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517 F.2d 826·
5th Cir.·
1975-08-18
·cited 219×
The court held that intervention as of right was not conferred by Congress in this 'pattern or practice' action under Title VII § 707, and thus NOW's appeal for organizational intervention was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
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157 F.2d 216·
5th Cir.·
1946-07-31
·cited 66×
The court held that the absence of indispensable parties requires reversal, even if the original parties are satisfied with the judgment.
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421 F.2d 869·
5th Cir.·
1970-01-30
·cited 65×
The court held that the Orleans Levee Board is an indispensable party whose joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction, and therefore, the case should be dismissed in equity and good conscience.
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833 F.2d 1179·
5th Cir.·
1987-12-17
·cited 62×
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction after a nondiverse party was added, requiring remand to state court. The court also vacated the order allowing the amendment and remanded for reconsideration of whether joinder was appropriate.
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513 F.2d 862·
5th Cir.·
1975-05-27
·cited 57×
The court held that the government's failure to fulfill its plea bargain promises regarding deportation and sentence, despite the defendant's crucial cooperation, necessitates further proceedings to determine the appropriate remedy.
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155 F.2d 971·
5th Cir.·
1946-06-13
·cited 56×
The court held that absent owners of overriding royalty interests were indispensable parties, and their joinder was necessary for the court to proceed.
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626 F.2d 293·
3d Cir.·
1980-07-10
·cited 51×
The court held that the district court's record was insufficient to determine if Ivana was an indispensable party and that the complaint could be amended to substitute Lucille as administratrix to cure defective jurisdictional allegations.
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567 F.2d 154·
1st Cir.·
1977-10-31
·cited 49×
Quabaug, as a licensee, lacks standing to sue for federal trademark infringement but has standing under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for false designation of origin. The court affirmed injunctive relief for the § 1125(a) violation but reversed the award of damages.
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603 F.2d 7·
7th Cir.·
1979-07-06
·cited 46×
The dissenting judge believes the district court properly granted partial summary judgment for the union.
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669 F.2d 667·
11th Cir.·
1982-03-05
·cited 44×
A party is not indispensable under Rule 19 if their absence does not prevent complete relief among existing parties and does not practically impair their own interests or subject existing parties to inconsistent obligations.
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587 F.2d 642·
5th Cir.·
1978-09-28
·cited 44×
The appellate court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that while mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel a district court to retain an erroneously remanded case, it is limited to situations where the district court explicitly states reliance on non-statutory
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827 F.2d 63·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-11
·cited 41×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, as neither laches nor untimeliness barred the plaintiffs' due process claims, and the Eleventh Amendment and indispensable party arguments were also without merit.
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637 F.2d 816·
1st Cir.·
1980-12-10
·cited 41×
The court held that the insurance policy did not create joint and several liability for premium payments among the insured companies, and thus Over The Road was only liable for its own premiums.
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504 F.2d 979·
5th Cir.·
1974-12-03
·cited 39×
The court held that a finding of alter ego status renders the corporation's judgment binding on the individual, and that joinder of a partial subrogee insurer is not compulsory under Rule 19 in this specific context.
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468 F.2d 476·
6th Cir.·
1972-10-18
·cited 37×
The court held that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is an indispensable party to the action, requiring dismissal of the appeal without prejudice to allow joinder.
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414 F.2d 73·
8th Cir.·
1969-07-16
·cited 37×
The court held that the complaint states a cause of action for racial discrimination in employment and should be reinstated, allowing broad judicial discretion in fashioning remedies.
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753 F.2d 1512·
9th Cir.·
1985-02-22
·cited 36×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the employer based on contract interpretation, but correctly denied the motion to join employees as necessary parties.
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587 F.2d 1340·
3d Cir.·
1978-10-27
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge holds that the court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order, which effectively denied all relief for de jure segregation.
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583 F.2d 565·
1st Cir.·
1978-09-15
·cited 36×
The court affirmed the judgment but remanded for the district court to consider the indispensable party issue regarding the bank.
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484 F.2d 798·
7th Cir.·
1973-07-17
·cited 36×
The court held that the International Union was properly dismissed for not being named in the EEOC charge, but the dismissal of LOF and Local 19 was an error under Rule 19 because complete relief could be granted without the International, and dismissal would prejudice the plaint
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835 F.2d 305·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-12-11
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the exhaustion defense and that the preliminary injunction was improperly granted.
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685 F.2d 1284·
11th Cir.·
1982-09-13
·cited 35×
A stay order is a final decision, and thus appealable, if it effectively places a party out of court by imposing an indefinite delay. The district court abused its discretion by staying the entire action, rather than severing and staying only the third-party claims against Iran a
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848 F.2d 1441·
9th Cir.·
1988-01-13
·cited 33×
The court should follow precedent in Village of False Pass v. Clark, which dictates that an agency need only consider the current stage of development in its biological opinion when a segmented development plan allows for future review.
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793 F.2d 1034·
9th Cir.·
1986-07-03
·cited 33×
The court held that while U-Haul can sue for its own damages, it must join or obtain ratification from other U-Haul System members to recover damages suffered by them, and that the Lanham Act § 35 remedies are available for unregistered marks.
