-
407 F.2d 735·
7th Cir.·
1969-02-11
·cited 322×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove a single overall conspiracy, and the defendants were prejudiced by being tried together for multiple conspiracies without proper jury instructions. Therefore, the convictions are voided.
-
573 F.2d 1040·
8th Cir.·
1978-04-19
·cited 282×
The court held that the district court did not err in its voir dire questions, admission of coconspirator statements, or jury instructions, and any errors in admitting testimony about the gun's purpose were harmless.
-
873 F.2d 437·
1st Cir.·
1989-04-27
·cited 252×
The court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines and that various procedural and substantive objections raised by the appellant lacked merit.
-
471 F.2d 128·
7th Cir.·
1972-03-03
·cited 142×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the key witness's testimony, denying severance motions, or in its handling of the indictment's duplicity, but found Count III to be duplicitous and reversed convictions on that count.
-
369 F.2d 185·
D.C. Cir.·
1966-07-28
·cited 130×
The court held that the joinder of offenses was permissible and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a severance, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
335 F.2d 609·
5th Cir.·
1964-08-10
·cited 118×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's various motions and that the jury instructions and verdict were proper.
-
924 F.2d 1385·
7th Cir.·
1991-02-14
·cited 116×
The court held that a buyer-seller relationship, without more, is insufficient to prove a conspiracy, as it does not demonstrate a mutual agreement to achieve a criminal objective beyond the transaction itself.
-
279 F.2d 767·
8th Cir.·
1960-06-07
·cited 116×
The court held that while some trial court actions constituted technical errors, they were harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and did not warrant reversal.
-
674 F.2d 647·
8th Cir.·
1982-03-12
·cited 115×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the existence of a RICO enterprise and that joinder of defendants was proper, or any misjoinder constituted harmless error.
-
560 F.2d 1358·
9th Cir.·
1977-08-22
·cited 109×
The court held that the defendants' convictions for conspiracy and distribution of controlled substances were valid, affirming the trial court's decisions regarding joinder, deposition testimony admissibility, jury instructions, sentencing, and effective assistance of counsel.
-
532 F.2d 1218·
9th Cir.·
1976-01-23
·cited 105×
The dissenting judge would reverse convictions because the government proved a different offense than the one charged by the grand jury.
-
618 F.2d 530·
9th Cir.·
1980-05-07
·cited 103×
The District Court for the District of Arizona lacked jurisdiction to enter judgments of conviction after transferring the indictment to the Southern District of California.
-
515 F.2d 112·
3d Cir.·
1975-06-24
·cited 103×
The court held that the indictment was duplicitous by charging conspiracy and attempt in a single count, and that the erroneous admission of a tape recording without proper authentication and chain of custody, along with other trial errors, required reversal and a new trial.
-
307 F.2d 62·
2d Cir.·
1962-07-27
·cited 100×
The court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on all elements of conspiracy, specifically knowledge of illegal importation, constituted plain error requiring reversal of the conspiracy convictions. It also held that admissions obtained from a defendant after
-
405 F.2d 971·
6th Cir.·
1968-12-30
·cited 99×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss based on alleged grand jury procedural irregularities or in refusing to allow inspection of grand jury minutes.
-
548 F.2d 1261·
6th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 96×
The court held that the admission of extensive, irrelevant, and prejudicial expert testimony regarding the properties, street value, and potential for abuse of DMT, as well as the economic incentives for its manufacture, constituted a violation of the defendants' due process righ
-
460 F.2d 48·
5th Cir.·
1972-05-18
·cited 89×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion by refusing to require an undercover agent to divulge his home address, as the defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and the agent had a reasonable fear for his safety.
-
410 F.2d 1209·
10th Cir.·
1969-05-16
·cited 86×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no abuse of discretion in denying severance, sufficient evidence to support convictions, proper admission of statements, and no reversible error in prosecutorial remarks or jury interference.
-
365 F.2d 990·
2d Cir.·
1966-08-03
·cited 83×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the denial of a severance motion was not prejudicial and that defendants lacked standing to suppress evidence seized from a third party.
-
350 F.2d 983·
8th Cir.·
1965-09-29
·cited 82×
The court held that warrantless searches of the defendant's automobile, house, and garage were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trial court did not err in admitting the seized evidence, nor in its handling of a potentially prejudicial cross-examination question
-
666 F.2d 498·
11th Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 81×
The court held that the trial court improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence because it was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. The court also found insufficient evidence that the defendant committed
-
166 F.2d 373·
3d Cir.·
1948-02-11
·cited 80×
-
501 F.2d 1·
9th Cir.·
1974-07-24
·cited 79×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination regarding the informant's residence, nor was the trial court's active participation in questioning witnesses erroneous.
-
509 F.2d 334·
D.C. Cir.·
1974-12-12
·cited 76×
The court held that while some trial errors occurred, they were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal given the strong evidence of guilt.
-
353 F.2d 862·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-11-04
·cited 75×
The dissenting judge believes the majority erred in reversing the trial court's decision, finding the police officer's actions reasonable under the circumstances.
-
437 F.2d 1098·
9th Cir.·
1971-02-11
·cited 74×
A prematurely filed notice of appeal becomes effective when the appealable judgment becomes final, and the appellate court has jurisdiction. The denial of a cosmetology instructor's petition for professional classification was not an abuse of discretion.
-
754 F.2d 1457·
9th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 70×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not err in its rulings on the indictment amendment, jury instructions, evidence admissibility, severance, sufficiency of evidence, Speedy Trial Act claims, juror questionnaire use, or other miscellaneous assi
-
900 F.2d 1462·
10th Cir.·
1990-04-04
·cited 69×
The court held that while there were trial errors, the cumulative effect did not warrant reversal due to a lack of demonstrated prejudice. Resentencing is necessary.
-
168 F.2d 133·
D.C. Cir.·
1948-02-02
·cited 68×
The court held that the statute prohibiting false statements within government jurisdiction applies even to informal conversations initiated by the employee, as long as the statements are made in a matter within the agency's jurisdiction.
-
413 F.2d 513·
9th Cir.·
1969-07-07
·cited 67×
The court held that while the admission of co-defendants' extrajudicial statements at a joint trial may violate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, such a violation can be harmless error if the evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming. The court also held that the appe
-
772 F.2d 1348·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-05
·cited 66×
The court held that the misjoinder of Galvan's heroin charges with the other defendants' charges violated Rule 8(b) and was not harmless error, compelling a new trial for all appellants on all counts. The court also found the retaliation statute constitutional.
-
527 F.2d 862·
5th Cir.·
1976-02-26
·cited 66×
The court held that while the trial court erred in failing to give a cautionary instruction regarding co-conspirator hearsay testimony, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt.
-
342 F.2d 408·
9th Cir.·
1965-02-25
·cited 64×
-
708 F.2d 17·
1st Cir.·
1983-05-26
·cited 63×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence of intent and knowledge, that jury instructions were proper, and that procedural and evidentiary objections lacked merit.
-
703 F.2d 1076·
9th Cir.·
1983-04-11
·cited 63×
The court held that the denial of a continuance for the defense to obtain a photographic expert was harmless error, but the trial court abused its discretion by failing to investigate a juror's claim of sleeping during the trial.
-
514 F.2d 171·
8th Cir.·
1975-04-14
·cited 60×
The court held that a jury selection plan using only voter lists is permissible even if it results in underrepresentation of a group that votes at a lower rate, absent evidence of deliberate discrimination or obstacles to voting. It also held that unobjected-to trial errors, incl
-
453 F.2d 598·
5th Cir.·
1972-01-13
·cited 58×
The court held that while prosecutorial comments bordered on impropriety, they did not constitute reversible error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the trial court's instructions.
-
359 F.2d 260·
D.C. Cir.·
1966-04-05
·cited 58×
The conviction should not stand because the indictment charged robbery by 'force and violence and against resistance and by putting in fear,' but the proof and jury instructions concerned robbery by 'sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching,' a different statutory basis.
-
578 F.2d 67·
5th Cir.·
1978-06-15
·cited 56×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting a partially unintelligible tape recording and its transcript, nor in admitting testimony about an extraneous drug transaction, as any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
-
854 F.2d 1483·
3d Cir.·
1988-07-20
·cited 54×
The admission of evidence not satisfying Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) was harmless error in this case.
-
601 F.2d 1279·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-04
·cited 54×
The court held that the district judge's violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, by requiring objections to jury instructions to be made in the jury's presence, constituted reversible error when it led to a constructive amendment of the indictment regarding an essenti
-
179 F.2d 905·
1st Cir.·
1950-01-25
·cited 54×
The court held that the indictments were sufficient, the denial of severance motions was proper, and the trial court did not commit reversible error in its rulings on evidence or jury instructions.
-
809 F.2d 1194·
6th Cir.·
1987-01-15
·cited 52×
The court held that the district court did not err in conducting an in camera hearing regarding peremptory challenges, as defendants' presence was not constitutionally required and their counsel had ample opportunity to present arguments. The court also affirmed the district cour
-
419 F.2d 520·
9th Cir.·
1969-08-19
·cited 52×
The court held that the appellants' grand jury testimony was admissible for impeachment, the V.A. suspension did not constitute double jeopardy, and various other alleged errors did not warrant reversal.
-
411 F.2d 283·
9th Cir.·
1969-01-30
·cited 52×
The court, reconsidering its prior decision, should grant rehearing and reverse the conviction due to the trial court's erroneous exclusion of the defendant's testimony regarding entrapment conversations.
-
373 F.2d 250·
2d Cir.·
1967-02-10
·cited 52×
A trial judge's charge to the jury that is excessively argumentative, prejudicial, and contains numerous irrelevant comments denies the defendant a fair trial.
-
724 F.2d 1498·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-13
·cited 51×
The court affirmed all of appellant's convictions, finding no reversible error in the admission of evidence or the sufficiency of the indictment.
-
713 F.2d 1371·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-08
·cited 50×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of other wrongful acts, telephone records, or in its handling of the indictment submission to the jury.
-
571 F.2d 980·
6th Cir.·
1978-02-07
·cited 49×
The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error by dismissing two jurors, as proper procedures were followed and no abuse of discretion occurred. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions.
-
555 F.2d 605·
7th Cir.·
1977-03-16
·cited 49×
Statements made during a court-ordered mental examination, though inadmissible on the issue of guilt, can be used for impeachment purposes to attack the defendant's credibility if the defendant testifies and opens the door to such statements.