-
566 F.2d 242·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-08-30
·cited 188×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, finding no significant fault with its disposition of the case regarding FOIA exemptions.
-
591 F.2d 753·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-10-31
·cited 135×
The court held that the settled standards guiding the United States Attorney's discretion should be available to the public.
-
424 F.2d 935·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-03-26
·cited 134×
The court held that the district court erred by failing to conduct specific inquiries into documents claimed to be exempt under the Freedom of Information Act and by not ruling on each item requested.
-
617 F.2d 854·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-02-15
·cited 110×
The court held that the Department of Energy (DOE) failed to adequately justify withholding internal legal memoranda under FOIA exemptions 5 and 7, as the documents were not protected by attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product, or the deliberative process privilege due t
-
617 F.2d 781·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-01-07
·cited 88×
The court held that the questionnaire responses were agency records subject to FOIA, but could be protected by Exemption 5, and that the government could not raise Exemption 6 on remand.
-
589 F.2d 827·
5th Cir.·
1979-02-14
·cited 76×
The court held that amended section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, in conjunction with FOIA Exemption 3, allows the IRS to withhold return information if disclosure would seriously impair federal tax administration, and that the district court's application of exemptions was
-
484 F.2d 1086·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-09-05
·cited 75×
The court held that the record was insufficient to determine if portions of the Defense Contract Audit Manual constituted 'secret law' exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.
-
792 F.2d 153·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-05-27
·cited 70×
The court held that the IRS's interpretation of the Haskell amendment, which allows for the release of certain anonymized data, is entitled to deference under Chevron.
-
584 F.2d 170·
7th Cir.·
1978-09-08
·cited 45×
The court held that the plaintiff's notice of appeal, despite referencing only one case number, was sufficient to appeal the district court's decision regarding all four agencies because his intent was clear and the adverse party was not prejudiced. The court also affirmed the di
-
556 F.2d 214·
3d Cir.·
1977-05-09
·cited 44×
The court held that union authorization cards submitted to the NLRB are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act's Exemption 6 (invasion of personal privacy) and that the case must be remanded for clarification regarding other requested documents.
-
702 F.2d 1125·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-03-15
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the district court's ruling on the first issue, vacated the ruling on the second as moot due to a new Executive Order, declined to reach the third issue, and reversed the ruling on the fourth issue.
-
591 F.2d 821·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-11-02
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court erred in denying disclosure of segregable factual portions of attorney work product documents under FOIA.
-
511 F.2d 815·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-04-16
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera inspection of certain documents claimed to be exempt under FOIA Exemption 5, and that the agency's descriptions of these documents were conclusory.
-
577 F.2d 1172·
5th Cir.·
1978-08-08
·cited 29×
The court held that union authorization cards are not exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act because they are not personnel, medical, or similar files, and their disclosure would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
-
665 F.2d 1251·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-09-10
·cited 28×
The court held that most documents were properly withheld under FOIA exemption 7(C) due to privacy concerns, but a specific passage regarding potential judicial bias must be disclosed.
-
839 F.2d 768·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-02-05
·cited 27×
-
663 F.2d 120·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-10-03
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Exxon's motion for discovery under Rule 56(f) and correctly granted summary judgment for the FTC.
-
815 F.2d 1565·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-04-14
·cited 25×
A draft historical manuscript prepared by the Air Force is exempt from disclosure under FOIA's Exemption 5 because its release would reveal the agency's deliberative process, even if the draft has undergone extensive revisions.
-
538 F.2d 80·
3d Cir.·
1976-07-08
·cited 24×
The court held that witness statements in a pending NLRB enforcement proceeding are privileged under FOIA exemption 7(A) and not subject to disclosure.
-
646 F.2d 666·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-03-12
·cited 22×
The court held that certain IRS internal memoranda (GCMs, TMs, AODs) are not protected by the deliberative process privilege under FOIA Exemption 5 because their nature and use indicate they are not pre-decisional or deliberative.
-
611 F.2d 1132·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-15
·cited 22×
The court held that an appraisal report prepared for purchase negotiations, not litigation, is not exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5 once negotiations have ended.
-
837 F.2d 486·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-01-19
·cited 20×
-
557 F.2d 559·
6th Cir.·
1977-06-22
·cited 20×
Employee affidavits obtained during investigation of pending unfair labor practice proceedings are exempt from disclosure under FOIA's exemption 7(A).
-
917 F.2d 571·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-07-24
·cited 19×
The court held that the presumption that FBI interviewees are confidential sources is a rule of evidence, not a shift in the burden of proof, and is consistent with FOIA.
-
721 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1983-11-02
·cited 19×
The court held that the government must show a significant harm to a relevant interest to invoke the confidentiality exemption, not just a promise of confidentiality.
-
806 F.2d 1411·
9th Cir.·
1986-12-30
·cited 18×
Presentence investigation reports are not categorically exempt from disclosure under FOIA's Exemption 3 or Exemption 5, and procedural rules governing their disclosure do not supersede FOIA.
-
730 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1984-03-21
·cited 18×
Presentence reports are not 'agency records' subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA because they originate with and are primarily controlled by the courts, not the Parole Commission.
