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778 F. Supp. 2d 1320·
M.D. Fla.·
2011-04-01
·cited 43×
The court held that Baker's statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted Kramer's motion to exclude them. The court also sustained Kramer's objection to the magistrate judge's order denying his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the Commission.
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926 F.2d 1044·
11th Cir.·
1991-03-15
·cited 43×
The court held that the stop was lawful, consent to search was valid, and prior conviction evidence was admissible to prove intent. However, the evidence was insufficient to prove a continuous course of conduct for the Travel Act conviction.
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837 F.2d 1024·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-19
·cited 43×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for conspiracy and possession of drugs with intent to distribute, and that the district court did not err in giving a deliberate ignorance instruction or denying a foreign deposition. Expert testimony did not
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784 F.2d 416·
1st Cir.·
1986-02-20
·cited 43×
The court affirmed jury convictions on narcotics charges, holding that evidence seized under the plain view doctrine was admissible and that the admission of co-conspirator statements and evidence of prior bad acts did not prejudice the appellants.
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713 F.2d 1447·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-26
·cited 43×
The exclusion of evidence suggesting a third party committed the crime did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights because the evidence was collateral, lacked probity, and did not directly connect the third party to the offense.
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598 F.2d 1101·
7th Cir.·
1979-05-18
·cited 43×
The court held that the jury instructions on intent were adequate, and that the use of prior grand jury testimony as substantive evidence was permissible. The court affirmed the convictions.
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557 F.2d 666·
9th Cir.·
1977-07-15
·cited 43×
The court held that admitting lay opinion testimony from law enforcement officers identifying the defendant in surveillance photos was not an abuse of discretion, and refusing the defendant's requested special jury instruction on identification was also not an error.
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484 F.2d 670·
7th Cir.·
1973-08-14
·cited 43×
The court held that a false statement regarding the source of income on a tax return, even without an understatement of income, can constitute a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and that the admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes was not an abuse of discr
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926 F.2d 649·
7th Cir.·
1991-02-25
·cited 42×
The court affirmed convictions and sentences, finding sufficient evidence for drug quantity, conspiracy, and other charges, and upholding the district court's evidentiary and procedural rulings.
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891 F.2d 810·
11th Cir.·
1990-01-09
·cited 42×
The court held that a hospital and its medical staff members are legally capable of conspiring under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that evidence of pretextual reasons for staff privilege decisions is admissible to prove conspiracy.
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838 F.2d 909·
7th Cir.·
1988-01-25
·cited 42×
The court held that the evidence supported a single conspiracy conviction and that the admission of 'other acts' evidence and testimony regarding co-conspirators' convictions was proper.
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825 F.2d 817·
5th Cir.·
1987-08-12
·cited 42×
The court held that sentences for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 657 (misapplication of funds) and 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (false entry) are not multiplicitous under the Blockburger test, as each requires proof of a fact the other does not. The court also applied the concurrent sentence doct
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821 F.2d 52·
1st Cir.·
1987-06-22
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing, holding that evidence of prior drug dealings and statements about using a gun for a 'hit' were admissible, but references to selling valium were not, though this latter error was harmless. The court also held that p
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808 F.2d 1050·
5th Cir.·
1987-01-14
·cited 42×
The court held that the DEA agent had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and probable cause to search it, and that the evidence found was admissible.
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808 F.2d 561·
7th Cir.·
1986-12-16
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that successive state and federal prosecutions do not violate double jeopardy, the Mann Act and kidnapping are distinct offenses, and the trial court did not err in evidentiary or procedural rulings.
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799 F.2d 1281·
9th Cir.·
1986-09-12
·cited 42×
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) precludes railroad employees from recovering FELA damages for the aggravation of injuries resulting from a subsequent, allegedly wrongful discharge.
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793 F.2d 909·
8th Cir.·
1986-06-09
·cited 42×
An arbitral decision does not preclude an independent cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the jury determines the weight of such a decision as evidence.
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770 F.2d 1475·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-12
·cited 42×
The court held that the admission of evidence regarding the defendant's subsequent extortion attempt was reversible error because it was highly prejudicial and of slight probative value.
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750 F.2d 1169·
2d Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury did not warrant dismissal of the indictment and that evidentiary rulings and severance denials were within the trial court's discretion.
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751 F.2d 477·
2d Cir.·
1984-12-13
·cited 42×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove FDIC insurance and that the admission of prior bad acts evidence was proper. Jury instructions on reasonable doubt were also found adequate.
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718 F.2d 1484·
10th Cir.·
1983-09-30
·cited 42×
The court held that the mailings of invoices and warrants were sufficiently related to the scheme to defraud to support mail fraud convictions, and that the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes and the prosecutor's remarks did not constitute reversible error.
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716 F.2d 1322·
10th Cir.·
1983-09-02
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the trial court's disposition, agreeing that the defendant's liability was limited to its apportioned share of damages, despite a settlement agreement.
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679 F.2d 1032·
2d Cir.·
1982-05-13
·cited 42×
A conspiracy continues for statute of limitations purposes until the conspirators receive their anticipated economic benefits, even if the substantive offense has been completed.
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675 F.2d 168·
8th Cir.·
1982-04-07
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the finding of liability for securities fraud and common law fraud but remanded for reconsideration of damages, holding that evidence of tax benefits should have been considered in calculating actual damages.
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641 F.2d 457·
7th Cir.·
1981-02-11
·cited 42×
Summary judgment was appropriate because plaintiffs failed to produce significant probative evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy, despite extensive discovery.
