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525 F.2d 845·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-01-09
·cited 66×
The court held that the Federal Power Commission erred in adopting a rate schedule without resolving the customer's contention that the schedule contravened a preexisting agreement, and that the filed rate doctrine does not preclude correction of rates filed in breach of contract
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589 F.2d 680·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-11-15
·cited 56×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) did not err in rejecting Belco's proposed offset procedure, as the agency's subsequent clarification of its refund order was reasonable and consistent with the Natural Gas Act.
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610 F.2d 950·
D.C. Cir.·
1979-09-21
·cited 46×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had statutory authority and substantial evidence to waive the prior notice requirement for a rate increase, for good cause shown, allowing the agreed-upon effective date to be enforced.
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566 F.2d 1323·
5th Cir.·
1978-02-06
·cited 40×
The court held that the Federal Power Commission reasonably interpreted its Opinion No. 595 to preclude an offset of overcharges by undercharges, and that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable relief.
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748 F.2d 266·
5th Cir.·
1984-11-29
·cited 36×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by staying execution of the railroads' judgment, and granted mandamus to allow immediate collection, awarding prejudgment interest.
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579 F.2d 659·
1st Cir.·
1978-06-26
·cited 28×
The court held that the Commission erred in automatically disallowing the surcharge based on precedent, as the surcharge presented a unique policy question for the Commission's expert appraisal of its justness and reasonableness.
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863 F.2d 932·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-12-09
·cited 26×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exceeded its authority under Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act by ordering the retroactive elimination of a minimum commodity bill. However, the court affirmed FERC's finding that the minimum bill was unjust and u
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774 F.2d 490·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-10-04
·cited 26×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) cannot make new rates effective before they are actually filed and accepted, as the Federal Power Act requires rates to be specified, not just principles for calculation.
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879 F.2d 400·
8th Cir.·
1989-07-17
·cited 25×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has primary jurisdiction to determine if a motor carrier's practice of collecting undercharges, despite a negotiated lower rate, constitutes an unreasonable practice under 49 U.S.C. § 10701, and that the ICC's revised p
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824 F.2d 1465·
5th Cir.·
1987-08-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court has jurisdiction over GSU's claims not preempted by the Federal Power Act, did not abuse its discretion in allowing GSU to deposit disputed funds under Rule 67, but erred in denying the LPSC's motion to intervene.
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215 F.2d 883·
3d Cir.·
1954-09-07
·cited 24×
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856 F.2d 361·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-06
·cited 23×
The court held that the contract language unambiguously foreclosed recovery of plant addition interest costs (PAI) and that FERC correctly excluded extrinsic evidence. The court also affirmed FERC's authority to order refunds for improperly billed PAI charges, notwithstanding a c
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760 F.2d 1347·
2d Cir.·
1985-04-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the Keogh doctrine, barring antitrust damages claims for filed rates, has not been overruled by statute or Supreme Court precedent, but that injunctive relief was prematurely dismissed and damages claims may be repleaded if injury resulted from acts other than
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831 F.2d 1135·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-10-27
·cited 21×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exceeded its authority by permitting pipelines to recover deferred production-associated costs from customers through direct billing surcharges, as this constituted prohibited retroactive ratemaking under the Natural Ga
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671 F.2d 1173·
8th Cir.·
1982-03-04
·cited 21×
The court held that a municipality's price-squeeze claim against an electric utility is cognizable under antitrust laws and not barred by the exclusive jurisdiction, filed-rate, state-action, or Noerr-Pennington doctrines.
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902 F.2d 101·
1st Cir.·
1990-04-13
·cited 20×
The court held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires referral of both the reasonableness of the filed rate and the reasonableness of the carrier's collection practice to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
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805 F.2d 1068·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-11-25
·cited 20×
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission correctly interpreted a fuel adjustment clause to require a utility to remit refunds received from fuel suppliers to its wholesale customers.
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793 F.2d 376·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-06-24
·cited 20×
The court held that the ICC acted unlawfully by approving a tariff rule that allowed freight forwarders to charge unpublished, averaged rates, as this violated statutory requirements for filed rates.
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817 F.2d 127·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-04-28
·cited 18×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's interpretation of the contract, allowing VELCO to unilaterally file rate schedules without recognizing Vermont's supervisory powers, was supported by facts and law.
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981 F.2d 402·
9th Cir.·
1992-06-17
·cited 16×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's credit regulations cannot be enforced in a way that undercuts the filed rate doctrine, and that a carrier lacks standing to challenge the lawfulness of its own filed rates.
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893 F.2d 472·
2d Cir.·
1990-01-04
·cited 16×
The court held that the filed rate doctrine does not preclude referral to the ICC to determine the reasonableness of a carrier's collection practices, even when equitable defenses are raised.
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893 F.2d 1016·
9th Cir.·
1990-01-04
·cited 16×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) determination that an unreasonable practice can be an exception to the filed rate doctrine, and thus a defense to an action for common carrier undercharges, was correct.
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863 F.2d 73·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-12-13
·cited 16×
The court held that Northwest's challenge to the FERC orders was moot because the underlying certificates had expired, and any claim for retroactive relief was barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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731 F.2d 959·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 16×
The court held that the Commission's decision not to remedy the price squeeze was erroneous, but upheld its decisions regarding cost-of-service issues and the application of the forty-five-day convention for working capital.
