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582 F.2d 898·
5th Cir.·
1978-10-25
·cited 729×
The dissent argues the majority misinterpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by broadly allowing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, effectively overruling prior precedent ('Broadway') without sufficient justification.
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557 F.2d 128·
7th Cir.·
1977-06-29
·cited 65×
The court held that a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where the underlying facts were known to the defendant at the time of trial, is untimely under Rule 33 and cannot be treated as based on newly discovered evidence. The court also held that ev
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744 F.2d 1197·
6th Cir.·
1984-09-21
·cited 50×
The court held that while the trial court erred in failing to give a specific good faith jury instruction and in instructing the jury that bank loan file documents constituted 'bank statements' under 18 U.S.C. § 1005, these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The cour
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707 F.2d 1240·
11th Cir.·
1983-06-23
·cited 46×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for mail fraud and extortion, that cross-examination regarding unreported campaign contributions was proper impeachment, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for severance.
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608 F.2d 607·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-19
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera inspection of FBI 302 reports requested under Brady v. Maryland, and remanded for such an inspection to determine if the reports contained material exculpatory or impeachment evidence.
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909 F.2d 1114·
8th Cir.·
1990-07-19
·cited 36×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy, mail fraud, and FDCA violations, but vacated a portion of Carter-Glogau's sentence regarding prosecution costs.
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858 F.2d 1387·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-03
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized from the car and apartment, and that the scope of cross-examination and admission of fingerprint evidence were proper. The court also affirmed the conviction based on a Pinkerton
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556 F.2d 366·
5th Cir.·
1977-07-25
·cited 32×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the Jencks Act did not require production of the FBI reports, the exclusion of cross-examination was proper, and the sentencing procedure was fair.
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626 F.2d 1060·
1st Cir.·
1980-06-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motions, allowing certain cross-examination, or instructing the jury on punitive damages against the City, affirming the jury's verdict.
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803 F.2d 1085·
10th Cir.·
1986-10-21
·cited 29×
The court held that Kurt Vreeken waived his rule of speciality claim by failing to raise it timely, and that other alleged errors, including the exclusion of evidence and jury instructions, were either harmless or within the trial court's discretion.
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613 F.2d 1349·
5th Cir.·
1980-03-20
·cited 29×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, the admission of witness testimony was proper, and closing arguments were not reversible error.
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883 F.2d 1341·
7th Cir.·
1989-09-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the defendant's arguments regarding a duplicitous indictment, insufficient evidence, confrontation clause violations, and sentencing procedures were without merit, affirming his convictions.
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534 F.2d 578·
3d Cir.·
1976-04-07
·cited 26×
The court held that restricting voir dire questions about IRS employment and limiting cross-examination on unplayed tape recordings constituted reversible error.
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936 F.2d 1508·
7th Cir.·
1991-07-19
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an accomplice's statement, limiting cross-examination, or admitting palm print evidence, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.
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776 F.2d 1565·
6th Cir.·
1985-11-13
·cited 24×
The court held that Tennessee law permits punitive damages in asbestos products liability cases if the plaintiff meets the state's standard for fraud, malice, gross negligence, or recklessness, and that the evidence supported the jury's award in this case. The court also affirmed
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757 F.2d 66·
3d Cir.·
1985-03-15
·cited 22×
The court held that the jury instruction on product misuse was erroneous and prejudicial, and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony about a withdrawn expert opinion, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
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746 F.2d 406·
8th Cir.·
1984-10-11
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of flight, allowing leading questions, limiting cross-examination, admitting coconspirator statements, or in its handling of the government's closing remarks.
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736 F.2d 328·
6th Cir.·
1984-06-06
·cited 22×
The court held that the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple drug offenses did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that the trial court's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings were proper.
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665 F.2d 831·
8th Cir.·
1981-12-08
·cited 22×
The court held that Miranda warnings were not required for on-the-scene questioning of a suspect who was not in custody, and that cross-examination of a character witness about the defendant's prior arrests was permissible.
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707 F.2d 1007·
8th Cir.·
1983-06-03
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not commit prejudicial error in its jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and the jury verdict was supported by the record.
