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786 F.2d 247·
7th Cir.·
1986-02-25
·cited 28×
The dissenting judge argues that the defendant was not guilty of mail fraud because the mailings were not made for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme, and the jury instructions were confusing and erroneous.
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741 F.2d 915·
7th Cir.·
1984-08-02
·cited 28×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the evidence supported the conviction for willful misapplication of bank funds, and the prosecutor's remarks and evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error.
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506 F.2d 1171·
7th Cir.·
1974-11-05
·cited 28×
The cumulative effect of an improper question and an erroneous jury instruction regarding prior similar crimes, especially when lacking evidentiary support, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
-
423 F.2d 23·
5th Cir.·
1970-02-17
·cited 28×
-
315 F.2d 792·
5th Cir.·
1963-04-04
·cited 28×
The court held that the jury instruction defining 'wilful' as mere carelessness or disregard for lawfulness was erroneous and constituted plain error requiring reversal.
-
330 F.2d 662·
9th Cir.·
1964-04-08
·cited 27×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts for mail fraud and conspiracy, and that procedural errors in jury instructions were not prejudicial.
-
950 F.2d 1086·
5th Cir.·
1992-01-07
·cited 26×
The court held that the record must affirmatively show objective reasons for an increased sentence after a retrial to avoid a presumption of vindictiveness, as required by North Carolina v. Pearce.
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899 F.2d 243·
3d Cir.·
1990-03-21
·cited 26×
A defendant can be convicted of a scheme to defraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1) without proof of a false representation, and the jury charge error was not plain error.
-
740 F.2d 496·
7th Cir.·
1984-07-17
·cited 26×
The court held that evidence of a prior conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is admissible for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) without a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect, and that the jury instructions
-
720 F.2d 951·
7th Cir.·
1983-11-08
·cited 26×
The court held that while the failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony was an error, it was harmless because the jury was otherwise made aware of the accomplices' interests and received a general credibility instruction.
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439 F.2d 553·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-12-30
·cited 26×
The court held that the trial judge's findings on the voluntariness of the confession were not clearly erroneous, and that the failure to reintroduce all pretrial evidence of voluntariness before the jury did not constitute reversible error given the defense counsel's tactical de
-
350 F.2d 261·
6th Cir.·
1965-08-31
·cited 26×
The court held that a border search of an individual is valid under 19 U.S.C. § 1582, and evidence obtained from such a search, even if transferred to state custody, is admissible. The court also held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for aiding a
-
265 F.2d 14·
5th Cir.·
1959-04-03
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge held that the appellant was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury due to the trial judge's prejudicial statements, and thus a new trial is warranted.
-
209 F.2d 734·
9th Cir.·
1954-01-06
·cited 26×
The court held that there was substantial evidence to support the conspiracy conviction and that the trial court's instructions and evidentiary rulings were proper.
-
947 F.2d 170·
5th Cir.·
1991-11-05
·cited 25×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentencing in part, vacating and remanding in part, finding no double jeopardy violation and sufficient evidence for convictions.
-
905 F.2d 1497·
11th Cir.·
1990-07-13
·cited 25×
The court held that the defendant's "CIA intelligence gathering" defense was invalid as a matter of law and that the defendant failed to properly raise a separate defense of lacking specific intent to distribute cocaine at the trial level.
-
774 F.2d 530·
1st Cir.·
1985-10-09
·cited 25×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in finding plain error and in distinguishing between defendants regarding the harmlessness of the error.
-
632 F.2d 483·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-08
·cited 25×
The court held that while the prosecutor's conduct was improper, it did not rise to the level of plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights, thus the conviction is affirmed.
-
602 F.2d 160·
8th Cir.·
1979-07-16
·cited 25×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the appellant waived claims regarding severance and voir dire by failing to renew motions or object, and that evidence of other crimes was properly admitted to show intent.
-
932 F.2d 244·
3d Cir.·
1991-05-03
·cited 24×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court's failure to define 'preponderance of the evidence' and instruct on threats to children did not constitute plain error.
-
885 F.2d 354·
7th Cir.·
1989-09-06
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Lieutenant Dailey's expert testimony regarding countersurveillance and document interpretation, nor in rereading trial testimony to the jury.
-
864 F.2d 1056·
3d Cir.·
1988-12-29
·cited 24×
A mail fraud conviction based on a scheme that demonstrably caused monetary loss to the victim, even if also charged under an invalidated 'honest services' theory, can be sustained.
-
843 F.2d 78·
2d Cir.·
1988-03-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to dismiss a superseding indictment returned shortly before trial, nor in failing to grant a continuance, and that the government was not obligated to provide grand jury testimony claimed to b
-
821 F.2d 1015·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-30
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court erred by failing to conduct a second competency hearing, but this error does not mandate reversal if a meaningful retrospective hearing can be held and the defendant is found competent. Otherwise, convictions are affirmed.
-
684 F.2d 1118·
5th Cir.·
1982-08-24
·cited 24×
The court held that any errors regarding extraneous offenses or prosecutorial misconduct were harmless due to the overwhelming weight of the evidence supporting the conviction.