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390 F.2d 193·
3d Cir.·
1968-02-05
·cited 16×
A contract carrier is not barred from collecting the difference between its filed rates and the lower rates actually charged, even if the parties agreed to the lower rates and the carrier inadvertently failed to file a schedule reflecting that practice.
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D.D.C.·
1989-12-28
·cited 15×
The court held that the Commission's purchase deficiency allocation mechanism for take-or-pay costs violates the filed rate doctrine because it effectively changes rates retroactively without proper notice. The court also upheld the Commission's position that certain take-or-pay
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424 F.2d 411·
10th Cir.·
1969-10-16
·cited 14×
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204 F.2d 166·
8th Cir.·
1953-05-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations, affirming the lower court's summary judgment.
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930 F.2d 847·
11th Cir.·
1991-05-06
·cited 13×
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691 F.2d 1184·
5th Cir.·
1982-11-26
·cited 13×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) abused its discretion in denying Hall Group's application for a waiver of notice requirements, as the Commission's stated reasons lacked sufficient support and misapplied legal principles.
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968 F.2d 1295·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-07-10
·cited 12×
The court held that while FERC's interpretation of its regulation was reasonable, the Commission failed to provide a reasoned basis for applying its cost-spreading and benefit rationales to § 7(c) transportation customers.
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955 F.2d 67·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-02-11
·cited 12×
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has discretion to refuse refunds for past overcharges when doing so does not conflict with the core purposes of the Federal Power Act or statutory requirements.
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954 F.2d 485·
8th Cir.·
1992-01-15
·cited 12×
The filed rate doctrine bars RICO claims seeking damages measured by the difference between approved rates and rates that might have been approved absent wrongdoing, as such claims interfere with agency rate-making authority.
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908 F.2d 998·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-07-24
·cited 12×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) failed to adequately justify its approval of Texas Eastern's gas inventory charge (GIC) by over-relying on customer agreement without sufficient analysis of market power, consumer impact, the exculpatory clause,
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899 F.2d 642·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-10
·cited 12×
The Interstate Commerce Commission has the authority to modify the filed-rate doctrine based on changing circumstances and the reasonableness of carrier practices, and courts should defer to such modifications.
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897 F.2d 570·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-03-23
·cited 12×
The court held that most of the challenges to the Gas Inventory Charge (GIC) were moot due to customer actions, but remanded the issue of collecting prior gas cost balances (Account No. 191) for further determination regarding notice.
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872 F.2d 438·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-04-07
·cited 12×
The court held that FERC's termination of the rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to justify its decision, particularly in light of its own tentative conclusion that the incentive price was contrary to the public interest and potentially violated the
-
790 F.2d 919·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-05-16
·cited 12×
The court held that the filed rate doctrine prevents a customer from unilaterally choosing an applicable rate schedule, and that the municipality failed to show good cause for waiving the notice period for a retroactive rate effective date.
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126 F.2d 969·
7th Cir.·
1942-04-07
·cited 12×
A shipper who relies on a misquotation of rates by a common carrier cannot recover damages incurred by reason of having to pay the correct and higher rate.
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906 F.2d 772·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-06-29
·cited 11×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Town's petition because the Town failed to present its argument for refunds to the Commission in an application for rehearing of the order that denied those refunds.
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837 F.2d 600·
3d Cir.·
1988-01-19
·cited 11×
The court held that Pennsylvania Act 74 does not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing the PUC to review the prudence of a utility's gas purchasing decisions, even when those purchases are at FERC-approved wholesale rates, as long as the PUC does not alter the FERC-approved ra
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833 F.2d 341·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-11-17
·cited 11×
The court held that FERC's interpretation of the negotiated contract price requirement, specifically its arm's-length bargaining test, was inadequate to ensure prices reflected market forces, and remanded for reformulation.
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895 F.2d 791·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-02-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) lacks the statutory authority under section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act to waive the filed rate doctrine and impose retroactive rate surcharges when adequate notice has not been provided to downstream purchasers.
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844 F.2d 879·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-04-22
·cited 10×
The court held that it could properly consider the issue of waiver of the filed rate doctrine on rehearing, even if not explicitly raised earlier, due to its impact on the public interest.
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836 F.2d 1386·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-01-22
·cited 10×
The FCC's newly discovered refund authority, allowing it to order refunds for past collected rates, is not supported by the Communications Act, which limits remedies to prospective relief.
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631 F.2d 794·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-05-14
·cited 10×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) lawfully ordered natural gas companies to pass through demand charge credits received from their pipeline supplier to their customers, and that the allocation method based on three-day peak sales was appropriate.
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150 F. Supp. 2d 1330·
S.D. Fla.·
2001-06-20
·cited 9×
The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged RICO claims to survive a motion to dismiss, but dismissed ERISA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and RICO claims for failure to plead predicate acts with particularity, except for specific plaintiffs.
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989 F.2d 281·
8th Cir.·
1993-03-26
·cited 9×
The court held that a motor carrier's tariff was not effectively filed because it failed to execute a power of attorney to participate in a referenced mileage guide, rendering the tariff void and precluding recovery of undercharges.
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969 F.2d 1563·
5th Cir.·
1992-08-14
·cited 9×
A mileage guide is considered a tariff, and a carrier's tariff referring to another tariff without formal participation is void as a matter of law.
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686 F.2d 322·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-24
·cited 9×
The court held that the act of state doctrine barred the tort claim alleging conspiracy with the Mexican government, and that CGNL was collaterally estopped from relitigating federal preemption issues in its contract claims.