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624 F.2d 1280·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-25
·cited 42×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict regarding the 'wire communication' element and that the defendants' claims of entrapment, due process violations, evidentiary errors, and indictment issues were without merit.
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623 F.2d 1198·
7th Cir.·
1980-06-11
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no merit in the defendant's five alleged errors regarding sufficiency of evidence, materiality standard, Speedy Trial Act compliance, admissibility of other crimes evidence, and jury instructions.
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614 F.2d 624·
9th Cir.·
1979-11-23
·cited 42×
The court affirmed both convictions, finding that the investigatory stop, arrest, and searches were lawful, and that the jury instructions, including those related to insanity and aiding and abetting, were adequate or properly handled.
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606 F.2d 919·
10th Cir.·
1979-10-01
·cited 42×
The court held that while the admission of a recorded conversation for impeachment purposes was permissible, the admission of the entire conversation, including highly prejudicial discussions of murder plans, constituted reversible error requiring a new trial.
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583 F.2d 1302·
5th Cir.·
1978-11-14
·cited 42×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish intent to defraud and that the trial court properly instructed the jury on intent, cross-examination, and the defendant's right to remain silent.
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576 F.2d 846·
10th Cir.·
1978-05-12
·cited 42×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior uncharged misconduct for the purpose of proving intent and motive, nor did it err in allowing a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's demeanor during testimony, as the defendant ulti
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565 F.2d 831·
2d Cir.·
1977-11-15
·cited 42×
The court held that the district court erred by allowing prejudicial information about a witness's stabbing to be disclosed to the jury venire and by refusing to poll the jury about exposure to prejudicial newspaper articles during the trial.
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555 F.2d 992·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-04-07
·cited 42×
The court held that the admission of evidence regarding the defendant's arrest sixteen days after the charged offense was improper and not harmless error.
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547 F.2d 1264·
5th Cir.·
1977-03-04
·cited 42×
The court held that the evidence admitted was relevant, the jury charge was not plain error, and there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for aiding and abetting.
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539 F.2d 924·
2d Cir.·
1976-07-26
·cited 42×
The court held that the trial judge's exclusion of critical defense psychiatric testimony, without stating reasons, constituted an abuse of discretion under Rule 403, requiring reversal of Dwyer's conviction.
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539 F.2d 287·
2d Cir.·
1976-07-26
·cited 42×
The court held that the admission of prior criminal acts evidence, prosecutorial comments, and sentencing remarks did not deprive the appellants of a fair trial.
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530 F.2d 1076·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-02-20
·cited 42×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting rebuttal testimony to show bias of an alibi witness, and that the admission of prejudicial testimony regarding a threat was within the bounds of the judge's discretion.
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522 F.2d 438·
6th Cir.·
1975-09-16
·cited 42×
The court held that an off-duty police officer acting within the scope of his duties, even if exceeding his authority, acts under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the trial court did not err in admitting medical records or excluding evidence of prior
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924 F.2d 1362·
7th Cir.·
1991-02-06
·cited 41×
The court held that the defendants' conviction under RICO was proper, but remanded for resentencing and reconsideration of a fine due to issues with the Sentencing Guidelines and statutory factors. The court also affirmed the forfeiture order.
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851 F.2d 1249·
10th Cir.·
1988-07-14
·cited 41×
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) does not preclude federal court jurisdiction over a § 1981 racial discrimination claim, even if the dispute arises from a collective bargaining agreement. Independent statutory rights are not barred by the RLA's exclusive jurisdiction over minor disput
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837 F.2d 415·
9th Cir.·
1988-01-26
·cited 41×
The court held that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge was not discriminatory, the exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony was proper, and the admission of prior bad acts evidence was permissible.
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803 F.2d 969·
9th Cir.·
1986-09-04
·cited 41×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the admission of evidence was proper, prosecutorial comments were not reversible error, the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions, and statutory interpretations were correct.
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725 F.2d 1146·
8th Cir.·
1984-01-16
·cited 41×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions for a new trial or remittitur based on allegedly improper closing arguments and an excessive verdict, nor in limiting cross-examination regarding collateral source payments or excluding evidence o
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924 F.2d 1148·
1st Cir.·
1991-01-23
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding that while some evidentiary rulings and prosecutorial remarks were questionable, they constituted harmless error given the overwhelming evidence, and the sentencing departure was justified.
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878 F.2d 735·
3d Cir.·
1989-06-30
·cited 40×
The court held that hearsay statements by the victim were admissible to show her state of mind and plan, and that the Sentencing Reform Acts did not alter the mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
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871 F.2d 1151·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury's verdicts against the City of Everett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were supported by sufficient evidence, both based on an unconstitutional custom of breaking down doors without a warrant and on a policy of deliberate indifference to inadequate training an
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869 F.2d 9·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-06
·cited 40×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the marijuana's street value.
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859 F.2d 585·
8th Cir.·
1988-10-14
·cited 40×
The admission of the defendant's prior conviction for possessing stolen bank money was prejudicial error because it was not relevant to any material issue other than propensity, thus requiring reversal and a new trial.
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857 F.2d 845·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-15
·cited 40×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior conviction, blank Social Security cards, and tax return, nor was the evidence insufficient for conviction.
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850 F.2d 1015·
3d Cir.·
1988-06-29
·cited 40×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury or admitting evidence of other crimes, and that limiting instructions were appropriate.