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611 F.2d 1129·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-15
·cited 74×
The court held that while a state statute of limitations applies to a § 1983 claim, federal law governs the accrual of the cause of action, requiring awareness of the injury and its cause.
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482 F.2d 66·
2d Cir.·
1973-06-14
·cited 64×
A district court cannot treat a partial disposition of a single claim, such as principal without prejudgment interest, as final under Rule 54(b).
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550 F.2d 1173·
9th Cir.·
1977-03-08
·cited 38×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the class action settlement, finding adequate representation, notice, and fairness.
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506 F.2d 735·
3d Cir.·
1974-12-19
·cited 36×
The court held that the union was not entitled to intervene as a party plaintiff generally but should be permitted to intervene as a party defendant to protect its interests in collective bargaining agreements.
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825 F.2d 1173·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-04
·cited 23×
Percentage service charges added by hotels to banquet bills constitute 'commissions' under the FLSA, exempting banquet waiters from overtime pay requirements, and employees must exhaust union grievance procedures before suing for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
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729 F.2d 1208·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-03
·cited 20×
The court held that consumers are not estopped from asserting a retail price-fixing conspiracy theory to avoid the Illinois Brick bar, as it presents distinct issues from a wholesale conspiracy and does not pose a significant risk of duplicative recovery or undue complexity.
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275 F.2d 52·
9th Cir.·
1960-02-15
·cited 20×
The court held that under Rule 24(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seeking to protect a trade secret that is subject to the court's control has a right to intervene in an action where disclosure of that secret is at issue.
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848 F.2d 674·
6th Cir.·
1988-05-17
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the fraud and antitrust claims for failure to plead with particularity, but correctly dismissed the misjoined defendant.
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594 F.2d 1313·
9th Cir.·
1979-04-16
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) and that Champion's refusal to sell certain product lines and termination of the franchise agreement did not violate Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
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732 F.2d 998·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-04-27
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court improperly invoked Rule 54(b) to enter a final judgment on part of a single claim, and therefore dismissed the appeal.
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320 F.2d 90·
2d Cir.·
1963-07-18
·cited 16×
The court held that the appeal was premature because the district court failed to make an express determination that there was no just reason for delay under Rule 54(b).
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283 F.2d 39·
1st Cir.·
1960-09-26
·cited 16×
The court held that a dismissal of some defendants in a multiparty action, even if certified under Rule 54(b), is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal unless those defendants represent an entire 'claim for relief' distinct from others.
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762 F.2d 462·
5th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 12×
The court held that a partial summary judgment on a duty to defend, while deferring claims for fees and penalties, is not a final appealable order under Rule 54(b).
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642 F.2d 614·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-10-10
·cited 12×
Interest does not accrue on a judgment entered by the clerk when third-party claims remain pending and the court has not made an express Rule 54(b) determination of finality.
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599 F.2d 32·
2d Cir.·
1979-05-10
·cited 12×
The court remanded for clarification of the controlling question of law regarding the denial of damages for the 1969 exclusion claim.
-
516 F.2d 355·
8th Cir.·
1975-05-09
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding the Comptroller's approval of a branch bank facility was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.
-
401 F.2d 510·
2d Cir.·
1968-07-18
·cited 12×
The court held that the judgment entered under Rule 54(b) was final and appealable because the claims involved distinct operative facts and commercial considerations.
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852 F.2d 1244·
10th Cir.·
1988-07-26
·cited 11×
The court held that an amendment adding a party relates back under Rule 15(c) if the party knew or should have known it would be sued but for a mistake concerning identity within the limitations period, regardless of subsequent delay in filing the amendment. The court also held t
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766 F.2d 105·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-27
·cited 8×
The court held that New Jersey law bars commercial buyers from suing in tort for economic loss, limiting them to UCC warranty claims, and that factual disputes preclude summary judgment on certain warranty claims.
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699 F.2d 401·
7th Cir.·
1983-02-04
·cited 8×
A Rule 68 Offer of Judgment that specifies only 'costs and expenses' does not include attorney's fees unless the offer explicitly states so or a governing statute mandates it.
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318 F.2d 485·
9th Cir.·
1963-05-29
·cited 8×
The court held that intervenors, as owners of trade secrets, have a right to intervene in an action where those secrets are subject to court control and risk of disclosure, and that such intervention is ancillary and does not require an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
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597 F.2d 890·
5th Cir.·
1979-06-25
·cited 6×
The court held that the third-party complaint for indemnity could not be foreclosed by summary judgment because the indemnity agreement could be read to cover losses caused by the contractor's negligence, which is permissible under Mississippi law.
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331 F.2d 1018·
D.C. Cir.·
1964-02-27
·cited 6×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the legality of the taking due to the absence of a timely appeal from the District Court's final order. The court also affirmed the judgment as to just compensation.
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563 F.2d 884·
8th Cir.·
1977-10-07
·cited 4×
The district court abused its discretion by denying the government leave to amend its complaint to include supplemental tax assessments, as justice required the amendment to be freely given.
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505 F.2d 953·
6th Cir.·
1974-11-21
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Seaway Motors as a party defendant and in refusing to remand the cases to state court.
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483 F.2d 255·
5th Cir.·
1973-08-10
·cited 4×
The court held that the appeal was not ripe for review because the district court's order was not final and appealable under Rule 54(b).
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344 F.2d 773·
8th Cir.·
1965-04-29
·cited 4×
The court held that an order dismissing a claim against one of multiple defendants, initially not final under Rule 54(b), became appealable after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants without prejudice.
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989 F.2d 93·
2d Cir.·
1993-03-22
·cited 2×
The non-settling defendants lack standing to appeal the district court's orders approving the partial settlements because the settlements do not legally prejudice their rights.
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909 F.2d 1073·
7th Cir.·
1990-08-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in serving the federal officers and that equitable estoppel did not apply. Therefore, the dismissal for failure to serve within the prescribed time was proper.
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835 F.2d 848·
11th Cir.·
1988-01-15
·cited 2×
The court held that state law claims against the union were preempted by federal law, and claims against employers were properly dismissed under state workers' compensation law or for failure to exhaust grievance procedures.
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607 F.2d 530·
2d Cir.·
1978-04-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 against plaintiffs and their counsel for failure to comply with a discovery order.
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966 F.2d 1133·
7th Cir.·
1992-07-02
·cited 1×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the FDIC leave to amend its complaint, that the amendment related back to the original filing date, and that the FDIC was entitled to the escrowed funds.
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866 F.2d 648·
3d Cir.·
1989-02-01
The court held that the insurance policy exclusion for loss of use of property not physically injured applied, and the exception for sudden and accidental physical injury did not apply.
-
821 F.2d 644·
Fed. Cir.·
1987-06-24
An interlocutory order that effectively denies an injunction is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) only if it causes serious, irreparable consequences that can only be challenged by immediate appeal.
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774 F.2d 398·
10th Cir.·
1985-09-27
The court held that the district court's ex parte verbal order compelling depositions was invalid because it lacked reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, violating Rule 37 and due process.
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230 F.2d 625·
1st Cir.·
1956-03-06
The court held that the first appeal was dismissible for lack of appellate jurisdiction due to non-compliance with Rule 54(b), but the second appeal was timely and the case must be remanded for a determination of the surety's good faith in completing the contracts.