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719 F.2d 1475·
9th Cir.·
1983-11-10
·cited 35×
The court held that evidence of drug paraphernalia and cash found in the defendant's home was admissible, and incriminating statements made during a chance encounter with an agent were also admissible. However, the court reversed the firearm conviction due to insufficient evidenc
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705 F.2d 624·
2d Cir.·
1983-04-11
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court erred in imposing fines for violations occurring on flights outside U.S. air commerce jurisdiction and for which no actual danger was proven.
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698 F.2d 995·
9th Cir.·
1983-02-08
·cited 35×
The court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises, thus lacking standing to challenge the search or suppress derivative evidence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of prior counter
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623 F.2d 1084·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-14
·cited 35×
Mustang is liable for the actions of Roberts Airways based on estoppel, and the court reverses separate awards for mental anguish and loss of affection, remanding for a single award.
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553 F.2d 497·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-06
·cited 35×
The court held that testimony regarding subsequent meetings was admissible and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for importation and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
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990 So. 2d 639·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2008-09-10
·cited 34×
Plaintiff Thigpen sued UPS for retaliating against him for filing workers' compensation claims by fabricating grounds for his termination. The jury awarded him $6 million, but the trial court granted UPS a new trial after determining that highly prejudicial testimony about a form
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716 So. 2d 301·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1998-07-29
·cited 34×
Nevil McDonald Lopez was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm. The appellate court affirmed most convictions but reversed Lopez's conviction for attempted first-degree murder of Craig Manor, reducing it to aggravated assault, and revers
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955 F.2d 786·
2d Cir.·
1992-01-09
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting DNA profiling evidence, applying the admissibility standard for novel scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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939 F.2d 659·
8th Cir.·
1991-07-30
·cited 34×
The court held that the defendant's incriminating statements were properly admitted, evidence of prior criminal conduct was admissible, the jury instructions were appropriate, and the sentence for possession of cocaine base was constitutional.
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914 F.2d 934·
7th Cir.·
1990-09-28
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury selection and composition did not violate the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, and that evidence of prior bad acts was properly admitted.
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877 F.2d 520·
7th Cir.·
1989-06-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination, admitting a photograph, or applying the sentencing enhancement statute to prior burglary convictions.
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874 F.2d 324·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-24
·cited 34×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that any errors in admitting evidence or failing to record side-bar conferences were harmless.
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873 F.2d 569·
2d Cir.·
1989-04-19
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an address book entry, the defendant's alias statement during booking, or in enhancing the sentence based on corroborated hearsay testimony.
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847 F.2d 1261·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-26
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of a prior similar accident and in redacting a portion of an incident report, as the evidence was not substantially similar or was unduly prejudicial.
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844 F.2d 500·
8th Cir.·
1988-04-01
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial, in its jury instructions, or in admitting evidence of the plaintiff's prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
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831 F.2d 909·
9th Cir.·
1987-11-05
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's affidavit, in finding sufficient proof of interstate transportation, in upholding the legality of the stop, or in applying the sentence enhancement provisions.
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822 F.2d 1016·
11th Cir.·
1987-07-27
·cited 34×
The court held that while the limitation on cross-examination of the government's witness was proper, the exclusion of the defense witness's testimony was an abuse of discretion and substantially prejudicial.
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810 F.2d 809·
8th Cir.·
1987-02-04
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court committed reversible error by admitting prejudicial evidence and argument concerning prior cocaine transactions, which tended to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis.
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786 F.2d 1322·
7th Cir.·
1986-03-18
·cited 34×
The court held that the false statements made to the CAB were material under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, materiality is a question of law for the judge, and the admission of certain evidence and the prosecutor's closing arguments were not reversible error.
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785 F.2d 631·
8th Cir.·
1986-03-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish county liability under § 1983, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, mistrial, evidence admission, or damage and fee awards.
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785 F.2d 399·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-06
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no merit in the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence for a continuing criminal enterprise conviction, Sixth Amendment violations, or improper admission of evidence.
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784 F.2d 590·
5th Cir.·
1986-03-06
·cited 34×
The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions for witness tampering and retaliation, and that any misjoinder of defendants was harmless error. The indictment was also found to be sufficient and not multiplicious.
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780 F.2d 1102·
4th Cir.·
1985-12-04
·cited 34×
The en banc court erred by departing from the Classified Information Procedures Act and existing standards for evidence admissibility, particularly concerning classified information the defendant seeks to introduce.
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767 F.2d 1185·
7th Cir.·
1985-07-03
·cited 34×
The court held that the jury could reasonably find that the withheld information about Angus Littlejohn's agreement to contact prospective buyers was material and that the defendants acted with scienter, thus affirming the jury's verdict on the securities fraud claim.
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763 F.2d 697·
5th Cir.·
1985-06-07
·cited 34×
The court held that the government improperly used a witness for the primary purpose of impeaching him with otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence, thereby depriving the defendants of a fair trial.
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760 F.2d 1492·
9th Cir.·
1985-05-22
·cited 34×
The court held that a district court errs by accepting conceded Brady material and failing to disclose it or determine its discoverability. The prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland cannot be shifted to the court.