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603 F.2d 1065·
3d Cir.·
1979-08-08
·cited 33×
The court held that the district court erred in imposing liability on Publicker under the January contract without sufficient findings on agency or alter ego theory, and that further findings are needed to calculate damages under the UCC. The court affirmed the dismissal of Conti
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487 F.2d 571·
5th Cir.·
1973-11-20
·cited 33×
The court held that the contract was mutually rescinded due to breaches by both parties, but reversed the damages award, remanding for a full accounting that includes the corporation.
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442 F.2d 394·
5th Cir.·
1971-04-22
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Charles H. Glueck an indispensable party and dismissing the action for lack of complete diversity.
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525 F.2d 1007·
6th Cir.·
1975-11-26
·cited 29×
The EEOC is not barred from bringing an action to enforce Title VII rights based on an employee's charge, even if the employee later settled a private action or accepted an arbitration award, and unions not named in the initial EEOC charge can be joined if necessary for interpret
-
729 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1984-02-24
·cited 28×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted on claims of deceit and unfair practices, as genuine issues of material fact existed regarding misrepresentation and state of mind. The dismissal of the declaratory relief count was affirmed, but the restitution count wa
-
485 F.2d 78·
4th Cir.·
1973-06-04
·cited 26×
A subrogor with a retained pecuniary interest can sue for the entire loss, even if the subrogee controls the litigation and would ultimately receive most of the recovery, to avoid destroying diversity jurisdiction.
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411 F.2d 88·
3d Cir.·
1969-04-02
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge would reverse the judgment and order a new trial, finding the District Court erred in ruling a witness incompetent under the Pennsylvania Dead Man's Act and in its jury instructions regarding deviation from permitted use of a vehicle.
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692 F.2d 1239·
9th Cir.·
1982-11-02
·cited 25×
The Ninth Circuit held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to join indispensable parties.
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854 F.2d 1285·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-14
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding no discriminatory intent in promotions, but reversed and remanded the disparate impact claim regarding promotions and assignments due to flawed analysis.
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717 F.2d 1251·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-15
·cited 24×
The court held that the 1857 Executive Order conveyed title to the riverbed to the Puyallup Tribe and that the 1948-50 river rechannelization was an avulsive change, leaving title with the Tribe.
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662 F.2d 534·
9th Cir.·
1981-11-04
·cited 24×
The court held that employers were not indispensable parties under Rule 19 because complete relief could be afforded against the JATC, and the employers' ability to protect their interests would not be practically impaired by their absence.
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653 F.2d 1378·
10th Cir.·
1981-07-14
·cited 24×
The court held that the appeal was timely and that the district court properly dismissed the employer to preserve diversity jurisdiction, affirming the jury's allocation of fault.
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908 F.2d 1099·
2d Cir.·
1990-05-25
·cited 23×
The court reversed the denial of Dean Witter's motion for a stay pending arbitration, holding that the claims against Dean Witter in McCowan II were referable to arbitration under the parties' agreement. The court also exercised pendent jurisdiction to review Sears' appeal.
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727 F.2d 617·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-06
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed the claim for enforcement of the ICC order under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, but reversed the dismissal of the duty of fair representation claim. The court also reversed the dismissal of the claim that Conrail vi
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414 F.2d 311·
1st Cir.·
1969-07-31
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims could be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement because they shared a common and undivided interest in a fund, and that the class was sufficiently defined and not antagonistic.
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860 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1988-10-25
·cited 22×
The court held that diversity jurisdiction was properly established and that the trial court did not err in its rulings regarding jurisdiction, evidence, or trial conduct.
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668 F.2d 76·
1st Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 22×
The court held that Acton, as an indispensable party whose joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction, could not be joined, and therefore the action should be dismissed under Rule 19(b).
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590 F.2d 1209·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-12-22
·cited 22×
A prior judgment in a reverse-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit does not bar subsequent FOIA suits by requesters who were not parties to the prior litigation.
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495 F.2d 1095·
3d Cir.·
1974-04-18
·cited 22×
The court held that the petitions to intervene were untimely and therefore properly denied, meaning the school districts are not parties and cannot appeal the district court's judgment.
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883 F.2d 999·
11th Cir.·
1989-09-15
·cited 20×
The court held that res judicata does not bar Mann's claim and vacated the district court's summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings considering City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
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731 F.2d 457·
7th Cir.·
1984-04-09
·cited 20×
The court held that an insured's failure to provide timely notice of an occurrence, without a valid excuse, relieves the insurer of its obligations, regardless of whether the insurer was prejudiced by the delay. The court also held that the absence of another insurer did not depr
-
883 F.2d 890·
10th Cir.·
1989-08-28
·cited 19×
The court held that the Tribe is an indispensable party and thus the suit against federal officials must be dismissed, and affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the Tribe based on sovereign immunity.
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699 F.2d 1274·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-02-25
·cited 18×
A district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 when a necessary party could not be joined without destroying diversity jurisdiction.
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663 F.2d 1300·
5th Cir.·
1981-12-02
·cited 18×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support the verdict and rejecting the Oppenheims' various claims of error.
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598 F.2d 790·
3d Cir.·
1979-04-30
·cited 18×
The court held that the Consumer Product Safety Act's disclosure requirements apply to information released under the Freedom of Information Act, and that the district court correctly enjoined disclosure.
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365 F.2d 802·
3d Cir.·
1966-08-30
·cited 18×
The court held that the absence of an 'indispensable' party, Dutcher, was not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal, especially after trial, and that the jury's factual determination regarding permission should be preserved.