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722 F.2d 1196·
5th Cir.·
1984-01-03
·cited 40×
The court held that the admission of a law enforcement officer's post-hypnotic identification testimony was improper and prejudicial, especially when the identification was of a suspect known to the witness and was uncorroborated.
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721 F.2d 856·
1st Cir.·
1983-11-23
·cited 40×
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against Gomes for his involvement in the drug conspiracy.
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601 F.2d 95·
3d Cir.·
1979-06-18
·cited 24×
The court held that the denial of a deposition for a witness who was a fugitive was an error, especially when combined with doubts about the credibility of a key prosecution witness, warranting a new trial.
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725 F.2d 417·
7th Cir.·
1984-01-10
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge would reverse the conviction, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motions for a competency hearing, a psychiatric examination of a key government witness, and to strike the witness's testimony. The dissent argues that
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595 F.2d 540·
10th Cir.·
1979-03-26
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the contract regarding royalty calculations and patent rights, nor in denying a new trial or attorney's fees.
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697 F.2d 130·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-03
·cited 13×
The court held that the trial court erred by prohibiting an attorney of record from testifying and by ruling that the defendant admitted the accuracy of stock summaries under Rule 36. The case is remanded for a new trial.
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873 F.2d 1001·
7th Cir.·
1989-04-27
·cited 12×
The court held that the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of promissory fraud and that the Illinois dead man's statute, as applied through Federal Rule of Evidence 601, did not bar O'Berto's testimony due to ambiguity in his deposition regarding witness presence.
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730 F.2d 300·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-23
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the post-judgment settlement dispute and vacated the judgment on that issue, remanding for further proceedings. Other claims of error were found to be harmless.
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841 F.2d 177·
7th Cir.·
1988-03-02
·cited 6×
The court held that the trust agreement, when construed under Illinois law, allowed individual co-trustees to bind the trust, and that the plaintiff's testimony regarding conversations with a deceased co-trustee was admissible.
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811 F.2d 74·
2d Cir.·
1987-01-27
·cited 6×
The dissenting judge would hold that the lower court erred in imposing a constructive trust because the party seeking the trust failed to prove unjust enrichment based on the transferor's wishes at the time of death.
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873 F.2d 75·
4th Cir.·
1989-04-24
·cited 2×
The court certified questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals regarding the application and effect of the Dead Man's Statute on the admissibility of evidence concerning conversations with a deceased policyholder.
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861 F.2d 1366·
5th Cir.·
1988-12-21
·cited 2×
The court held that a special master, performing quasi-judicial functions, is not subject to deposition regarding their mental processes in making recommendations.
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M.D. Fla.·
2024-09-30
The court held that judicial estoppel bars the plaintiff's claims due to his directly contradictory sworn testimony in a prior criminal proceeding, and alternatively, his testimony is not competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.
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950 F.2d 326·
6th Cir.·
1991-12-04
The court held that issues concerning expert testimony on causation were moot because the jury found no negligence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in submitting verdict interrogatories or in denying a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.