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757 F.2d 1161·
11th Cir.·
1985-04-15
·cited 34×
The government's manipulation of evidence to create two separate crimes from a single transaction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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756 F.2d 1342·
9th Cir.·
1984-06-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that joinder of defendants and offenses was proper, severance was not required, venue changes were unwarranted, evidence was properly admitted, and speedy trial rights were not violated.
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728 F.2d 924·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-27
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding insufficient evidence of retaliatory discharge and in excluding certain evidence, affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims.
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728 F.2d 864·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-16
·cited 34×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant knowingly possessed the unregistered machine gun and silencer, and that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of other items seized or in its cross-examination of the defendant.
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727 F.2d 734·
8th Cir.·
1984-02-09
·cited 34×
The court held that the joint representation hearing was adequate, the admission of 'bad acts' evidence was proper, and the jury instructions were sufficient, thus affirming the convictions.
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712 F.2d 1241·
8th Cir.·
1983-07-19
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the plaintiff's post-discharge assault, that the evidence supported the jury's award for mental anguish, and that punitive damages were appropriate given the defendant's conduct.
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695 F.2d 207·
6th Cir.·
1982-07-21
·cited 34×
The court held that a recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision did not alter its original conclusion regarding the constitutionality of Kentucky's 'no action' statute.
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674 F.2d 469·
5th Cir.·
1982-04-30
·cited 34×
The court held that the admission of computer-generated information regarding a defendant's prior record and suspected drug smuggling activities constituted hearsay and improper use of prior offenses, requiring reversal of his conviction. However, the court found sufficient evide
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668 F.2d 73·
1st Cir.·
1982-01-06
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the defendant's statement as evidence of consciousness of guilt, as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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664 F.2d 200·
8th Cir.·
1981-11-24
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in refusing a specific jury instruction on equality, admitting evidence of drug use, admitting a photograph of a shotgun, or excluding a physician's diagnosis phrase, as the jury instructions as a whole were fair and the evidenti
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630 F.2d 780·
10th Cir.·
1980-09-18
·cited 34×
The court held that the investigatory stop and subsequent search were lawful, and the admission of evidence of prior acts and the prosecutor's comments did not constitute reversible error.
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615 F.2d 277·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-09
·cited 34×
A district court judge may exclude evidence of a prior conviction involving dishonesty when its prejudicial effect is overwhelming, even if admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).
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609 F.2d 198·
5th Cir.·
1980-01-04
·cited 34×
The court held that evidence of prior convictions of a defendant's relatives and associates, not relevant to the issues or character traits presented, is inadmissible and prejudicial. The court affirmed convictions where evidence was sufficient but reversed one due to improper cr
-
613 F.2d 688·
8th Cir.·
1979-11-29
·cited 34×
The dissent argues that the defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 912 should be reversed because the evidence did not prove he 'acted' as a federal officer, and the prosecutor's remarks were unfairly prejudicial.
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596 F.2d 44·
2d Cir.·
1979-03-14
·cited 34×
The court held that an in-court identification, even after a suggestive accidental courtroom confrontation, is admissible if it is reliable under the totality of the circumstances. The court also found that the admission of prior similar acts evidence, if error, was harmless beyo
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565 F.2d 111·
7th Cir.·
1977-10-31
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to release grand jury testimony, excluding rebuttal evidence, or in its jury instructions, and that any errors in handling jury communications were harmless.
-
560 F.2d 122·
2d Cir.·
1977-07-22
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not err in excluding certain bankruptcy documents, denying a pre-indictment delay claim, refusing a reliance-on-counsel jury instruction, or admitting evidence of motive.
-
848 F.2d 1523·
11th Cir.·
1988-07-12
·cited 33×
The court held that the government was not estopped from bringing a civil action due to an alleged compromise agreement, as the Assistant U.S. Attorney lacked the authority to make such an agreement. Furthermore, the admission of guilty pleas was proper, and the trial judge's act
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846 F.2d 941·
4th Cir.·
1988-05-17
·cited 33×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding statements made by a child to a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment under Fed.R.Evid. 803(4).
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842 F.2d 1380·
2d Cir.·
1988-03-28
·cited 33×
The court held that surveillance tapes were admissible against a defendant as co-conspirator statements and that expert testimony regarding organized crime was admissible for background, affirming convictions.
-
674 F.2d 1293·
9th Cir.·
1982-04-20
·cited 33×
The court held that it has jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal regarding the restraining order and that the district court erred in denying the motion to dissolve the order without a hearing. It also affirmed the suppression of evidence from the Crozier and Stein reside
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617 F.2d 180·
9th Cir.·
1980-04-17
·cited 33×
The court held that a second competency hearing is not automatically required upon a defendant's return from a commitment facility, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a hearing sua sponte or by limiting surrebuttal evidence.
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605 F.2d 330·
7th Cir.·
1979-08-20
·cited 33×
A judge's extrajudicial acts, motivated by racial animus and performed under color of law, are not protected by judicial or prosecutorial immunity and can form the basis of an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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135 So. 3d 1002·
Fla.·
2014-01-09
·cited 32×
Richard Allen Johnson, convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery in the 2001 death of Tammy Hagin, appealed the denial of his postconviction Rule 3.851 motion and filed a habeas petition. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of all postconviction r