559 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 337 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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554 F.2d 1353·
5th Cir.·
1977-07-01
·cited 33×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding no intentional racial discrimination and abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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861 F.2d 1389·
9th Cir.·
1988-11-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the removed complaints and should have remanded them to state court. The dismissal of the first complaint should not have had claim-preclusive effect on the second.
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790 F.2d 624·
7th Cir.·
1986-05-12
·cited 32×
The court held that while the district court improperly resolved a factual dispute on summary judgment, the plaintiff implicitly consented to a partial bench trial, making the findings not clearly erroneous; however, the denial of leave to amend the complaint was an error.
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744 F.2d 354·
3d Cir.·
1984-09-28
·cited 32×
Pleading the issuance of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a Title VII employment discrimination claim, and a district court abuses its discretion by denying leave to amend a complaint to allege such issuance when justice requires.
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607 F.2d 1097·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-03
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and properly granted summary judgment on the original counts.
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749 F.2d 1519·
11th Cir.·
1985-01-10
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the plaintiff's drinking habit, granting a directed verdict on the duty to warn, denying a motion to amend the complaint, or in its assessment of costs.
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713 F.2d 618·
11th Cir.·
1983-08-29
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ploof's motion to amend its counterclaim and in granting summary judgment for Norton.
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695 F.2d 524·
11th Cir.·
1983-01-10
·cited 31×
A district court cannot sua sponte dismiss a case on the merits without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
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687 F.2d 761·
3d Cir.·
1982-08-31
·cited 31×
The court held that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to vacate the default judgment.
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810 F.2d 618·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-16
·cited 30×
The court held that a request for benefit distribution does not constitute a request for information triggering the ERISA § 502(c) penalty, and punitive damages are not recoverable under ERISA § 1132(a)(3).
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658 F.2d 859·
1st Cir.·
1981-09-11
·cited 30×
The admission of evidence found during an unlawful search, without proper limiting instructions, was not harmless error and requires a new trial. The district court also erred in denying plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to add the City of Boston as a defendant.
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486 F.2d 479·
6th Cir.·
1973-10-31
·cited 30×
The court held that the amendment to include the pain and suffering claim related back to the original filing, and that the settlement with a co-defendant did not fully preclude the plaintiff's wrongful death claim against the appellant, but remanded for allocation of settlement
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461 F.2d 890·
7th Cir.·
1972-04-13
·cited 30×
The court held that the complaint stated a proper federal claim under Section 1983 for arbitrary denial of constitutional rights.
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Joining a permissive counterclaim with jurisdictional defenses does not waive those defenses if the counterclaim is later withdrawn without leave of court.
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159 F.2d 239·
6th Cir.·
1947-02-07
·cited 30×
The District Court erred in denying leave to amend and in granting summary judgment, as the complaint raised genuine issues of material fact regarding mismanagement and breach of trust, and the court possessed jurisdiction over the in personam action.
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767 F.3d 1082·
11th Cir.·
2014-09-10
·cited 29×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of deceased smokers, 160 loss of consortium cases derived from those personal injury cases, and 2 wrongful death cases filed outside the statute of limitations. The Wilner Firm filed these ca
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869 F.2d 1023·
7th Cir.·
1989-02-22
·cited 29×
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint, excluding certain testimony, or denying the inmate's presence at trial, and the factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
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764 F.2d 381·
5th Cir.·
1985-07-01
·cited 29×
The court held that Auster's original complaint stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourth Amendment rights and that the district court should have allowed Auster to amend its complaint.
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The court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint, refusing to convene a three-judge court, as there was no genuine threat of irreparable harm or chilling effect on First Amendment rights to warrant injunctive relief.
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780 F.2d 124·
1st Cir.·
1985-12-19
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification due to failure to meet the numerosity requirement and in allowing the plaintiff to proceed pro se.
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704 F.2d 44·
2d Cir.·
1983-03-25
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting the defendant leave to amend its answer to assert res judicata nearly three years after the initial answer, on the eve of trial, and without compelling justification for the delay.
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696 F.2d 109·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-12-17
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as moot because the defendants failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that there was no reasonable expectation of recurrence of the alleged violation and that its effects had been completely and ir
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523 F.2d 340·
8th Cir.·
1975-09-03
·cited 28×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding racial discrimination in her non-renewal, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint with a new cause of acti
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366 F.2d 355·
9th Cir.·
1966-09-16
·cited 28×
The court held that the employer's fire protection services for businesses engaged in interstate commerce brought its employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and that the amendment to the complaint related back to the original filing date. However, the court remanded for in
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814 F.2d 1127·
7th Cir.·
1986-12-08
·cited 27×
The court held that VALIC's fixed annuity is an exempt insurance product under the Securities Act of 1933 and not an employee benefit plan under ERISA, affirming summary judgment on these claims. It reversed dismissal of conspiracy claims related to ERISA and the Securities Act,
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661 F.2d 1022·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-20
·cited 27×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint, and affirmed the finding that she failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
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223 F. Supp. 2d 1270·
M.D. Fla.·
2002-07-01
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint should be denied due to undue delay, prejudice, and futility, and the defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony should be granted because the expert's opinion was unreliable.
