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149 F.2d 404·
7th Cir.·
1945-05-15
·cited 46×
The dissenting judge believes the Morrison Hotel Corporation lacked the power to enter into the contract without District Court approval due to retained jurisdiction.
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908 F.2d 1363·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-20
·cited 35×
A federal magistrate cannot conduct voir dire in a civil jury trial without the parties' consent, and such an error is not subject to the harmless error rule. The doctrine of election of remedies, in its substantive aspect, prevents double recovery but does not bar a party from a
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792 F.2d 1520·
11th Cir.·
1986-07-07
·cited 31×
The court held that plaintiff's claims for negligence, unseaworthiness, and products liability failed due to lack of causation, and his maintenance claim was properly dismissed for failure to prove incurred expenses.
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649 F.2d 985·
4th Cir.·
1981-05-18
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that while Colgate breached its contract by ceasing performance before the termination date, its actions did not constitute an unfair or deceptive practice under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, thus precluding treble damages.
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192 F.2d 710·
5th Cir.·
1951-11-23
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court erred in striking the answer and counterclaim without affording the appellants an opportunity to amend, as the answer raised a justiciable issue regarding the surety's alleged breach of contract through unreasonable delay in making advances.
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140 F.2d 367·
7th Cir.·
1944-02-04
·cited 22×
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted if the pleadings present a genuine issue of material fact, even if the opposing party also moves for judgment on the pleadings.
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238 F.2d 544·
3d Cir.·
1956-11-14
·cited 20×
The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the actions, as the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. Furthermore, the excluded portions of the third-party complaint did not constitute admissions of the def
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171 F.2d 732·
D.C. Cir.·
1948-06-01
·cited 16×
The court held that the trial court erred in its instructions regarding qualified privilege and punitive damages, and in denying the motion for a mistrial, requiring reversal and remand.
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227 F.2d 791·
9th Cir.·
1955-11-25
·cited 12×
A seaman can combine claims for unseaworthiness and negligence in a single civil suit under diversity jurisdiction, preserving the right to a jury trial.
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666 F.2d 1156·
8th Cir.·
1981-12-11
·cited 8×
The court held that admitting a portion of the plaintiffs' amended complaint into evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and was supported by precedent.
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500 F.2d 617·
6th Cir.·
1974-08-05
·cited 8×
A party may plead the statute of limitations as a defense and simultaneously seek indemnity or contribution from other parties under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as this does not violate Rule 11 or create an estoppel.
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168 F.2d 880·
7th Cir.·
1948-06-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the wilful and wanton count to the jury, nor in admitting a letter from the defendant's claim agent.
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353 F.2d 721·
7th Cir.·
1965-11-18
·cited 4×
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209 F.2d 453·
7th Cir.·
1954-01-18
·cited 4×
False misrepresentations in an insurance application that materially affect the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer are sufficient to avoid the policy, even without proof of actual intent to deceive.
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199 F.2d 720·
4th Cir.·
1952-11-05
·cited 4×
The court held that the jury instructions were too narrow, failing to properly instruct the jury on the reasonableness of the detention for investigation, and that the plaintiff should not have been required to elect between her claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecu
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953 F.2d 626·
Fed. Cir.·
1992-01-16
·cited 2×
The Claims Court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to hear claims by federal judges that the imposition of social security taxes diminished their compensation in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
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242 F.2d 452·
7th Cir.·
1957-03-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the alleged oral promise and partial payment in 1952 were insufficient to overcome the statute of limitations and the bankruptcy discharge, respectively.