-
806 F.2d 1324·
7th Cir.·
1986-12-03
·cited 53×
A hybrid § 301 claim accrues on the date of the arbitration decision, and the court will not consider tolling arguments not adequately preserved or developed in the appellate brief.
-
672 F.2d 207·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-03-09
·cited 53×
The court held that the timely-filing requirement for Title VII claims is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, but the appellant failed to plead or prove sufficient grounds for equitable tolling.
-
492 F.2d 292·
9th Cir.·
1974-02-22
·cited 52×
The court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and the defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her, affirming the lower court's judgment.
-
752 F.2d 410·
9th Cir.·
1985-01-22
·cited 51×
The court held that claims of employment discrimination against the Postal Service based on handicap are exclusively governed by Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that the appellant failed to exhaust these remedies in
-
738 F.2d 1092·
10th Cir.·
1984-07-05
·cited 51×
The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the statute of limitations issue to the jury, admitting evidence of the defendant's financial condition, allowing rebuttal argument on punitive damages, or admitting expert testimony, and affirmed the judgment.
-
485 F.3d 1273·
11th Cir.·
2007-05-11
·cited 50×
The dissenting judge believes that the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling because his petition was made untimely by the district court's improper, sua sponte recharacterization of his motion, which constituted an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control. The judge a
-
365 F.3d 1273·
11th Cir.·
2004-04-16
·cited 49×
Michael Donald Dodd, a federal prisoner convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and other drug offenses, appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition challenging his conviction on Sixth Amendment and Due Process grounds based on Richardson v. Un
-
434 F.3d 1254·
11th Cir.·
2006-01-04
·cited 48×
Three Salvadoran torture victims sued two former military leaders under the Torture Victim Protection Act and Alien Tort Claims Act for torture allegedly inflicted during El Salvador's civil war (1979–1983). The defendants argued the statute of limitations barred the claims, but
-
782 F.2d 227·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-01-21
·cited 48×
The court held that it has appellate jurisdiction over the case and that the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for Takings Clause and contract claims, but not for other monetary claims.
-
726 F.2d 333·
7th Cir.·
1984-01-19
·cited 48×
The court held that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to correct alleged errors of law made by the district court in the underlying judgment, and that a change in the law after judgment does not, by itself, justify relief under Rule 60(b).
-
856 F.2d 514·
3d Cir.·
1988-08-26
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint and in finding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA claims.
-
818 F.2d 1126·
4th Cir.·
1987-05-21
·cited 46×
The court held that the plaintiff's own testimony did not establish genuine issues of material fact regarding employer coercion, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
-
755 F.2d 20·
2d Cir.·
1985-02-06
·cited 46×
The court held that the plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim was time-barred because he failed to file his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 300-day statutory period after receiving notice of termination. The court
-
598 F.2d 829·
3d Cir.·
1979-05-14
·cited 46×
The court held that the time limits for filing a charge under Title VII are not jurisdictional but are subject to equitable tolling, but affirmed the lower court's refusal to toll the time period in this specific case.
-
843 F.2d 631·
1st Cir.·
1988-04-07
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court erred by not considering the plaintiffs' equitable tolling claim, which was sufficiently raised in the pleadings and memoranda, before granting judgment on the pleadings.
-
579 F.2d 1067·
7th Cir.·
1978-07-21
·cited 45×
The court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may apply to claims under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, even when the statute of limitations contains unequivocal language like 'in no event'.
-
2006 WL 3755195·
N.D. Fla.·
2024-08-20
·cited 44×
The court held that the petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition is time-barred under AEDPA's one-year limitations period.
-
846 F.2d 1190·
9th Cir.·
1988-05-16
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but erred in dismissing claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and the RICO and state law claims, which should be remanded for further proceedings on statutes of limitation
-
720 F.2d 1082·
9th Cir.·
1983-11-21
·cited 44×
A pro se litigant's request for appointment of counsel, filed within the jurisdictional time limit and containing a description of the claim and administrative dispositions, can be considered the filing of a civil action under Title VII, and the proper defendant can be identified
-
616 F.2d 394·
9th Cir.·
1980-02-26
·cited 44×
The court held that the statute of limitations for Mt. Hood's antitrust claim was equitably tolled during the pendency of its related administrative proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
-
446 F.2d 338·
5th Cir.·
1971-06-22
·cited 44×
The court held that the plaintiff's inability to procure a copy of the allegedly infringing book, despite knowledge of its existence, did not constitute fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under general equitable principles.
