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416 F.2d 71·
9th Cir.·
1969-09-08
·cited 226×
The court held that the jury instructions overstated the per se rule for group boycotts under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that not every agreement to transfer distributorships constitutes an illegal restraint of trade.
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579 F.2d 126·
2d Cir.·
1978-05-01
·cited 94×
A conspiracy between a manufacturer and a competitor of a distributor to terminate that distributor is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, regardless of whether the manufacturer could have lawfully terminated the distributor unilaterally.
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740 F.2d 1499·
11th Cir.·
1984-09-10
·cited 81×
The court held that Midwest's motion to dismiss Gulf Coast's appeal was frivolous due to a severance order, and that PAX's appeal was timely because the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion was an appealable order. The court affirmed the jury's finding that Gulf Coast breached its con
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318 F.2d 283·
6th Cir.·
1963-06-11
·cited 78×
A manufacturer's termination of one distributor and replacement with another, without more, does not violate the Sherman Act unless it results in an unreasonable restraint of trade, such as price fixing or monopoly creation.
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985 F.3d 1350·
11th Cir.·
2021-01-26
·cited 45×
Acrylicon USA sued German flooring-resin manufacturer Silikal for breaching a 2010 settlement agreement by manufacturing and selling 1061 SW resin without permission, asserting claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
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796 F.2d 1216·
10th Cir.·
1986-06-25
·cited 40×
The court held that the trial court's finding of market power was clearly erroneous, and that there was no per se violation in the absence of illegal pricing or tying arrangements.
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472 F.2d 637·
10th Cir.·
1973-01-05
·cited 40×
The court held that the exclusive distributorship agreement and related contract provisions did not violate federal antitrust laws, as there was no evidence of per se violations like illegal tying arrangements or territorial restrictions, nor a violation of the Robinson-Patman Ac
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282 F.2d 924·
6th Cir.·
1960-10-12
·cited 36×
The court held that a contract granting a distributorship within a specific territory does not, by implication, create an exclusive distributorship, especially when the contract is clear and unambiguous and does not contain language expressing or implying exclusivity.
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68 F.3d 429·
11th Cir.·
1995-11-07
·cited 33×
CD Medical challenged an arbitration award in favor of Lifecare International on two grounds: that arbitrator Craig Stein was biased due to nondisclosures, and that the award was arbitrary and capricious. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's confirmation of the awar
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738 F.2d 405·
10th Cir.·
1984-07-02
·cited 33×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the defendant acted in good faith and for good cause, and that the distribution agreement was not exclusive, thus affirming the judgment.
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546 F.2d 30·
5th Cir.·
1977-01-26
·cited 27×
The court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue under Section 16 of the Clayton Act for a potential Section 7 violation, and that summary judgment was inappropriate as a material question of fact existed regarding the antitrust violation.
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466 F.2d 137·
5th Cir.·
1972-08-14
·cited 27×
The court held that the sale of Omega watches with altered serial numbers and false guarantees constituted unfair competition under federal law, and that the injunction should be modified to require specific disclosures.
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248 F.2d 23·
9th Cir.·
1957-08-07
·cited 27×
The court held that the trial court should have awarded interest on the trade acceptances from their maturity date and that the appellant is estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds and the Equal Dignities Rule as defenses.
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829 F.2d 729·
9th Cir.·
1987-09-30
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish injury to competition under the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act, and that the Ohio antitrust claims were therefore also properly dismissed.
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568 F.2d 1147·
7th Cir.·
1978-01-09
·cited 20×
The court held that erroneous jury instructions regarding antitrust law, particularly the application of Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. and the implication of anticompetitive purpose from an antitrust violation, constituted reversible error requiring a new trial.
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554 F.2d 276·
6th Cir.·
1977-05-03
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an exclusive distributorship agreement existed as a matter of law, reversing that part of the judgment. The court affirmed the directed verdict on the tort claims.
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529 F.2d 170·
9th Cir.·
1975-12-29
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of corporate mismanagement and substitution of distributors did not state a claim under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade or monopolization.
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794 F.2d 850·
3d Cir.·
1986-06-24
·cited 15×
The court held that an exclusive distributor who has developed separate goodwill in the United States for a foreign-manufactured product can own the U.S. trademark and is entitled to protection under Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 against the importation of genuine goods b
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622 F.2d 621·
2d Cir.·
1980-05-01
·cited 14×
An exclusive distributor lacks standing to sue for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act if they do not own the trademark or possess an assignment of rights, but may have a claim for intentional interference with contract.
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539 F.2d 907·
2d Cir.·
1976-07-13
·cited 14×
The court held that the defendants' actions constituted a conspiracy to violate antitrust laws, that the court had jurisdiction, and that the damages awarded were supported by the evidence.