-
558 F.2d 274·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-29
·cited 18×
The court held that the safety investigation report (AAR) is protected by FOIA Exemption 5 due to its need for confidentiality to ensure effective accident prevention, while the JAG Manual Investigation report (JAGIR) is generally disclosable, subject to in camera review for deli
-
699 F.2d 1219·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-02-01
·cited 17×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing ITT's ultra vires claim for lack of standing and ripeness, and that subject matter jurisdiction was proper. It also modified the FOIA disclosure order, reversing it in part and affirming it in part.
-
763 F.2d 435·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-04-26
·cited 14×
The judgment of the district court is affirmed because it did not misapprehend the law or overlook a crucial policy concern in balancing privacy and disclosure interests.
-
804 F.2d 701·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-09-12
·cited 12×
Presentence reports prepared for federal offenders are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 5, as they are considered intra-agency memoranda not routinely available in civil litigation.
-
636 F.2d 838·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-12-23
·cited 12×
The court held that records transferred between Congress and the CIA lose their exemption from FOIA if Congress fails to clearly retain control, and affirmed the protection of intelligence sources under FOIA exemption 3.
-
614 F.2d 825·
2d Cir.·
1980-01-15
·cited 11×
The Office of the Pardon Attorney is an 'agency' under FOIA, but its files may be exempt under Exemption 5, requiring further factual determination for most documents.
-
770 F.2d 355·
3d Cir.·
1985-08-15
·cited 10×
The court held that documents withheld under FOIA Exemption 5 were properly protected as predecisional and deliberative, and that records not retrievable by name under the Privacy Act were correctly denied access.
-
633 F.2d 1327·
9th Cir.·
1980-12-15
·cited 10×
The court held that 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6) does not qualify as an exempting statute under the amended FOIA Exemption 3 because it fails to establish particular criteria for withholding and leaves too much discretion to the agency.
-
575 F.2d 932·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-04-03
·cited 10×
The court held that the withheld Air Force documents, consisting of cost comparisons, feasibility opinions, and related data, were properly exempt under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act as deliberative and policy-related, rather than raw factual material.
-
565 F.2d 778·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-11-10
·cited 10×
The court held that FOMC's Domestic Policy Directives and tolerance ranges are effective policy decisions, not predecisional deliberative materials, and thus do not fall under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act.
-
565 F.2d 967·
7th Cir.·
1977-11-09
·cited 10×
An intra-agency memorandum, initially exempt under FOIA Exemption 5, loses its exempt status if expressly adopted or incorporated by reference into a final agency disposition, unless another exemption applies.
-
685 F.2d 698·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-08-13
·cited 8×
The court denied the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
-
671 F.2d 553·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-02-05
·cited 8×
Documents prepared by attorneys in contemplation of litigation, reflecting their mental processes, legal theories, and strategy, are protected by the work-product privilege and attorney-client privilege, and thus exempt from disclosure under FOIA's Exemption 5, even after the ter
-
615 F.2d 551·
1st Cir.·
1980-02-11
·cited 8×
The court held that the Meloy Technical Proposal is exempt under Exemption 4 and the intra-agency memoranda are exempt under Exemption 5 of the FOIA, affirming the district court's decision.
-
702 F.2d 233·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-03-01
·cited 7×
The court held that summary-indexes of Chief Counsel Opinions (CCOs) interpreting specific maritime statutes are not protected by FOIA Exemption 5 because they constitute adopted agency law, not deliberative material or privileged communications.
-
968 F.2d 916·
9th Cir.·
1992-07-01
·cited 6×
The court held that the adjusted census data tapes are not protected by FOIA Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege because they are factual and postdecisional, and their release would not reveal the agency's decision-making process.
-
815 F.2d 1527·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-04-07
·cited 6×
The court held that the dates and titles in the agency's Regulations Log are factual information, not deliberative, and therefore not protected by the deliberative process privilege or the constitutional executive privilege under FOIA Exemption 5.
-
795 F.2d 205·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-07-18
·cited 6×
The dissenting judge believes the majority misapplied the waiver rule by not allowing the government to assert an Exemption 4 privilege claim.
-
777 F.2d 1012·
5th Cir.·
1985-12-04
·cited 6×
The court held that Promotion Recommendation Reports (Form 705) are exempt from FOIA disclosure under the deliberative process privilege, but may be subject to disclosure under the Privacy Act if portions can be released without revealing source identities.
-
825 F.2d 1148·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-03
·cited 4×
The court held that four records from an investigation into the death of Infant Doe are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) due to privacy and investigatory file exemptions.
-
604 F.2d 322·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-09
·cited 4×
The court held that witness statements taken during an NLRB investigation of a representation election are exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 7(A).
-
593 F.2d 902·
9th Cir.·
1979-03-26
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court must reconsider the Postal Service's withholding of records in light of recent amendments to FOIA Exemption 3 and the Postal Service's own regulations.
-
299 F. Supp. 2d 1264·
S.D. Fla.·
2003-11-12
·cited 3×
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Count I, finding the CORPS failed to adequately search for and produce responsive documents under FOIA, and denied the CORPS' cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II, finding insufficient justification for claimed