-
511 F.2d 710·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-21
·cited 169×
-
784 F.2d 577·
5th Cir.·
1986-02-04
·cited 151×
The court held that a loss of consortium claim, arising from a spouse's bodily injury, is subject to the per-person limit of an uninsured motorist policy, and cannot be used to aggregate or stack coverage when the claimant spouse suffered no bodily injury.
-
385 F.2d 841·
5th Cir.·
1967-10-20
·cited 140×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the mixture of products was defective or unreasonably dangerous, and that the plaintiff was not within the class of intended users for the products.
-
485 F.2d 520·
5th Cir.·
1973-08-28
·cited 139×
The court held that the "locality plus" test for admiralty tort jurisdiction requires a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, considering all circumstances.
-
278 F.2d 79·
3d Cir.·
1960-04-06
·cited 137×
The court held that reversing an order granting a new trial, when the trial judge found the verdict against the weight of the evidence, is an extraordinary step without precedent.
-
853 F.2d 355·
5th Cir.·
1988-08-29
·cited 126×
A breach of implied warranty claim, pleaded separately from a DTPA claim, is governed by a four-year statute of limitations, not the DTPA's two-year limit. The DTPA claim itself was time-barred.
-
821 F.2d 1147·
5th Cir.·
1987-07-21
·cited 126×
The concurrence argues that the Erie analysis should give greater weight to state interests and less to federal forum interests in self-administration. It contends that the "twin aims" of Erie, as articulated in Hanna v. Plumer, are primarily to discourage forum-shopping and prev
-
281 F.2d 401·
5th Cir.·
1960-07-08
·cited 120×
A federal court in a diversity case must apply a Florida statute that excludes evidence if the statement was not provided to the injured party, even if the evidence is otherwise admissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), provided the statute is outcome-determinative
-
451 F.2d 505·
5th Cir.·
1971-09-28
·cited 113×
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299 F.2d 525·
5th Cir.·
1962-01-25
·cited 111×
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, as the annexed exhibits did not conclusively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the insurer's good faith and the insured's damages.
-
622 F.2d 657·
3d Cir.·
1980-03-18
·cited 105×
The dissenting judge believes the majority erred in their interpretation of Ohio's legislative and judicial roles regarding statutes of limitation.
-
572 F.2d 1119·
5th Cir.·
1978-05-12
·cited 105×
The court held that the determination of whether a delay in royalty payments was justified is an issue of fact for the jury, not for summary judgment, when a jury trial is demanded.
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665 F.2d 1367·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-25
·cited 102×
The court held that the evidence did not support a finding of gross negligence sufficient to award punitive damages.
-
754 F.2d 1212·
5th Cir.·
1985-03-11
·cited 98×
The court held that unresolved questions of fact regarding whether Georgia-Pacific was "engaged in the business of selling" used equipment preclude summary judgment. The district court's interpretation of the occasional seller doctrine was too broad.
-
781 F.2d 394·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-22
·cited 92×
A plaintiff in a strict liability action can recover punitive damages, and punitive damages are available in mass tort cases under Mississippi law.
-
621 F.2d 777·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-18
·cited 89×
The court held that the district court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to offer an expert's deposition as an admission of the defendant, but this error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not err in allowing cross-examination of the plaintiffs'
-
548 F.2d 281·
10th Cir.·
1977-01-12
·cited 88×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to preserve her objections to the Wyoming Guest Statute for appellate review due to a lack of timely and specific objections in the trial court.
-
405 F.2d 1061·
4th Cir.·
1969-01-08
·cited 86×
The court held that the federal standard, not the state standard, applies to determining the sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury in a diversity case. The court also found sufficient evidence of proximate causation to go to the jury.
-
378 F.2d 832·
2d Cir.·
1967-04-04
·cited 84×
The court affirmed the award of compensatory damages for injuries allegedly caused by the drug MER/29, finding sufficient evidence of causation for the jury to consider. However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to wa
-
624 F.2d 366·
1st Cir.·
1980-06-19
·cited 82×
The court held that 'export sodas' is a generic term in Puerto Rico, not protectable as a trademark, but remanded to determine its status in U.S. markets. The court reversed the injunction against Rovira's packaging due to insufficient evidence of consumer confusion.
-
613 F.2d 1385·
5th Cir.·
1980-03-21
·cited 82×
The court held that evidence of a surviving spouse's remarriage is not admissible to mitigate damages under Texas law, and that evidence of prior accidents and signal malfunctions at a railroad crossing is relevant to prove the crossing's hazardous nature and the railroad's notic
-
576 F.2d 606·
5th Cir.·
1978-07-13
·cited 82×
In Federal Tort Claims Act actions, federal courts must apply federal principles of collateral estoppel when considering the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment, not state rules.
-
322 F.2d 267·
5th Cir.·
1963-09-04
·cited 81×
An assembler-manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by a negligently manufactured component part, even if the assembler could not discover the defect through reasonable inspection.
-
832 F.2d 1358·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-05
·cited 78×
The court held that the insurance policy's exclusion clause unambiguously applied to the duty to defend, and therefore the insurer was not obligated to defend the insured when the underlying suit alleged only excluded acts. The court reversed the DTPA claim due to lack of evidenc
-
704 F.2d 963·
7th Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 73×
The court held that the jury's verdict was excessive because it lacked a rational connection to the evidence presented, particularly regarding lost earnings and future pain and suffering, and thus remanded for a new trial or remittitur.
-
783 F.2d 1337·
9th Cir.·
1986-02-27
·cited 72×
The court held that a manufacturer's ignorance of a product's danger is not a defense to a strict product liability claim under Washington law, and admitting evidence of such ignorance was an abuse of discretion.
-
346 F.2d 532·
2d Cir.·
1965-06-09
·cited 72×
The trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's finding that the defendant was not guilty of wilful misconduct.
-
583 F.2d 426·
9th Cir.·
1978-10-03
·cited 69×
The court held that a promissory note given in a commercial construction financing transaction is not a security under federal or Arizona securities laws, and a surety on a construction bond does not owe an implied tort duty of good faith to the obligee beyond the express terms o
-
573 F.2d 873·
5th Cir.·
1978-05-26
·cited 66×
The court held that damage caused by earth movement, even if triggered by flood, is excluded under the National Flood Insurance Act policies, but prejudgment interest is allowable under federal law.
-
294 F.2d 139·
5th Cir.·
1961-07-17
·cited 66×
The judgment before the court is not a final judgment and therefore not appealable.
-
733 F.2d 463·
7th Cir.·
1984-05-02
·cited 64×
The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 407, barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, applies in diversity cases even when state law would admit such evidence in strict liability claims. The rule's policy of encouraging safety
-
540 F.2d 762·
4th Cir.·
1976-10-14
·cited 64×
The court held that Georgia's wrongful death statute does not encompass strict liability claims.
-
526 F.2d 777·
3d Cir.·
1975-10-31
·cited 64×
The court held that the parties' contracts provided for consolidated arbitration, and that the defendant did not waive its right to arbitrate by filing a third-party complaint or seeking consolidation.
-
328 F.2d 483·
5th Cir.·
1964-02-04
·cited 64×
The court held that it should abstain from deciding the interpretation of insurance policy clauses regarding aircraft travel until Texas courts have clarified the applicable state law.
-
202 F.2d 893·
1st Cir.·
1953-03-19
·cited 64×
A federal court cannot apply a state statute to award pre-judgment interest in a maritime tort case, as such claims are governed by federal maritime law.
-
117 F.2d 488·
8th Cir.·
1941-02-11
·cited 64×
Service of process on the state auditor is valid against a foreign corporation that has done business in the state, even after it has ceased doing business, if the cause of action arose from its prior business activities.
-
724 F.2d 369·
3d Cir.·
1983-12-22
·cited 63×
The court held that a loss arising from an unknown design defect is a fortuitous event under Pennsylvania law, and thus can be covered by an all-risks insurance policy.
-
173 F.2d 5·
9th Cir.·
1949-02-11
·cited 62×
The court held that a surety under the Miller Act is liable for the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished under an implied agreement for extra work, even if not strictly within the original contract, and that attorneys' fees for an appeal must be sought in a court of
-
667 F.2d 1162·
4th Cir.·
1982-01-08
·cited 61×
The court affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not on the basis of the employee exclusion, but on the grounds of judicial estoppel due to the plaintiff's contradictory prior assertion of employee status.
-
278 F.2d 492·
5th Cir.·
1960-04-18
·cited 59×
-
923 F.2d 1441·
11th Cir.·
1991-02-01
·cited 58×
The court held that the new Georgia statute permitting reformation of covenants not to compete applies retroactively and that the preliminary injunction was properly granted under federal procedural standards.
-
678 F.2d 942·
11th Cir.·
1982-06-14
·cited 58×
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff cannot recover purely economic losses in tort when the damages result from a defective product and do not involve personal injury or damage to other property, absent an accident.
-
420 F.2d 1103·
5th Cir.·
1970-01-07
·cited 58×
The court held that the Ryan doctrine of implied indemnity does not apply to non-maritime, land-based accidents, and that Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Act bars a third-party tortfeasor from seeking indemnity from the employer.
-
391 F.2d 172·
5th Cir.·
1968-02-26
·cited 58×
A federal court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, based on a determination of state law, is improper if there is a good faith expectation that the claim is valid under state law, as this implicates removability and federal jurisdiction.
-
320 F.2d 853·
5th Cir.·
1963-06-25
·cited 58×
-
303 F.2d 333·
2d Cir.·
1962-05-04
·cited 58×
The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the action against Chase Manhattan and Mason because it was commenced when the summons was served, not when it was delivered to the Marshal, and that Hettinger was not barred by collateral estoppel from a prior dismissal
-
221 F.2d 189·
2d Cir.·
1955-02-17
·cited 57×
A claim agent's statement that it would not be necessary to file suit within the contractually stipulated one-year period constitutes a waiver or estoppel, preventing the defendant from asserting that limitation.
-
626 F.2d 933·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-02-21
·cited 56×
The court held that the District of Columbia does not recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and therefore, the plaintiff was not barred from pursuing his medical malpractice claim.
-
414 F.2d 591·
5th Cir.·
1969-07-11
·cited 56×
The court held that the manufacturer's substantial business contacts with Texas and the foreseeable introduction of its product into the stream of commerce were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the Texas Long Arm statute, even though the injury-causing product
-
335 F.2d 317·
5th Cir.·
1964-07-23
·cited 56×
An insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in the third-party complaint, not the ultimate facts, and a breach of this duty requires the insurer to take action to invalidate any resulting judgments against the insured.