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563 F.2d 54·
2d Cir.·
1977-09-21
·cited 12×
The court held that the jury instructions on 'restraint of trade' constituted plain error, requiring reversal. The court also found that Oreck failed to present sufficient evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade or anti-competitive effect under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
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605 F.2d 499·
10th Cir.·
1979-08-07
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the jury's award of monetary damages for breach of contract but remanded the equitable claims for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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602 F.2d 1173·
4th Cir.·
1979-07-30
·cited 10×
The court held that while the trial court properly denied judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 'lowest price' breach claim, it should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the lost profits claim due to insufficient proof of lost sales.
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263 F.2d 360·
2d Cir.·
1959-02-11
·cited 10×
A third party who induces a supplier to breach an exclusive distributorship contract, knowing of the contract and appropriating the distributor's profits, is liable for tortious interference, and the sale of a profitable business to achieve this is not privileged.
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128 F.2d 146·
10th Cir.·
1942-04-24
·cited 10×
The court held that the trial court's finding of a valid contract with a specific duration was supported by substantial evidence and that the agent had apparent authority to bind the principal.
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877 F.2d 1524·
11th Cir.·
1989-07-25
·cited 9×
The court held that the district court erred by submitting the issue of contract integration to the jury, rather than making a preliminary determination as required by the parol evidence rule.
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874 F.2d 1581·
11th Cir.·
1989-06-13
·cited 8×
The appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot because the requested injunction's end date has passed.
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547 F.2d 1024·
8th Cir.·
1976-12-28
·cited 8×
The court held that an exclusive distributorship agreement silent as to duration is terminable at will after a reasonable time, and the franchisor is not liable for breach of contract if the distributor has had a reasonable opportunity to recoup its investment.
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196 So. 2d 474·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1967-03-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting parol testimony to clarify ambiguous contract provisions regarding sales rights and quota terms, and that the jury's damages award had a reasonable basis in the evidence.
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801 F.2d 1001·
7th Cir.·
1986-09-26
·cited 6×
The court held that a merger of an exclusive distributor with a competitor of the supplier does not automatically constitute a breach of contract or improper delegation under the UCC.
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554 F.2d 1376·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-24
·cited 6×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the contract was renewed and that Shakespeare's actions were not justified, but a new trial is required on compensatory damages.
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478 F.2d 1111·
8th Cir.·
1973-05-18
·cited 6×
The court held that an oral exclusive distributorship agreement, even if performance could extend beyond one year, is not barred by the statute of frauds if performance within one year is possible. The court also found sufficient consideration and evidence of damages, but remande
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784 F.2d 746·
6th Cir.·
1986-02-27
·cited 4×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to fix prices or limit competition, and also failed to prove damages, thus affirming the directed verdict.
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746 F.2d 936·
2d Cir.·
1984-10-12
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction because the appellees failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law.
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736 F.2d 854·
2d Cir.·
1984-06-06
·cited 4×
The court held that Chapman was in contempt for violating the permanent injunction after its entry, but not for the period before the permanent injunction was issued due to lack of notice. The court affirmed the clarifying order and the award of costs and fees.
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583 F.2d 1056·
8th Cir.·
1978-09-15
·cited 4×
The majority holds that the $27,500 awarded by the district court is not unreasonable as a matter of law.
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246 F.2d 240·
5th Cir.·
1957-06-20
·cited 4×
The court held that the distributorship agreement was terminable at will without notice under Mississippi law, and that even if notice was required, the notice given was reasonable and damages were not sufficiently proven.
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884 F.2d 149·
4th Cir.·
1989-09-01
·cited 2×
The court held that a supplier's cessation of business does not constitute a breach of an exclusive distributorship agreement absent express contractual intent to the contrary, and that a limited warranty clause precludes claims for consequential damages.
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620 F.2d 750·
10th Cir.·
1980-04-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged a combination or conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to withstand a motion to dismiss.
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551 F.2d 125·
6th Cir.·
1977-03-22
·cited 2×
The court held that an alleged antitrust violation is not a valid defense to the enforcement of a distributorship agreement when the violation was not pleaded and enforcement does not directly facilitate the prohibited restraint.
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394 F.2d 413·
4th Cir.·
1968-04-25
·cited 2×
An exclusive distributorship agreement, even if terminable at will, requires reasonable notice of termination if the distributor provides consideration beyond mere best efforts, such as agreeing not to sell competing products.
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277 F.2d 94·
D.C. Cir.·
1960-03-17
·cited 2×
The Attorney General did not acquire sufficient ownership rights in the 'Zeiss' trademark through various seizures and vesting orders to prohibit its use by others, as the trademark was treated as a 'naked' mark separated from an appurtenant business.
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901 F.2d 181·
1st Cir.·
1990-04-17
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the supplier provided adequate notice before terminating the distributorship agreement, as the extensive negotiations alerted the distributor to the possibility of termination.
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205 F.2d 583·
7th Cir.·
1953-07-03
The court held that the sale of surplus radios to Arcade constituted a sale under 'special circumstances' as defined in the distributor contract, and affirmed the dismissal of claims based on fraud and breach of contract related to this sale. The court reversed the judgment for R