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811 F.2d 1099·
7th Cir.·
1987-02-04
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims for lack of federal jurisdiction and properly denied his motion to amend the complaint.
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810 F.2d 243·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-01-27
·cited 26×
The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, the award of holdover rent, and the final summary judgment on the monopolization claim, but vacated the order increasing post-judgment interest.
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The court held that a claim for substantive due process violation is not barred by the availability of state remedies, and that a municipal liability claim based on alleged policy or custom cannot be dismissed on the pleadings alone.
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767 F.2d 184·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Falstaff's proposed jury instructions and post-verdict amendments, but erred in not awarding Trinity the purchase price of the trash baler.
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628 F.2d 679·
1st Cir.·
1980-08-12
·cited 26×
The court held that the dismissal of the complaint against out-of-state defendants and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was proper, but remanded the case for redetermination of the motion to amend the complaint as to certain Massachusetts defendants and the United States.
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608 F.2d 15·
1st Cir.·
1979-10-30
·cited 26×
The court held that while the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint to add an unseaworthiness claim was based on an erroneous reason (futility), the motion should be reconsidered due to potential prejudice to the defendants and the plaintiffs' lack of diligence.
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556 F.2d 870·
8th Cir.·
1977-04-19
·cited 26×
The court held that the jury instructions on strict liability were erroneous because they improperly allowed the jury to consider the decedent's or employer's contributory negligence and maintenance failures as a defense.
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538 F.2d 904·
1st Cir.·
1976-06-25
·cited 26×
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the federal claim and the refusal to allow amendment of the complaint, but reversed the dismissal of the state law claim, remanding it to state court.
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482 F.2d 372·
1st Cir.·
1973-07-26
·cited 26×
A single district judge lacks jurisdiction to deny injunctive or declaratory relief or dismiss a complaint when a substantial constitutional question is raised and equitable relief is formally alleged, requiring a three-judge court.
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The court held that the Board erred in failing to consider whether the unions' unilateral imposition of production quotas and fines constituted a failure to bargain collectively under §§ 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act, even though these sections were not explicitly cited in the comp
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199 F.2d 566·
5th Cir.·
1952-11-04
·cited 26×
The court held that denying leave to amend based on the fact that the amendment would relate back under Rule 15(c) and thus deprive the defendant of a statute of limitations defense was an improper application of the rule.
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885 F.2d 531·
9th Cir.·
1989-09-06
·cited 25×
The court held that the Pinter standard for 'seller' liability applies to Section 12(2) claims, and that the investors failed to plead Section 10(b)/10b-5 claims with sufficient particularity. Leave to amend the Section 12(2) claim against stockbrokers was remanded.
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748 F.2d 774·
2d Cir.·
1984-11-15
·cited 25×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing claims against Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc. because Merrill, acting as the seller's FCM, breached its duty by certifying the EFP without inquiring into the seller's possession of the commodity, and that the dismissal of
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729 F.2d 605·
9th Cir.·
1984-03-27
·cited 25×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint without leave to amend, as the plaintiff had a right to amend her complaint as a matter of course or, alternatively, leave to amend should have been freely granted.
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698 F.2d 1174·
11th Cir.·
1983-02-22
·cited 25×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims against the United States were barred by sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act, and that the district court should have dismissed on jurisdictional grounds rather than for failure to state a claim.
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639 F.2d 1278·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-19
·cited 25×
The dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of Rule 15(a) is an unwarranted judicial amendment that improperly restricts a party's ability to amend a complaint.
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644 F.2d 690·
8th Cir.·
1981-02-19
·cited 25×
The court held that the district court erred in denying leave to amend the complaint, but affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the federal securities claim due to the statute of limitations.
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898 F.2d 470·
5th Cir.·
1990-04-18
·cited 24×
State law claims against an employer's ERISA plan for tortious breach of contract are preempted by ERISA, but claims against an insurance agent for fraudulent inducement to enroll in the plan may not be preempted.
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827 F.2d 1454·
11th Cir.·
1987-09-21
·cited 24×
Non-signatory subcontractors and sureties are not employers under ERISA, precluding federal subject matter jurisdiction for claims against them for a signatory's failure to make benefit contributions. The district court did not err in denying attorneys' fees and costs.
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780 F.2d 636·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-16
·cited 24×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under federal securities laws because their claims primarily involved breaches of state fiduciary duties and they had access to state law remedies. However, the court reversed the dismissal of RICO claims, allowing plaintiffs
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630 F.2d 1029·
5th Cir.·
1980-11-17
·cited 24×
The court held that the ordinance's "connection with criminal elements" language is void for vagueness, violating due process, but affirmed the district court's upholding of the age restriction.
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576 F.2d 1260·
7th Cir.·
1978-05-24
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint without granting leave to amend, as the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to correct jurisdictional pleading defects.
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532 F.2d 64·
8th Cir.·
1976-03-02
·cited 24×
The court held that the order denying leave to file a cross-claim was appealable under the collateral order doctrine and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave.