maryland law, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for actual injury, including impairment of reputation and mental anguish.
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798 So. 2d 797·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2001-10-24
·cited 1×
A plaintiff suing a media defendant for defamation must plead and prove actual injury, even if the statement is considered defamatory per se.
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814 F.2d 1017·
5th Cir.·
1987-04-20
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to cross-appeal the dismissal of their other claims, and therefore, the court could not reach the merits of the First Amendment issues raised by the 'incitement' theory.
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800 F.2d 787·
8th Cir.·
1986-09-11
The court held that the public figure/private figure distinction applies to defamatory petitioning activity, consistent with other First Amendment speech.
-
775 F.2d 593·
4th Cir.·
1985-10-30
The court held that the "actual malice" standard from New York Times v. Sullivan does not apply to speech concerning purely private matters, and the evidence was sufficient for a jury to award compensatory and punitive damages under common law principles.
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397 So. 2d 926·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1981-03-11
The court held that the appellant, despite his position with a publicly funded foundation, was a private individual for defamation purposes and did not have to prove actual malice.