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537 F.2d 828·
5th Cir.·
1976-08-25
·cited 20×
The court held that the cross-examination and rebuttal testimony of a defense witness for the purpose of showing bias was permissible.
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971 F.2d 876·
2d Cir.·
1992-07-30
·cited 19×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy and tax evasion, but vacated one defendant's fine, finding that prosecutorial remarks were largely permissible responses to defense arguments and evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion.
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877 F.2d 1129·
2d Cir.·
1989-06-14
·cited 18×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the IRS followed its procedures, discovery rules were not violated, hearsay was properly admitted or harmless, cross-examination was appropriately limited, and the evidence was sufficient for conviction.
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836 F.2d 324·
7th Cir.·
1987-12-29
·cited 18×
The court held that Miranda warnings are not required in bankruptcy proceedings and that false statements regarding the location of collateral are material even if a subsequent security agreement is alleged.
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774 F.2d 1024·
10th Cir.·
1985-10-07
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding extrinsic evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct for impeachment purposes and that the jury's damage award was supported by competent evidence.
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590 F.2d 24·
1st Cir.·
1978-12-28
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance and that the jury instructions and limitations on cross-examination were not prejudicial error.
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609 F.2d 675·
3d Cir.·
1979-07-19
·cited 17×
The court held that the admission of extrinsic evidence to rebut general denials of wrongdoing is within the trial court's discretion, and the prior ruling in Forsythe does not control this case.
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899 F.2d 1465·
6th Cir.·
1990-02-05
·cited 16×
The court held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for tax evasion and false statements, and the district court did not err in admitting certain evidence or expert testimony.
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751 F.2d 9·
1st Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings regarding cross-examination, videotaped depositions, and discovery disclosures.
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581 F.2d 28·
2d Cir.·
1978-07-11
·cited 14×
The court held that the government's net worth method of proof was sufficient to establish tax evasion, and evidentiary rulings were not prejudicial.
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917 F.2d 215·
6th Cir.·
1990-10-09
·cited 12×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying motions for severance or mistrial, admitting evidence seized based on third-party consent, admitting statements made by the defendant to his girlfriend, or in the prosecutor's closing argument comments.
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883 F.2d 1184·
3d Cir.·
1989-08-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees against the plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as the statute applies only to attorneys, not litigants, and that the finding of bad faith against the plaintiff's counsel was clearly erroneous. The court affir
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614 F.2d 953·
5th Cir.·
1980-03-31
·cited 8×
A party who testifies on direct examination waives the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination concerning matters relevant to that testimony, and cannot refuse to answer relevant cross-examination questions.
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932 F.2d 861·
10th Cir.·
1991-05-02
·cited 7×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for wire fraud and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting cross-examination regarding the defendant's educational background.
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609 F.2d 1098·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-28
·cited 7×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by curtailing the cross-examination of government witnesses, thereby denying the appellants a fair trial.
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703 F.2d 322·
8th Cir.·
1983-04-01
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination of the plaintiff regarding collateral source payments when the plaintiff's direct testimony created a misleading impression about his financial situation.
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803 F.2d 87·
3d Cir.·
1986-10-08
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding cumulative character witnesses and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.
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986 F.2d 1357·
10th Cir.·
1993-03-08
·cited 2×
The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of bank fraud and misapplication of funds, and that the district court did not err in allowing cross-examination regarding a consent order banning the defendant from banking.
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924 F.2d 568·
5th Cir.·
1991-02-28
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge argues that the admission of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, designed to evoke religious prejudice and chauvinism, constituted egregious error that affected the substantial rights of the plaintiffs. The majority's conclusion that the error was harmless
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992 F.2d 382·
1st Cir.·
1993-05-10
The court held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions on 'just cause' or in its evidentiary rulings, and affirmed the judgment.
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985 F.2d 79·
2d Cir.·
1993-02-03
The court held that the exclusion of hospital records and evidence of failure to file tax returns was prejudicially erroneous, requiring a new trial.
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947 F.2d 762·
5th Cir.·
1991-11-21
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding deposition testimony as rebuttal evidence because it did not contradict testimony on direct examination or serve as proper impeachment.