-
638 F.2d 185·
10th Cir.·
1980-11-17
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's lack of preparation time and experience in federal criminal law, necessitating a new trial.
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564 F.2d 22·
8th Cir.·
1977-10-26
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in implementing security measures, that jury instructions were proper, and that statements by the trial court did not prejudice the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
-
548 F.2d 1224·
5th Cir.·
1977-03-18
·cited 24×
The admission of mugshots was harmless error, and the failure to give a cautionary instruction on co-conspirator hearsay was not plain error absent a timely request and showing of prejudice.
-
561 F.2d 832·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-01-12
·cited 24×
The court held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures hinges on a reasonable expectation of privacy, not solely on common law property concepts or technical trespasses.
-
446 F.2d 410·
10th Cir.·
1971-08-16
·cited 24×
The court held that improper references to a "mug book" containing photographs of suspects, while not ideal, did not constitute plain error and did not deny the defendant due process, nor was his trial counsel ineffective.
-
362 F.2d 43·
8th Cir.·
1966-06-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of certain documents and photographs, even if questioned for the first time on appeal, did not constitute plain error or prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.
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325 F.2d 922·
6th Cir.·
1963-12-30
·cited 24×
A prosecutor's improper remarks and arguments, equating a nolo contendere plea to a guilty plea and making inflammatory statements about a defendant's prior conviction, can constitute prejudicial error requiring a new trial, even without timely objection.
-
209 F.2d 534·
7th Cir.·
1954-01-13
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for selling beer to Native American wards of the government was supported by substantial evidence and that no reversible error occurred during the trial.
-
189 F.2d 587·
3d Cir.·
1951-05-24
·cited 24×
The court held that undue restriction on cross-examination of a key witness necessitates a new trial, despite other points not warranting reversal.
-
905 F.2d 935·
6th Cir.·
1990-07-26
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court did not err in its rulings on cross-examination, the use of a toy gun as a dangerous weapon, the jury instructions on insanity, or the sentencing departure, and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
-
576 F.2d 656·
5th Cir.·
1978-07-14
·cited 23×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting a bank robbery is affirmed because the evidence was sufficient and the trial court committed no reversible error.
-
933 F.2d 1519·
10th Cir.·
1991-05-31
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony to help the jury understand the evidence related to drug trafficking, and that the ex parte communication with a juror did not constitute plain error.
-
676 F.2d 995·
4th Cir.·
1982-04-15
·cited 22×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting armed bank robbery was not reversible error, as he knew his co-defendants were armed, and he failed to properly object to the jury instructions at trial.
-
665 F.2d 831·
8th Cir.·
1981-12-08
·cited 22×
The court held that Miranda warnings were not required for on-the-scene questioning of a suspect who was not in custody, and that cross-examination of a character witness about the defendant's prior arrests was permissible.
-
600 F.2d 273·
5th Cir.·
1979-08-02
·cited 22×
A defendant's conviction will not be vacated due to procedural defects in bringing them before the court, such as the denial of a probable cause hearing, if the conviction itself is otherwise valid.
-
379 F.2d 911·
7th Cir.·
1967-06-28
·cited 22×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the evidence supported the conviction, and various evidentiary and procedural issues did not warrant reversal.
-
333 F.2d 588·
8th Cir.·
1964-06-25
·cited 22×
The court held that the defendant waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to renew his motion for acquittal at the close of all evidence, and that the admission of a prior conviction pending appeal for impeachment purposes was not prejudicial.
-
277 F.2d 566·
7th Cir.·
1960-04-13
·cited 22×
The court held that the indictment for Count One failed to state an offense and that the admission of telephone call testimony was proper.
-
275 F.2d 588·
2d Cir.·
1960-03-08
·cited 22×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of both defendants and that the trial court did not err in its instructions or rulings.
-
259 F.2d 500·
8th Cir.·
1958-10-15
·cited 22×
The court held that the defendant's failure to object to jury instructions before they were given to the jury, as required by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, precluded appellate review of those instructions, and that the instructions, when considered as a whol
-
908 F.2d 561·
10th Cir.·
1990-07-03
·cited 21×
The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1029 does not apply to satellite television descramblers, but 18 U.S.C. § 2512 does, and affirmed the conspiracy conviction based on § 2512.
-
875 F.2d 219·
9th Cir.·
1989-05-12
·cited 21×
Convictions for mail fraud are reversed because the jury instructions allowed conviction without proof that the defendant intended to obtain money or property from the party deceived. Convictions for making false statements are affirmed.
-
613 F.2d 629·
6th Cir.·
1980-01-03
·cited 21×
The court held that evidence of other crimes and weapons found were admissible to prove identity.
-
934 F.2d 599·
5th Cir.·
1991-06-13
·cited 20×
The court affirmed Baytank's RCRA convictions, granted the government's mandamus petition for special assessments, and reversed/affirmed parts of the government's appeal regarding other defendants and counts.
-
883 F.2d 191·
2d Cir.·
1989-08-15
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not commit plain error by giving a supplemental jury instruction on conscious avoidance of knowledge, even after closing arguments, as the evidence supported the charge and the jury's inquiry necessitated it.