-
639 F.2d 588·
10th Cir.·
1980-10-21
·cited 43×
The court granted reconsideration, holding that since no general damages were awarded, layoff allowances could not be deducted, and thus Kassens and Robertson should receive the full amount of extended layoff allowances.
-
581 F.2d 1287·
7th Cir.·
1978-08-24
·cited 43×
The 180-day notice requirement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and may be tolled on equitable grounds, particularly when the employer fails to post required notices of employee rights.
-
667 F.2d 1074·
3d Cir.·
1981-12-01
·cited 42×
The court held that Title VII charges filed after the 180-day period following the promulgation of a discriminatory eligibility roster, but before the roster's use for hiring, were untimely. The court also held that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 require proof of intentional discr
-
628 F.2d 949·
6th Cir.·
1980-08-11
·cited 42×
The Sixth Circuit en banc held that the 180-day notice requirement under the ADEA is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, allowing for equitable tolling, and overruled prior precedent to the contrary.
-
575 F.2d 363·
2d Cir.·
1978-04-04
·cited 42×
The court held that the time limitations for filing a notice of intent to sue under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are strict preconditions to filing a civil action, not statutes of limitation subject to equitable modification.
-
600 F.2d 24·
6th Cir.·
1979-06-04
·cited 41×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted, as conflicting evidence existed regarding whether the employer fraudulently induced the employee to delay filing his age discrimination claim, and that the jury should determine these factual issues.
-
18 F.3d 899·
11th Cir.·
1994-04-07
·cited 40×
Gordon and Laura Jones sued their financial advisor John Childers and his firm Talent Services, Inc. (TSI) for fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and Florida civil RICO violations arising from Childers' misrepresentations regarding risky Israeli tax
-
621 F.2d 117·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-07
·cited 40×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to comply with statutory limitations periods for Title VII actions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to amend.
-
605 F.2d 1121·
9th Cir.·
1979-10-04
·cited 40×
The court held that res judicata barred the claim regarding mass arrests, and the blacklist claim was barred by the statute of limitations. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the disciplinary proceedings claim, allowing plaintiffs to rely on a prior limited due proce
-
796 F.2d 924·
7th Cir.·
1986-07-17
·cited 39×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding his mental capacity to file a timely administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
-
739 F.2d 686·
1st Cir.·
1984-07-27
·cited 39×
The court held that the appellants' claims were time-barred under the applicable six-month statute of limitations, and their LMRDA claim lacked standing.
-
707 F.2d 1030·
9th Cir.·
1983-06-07
·cited 39×
The court held that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled under California law because the prior NLRB proceedings provided sufficient notice, the defendant suffered no prejudice, and the plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith.
-
603 So. 2d 1334·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1992-08-12
·cited 38×
Alachua County appealed a foreclosure judgment on two mortgages, contending that Cheshire's foreclosure action was barred by Florida's five-year statute of limitations on mortgage liens. The court affirmed, holding that equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling precluded the Co
-
817 F.2d 1559·
11th Cir.·
1987-06-02
·cited 38×
The court held that equitable tolling of the ADEA filing period may apply when an employer actively seeks to place the employee in a new position, and summary judgment is inappropriate when factual issues regarding tolling exist.
-
766 F.2d 490·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-23
·cited 38×
The court held that a Title VII plaintiff who voluntarily enrolls in full-time law school, thereby removing herself from the general labor market, is not entitled to back pay, even if she would have left school for the specific job she was denied.
-
650 F.2d 342·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-12-05
·cited 38×
The court held that the statute of limitations should be applied prospectively, and that appellants have a private right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
-
839 F.3d 958·
11th Cir.·
2016-10-05
·cited 37×
The Eleventh Circuit held that a job applicant cannot bring a disparate impact claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because the relevant statutory provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), applies only to individuals with "status as an employee." The court also hel
-
644 F.2d 811·
9th Cir.·
1981-05-07
·cited 37×
The court held that a plaintiff waives a Title VII claim by failing to include it in an amended complaint, and that post-discharge retaliatory conduct and adverse references can constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
-
503 F.2d 364·
7th Cir.·
1974-04-10
·cited 37×
The court held that the Midwest Stock Exchange did not breach its duty of self-regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and therefore did not aid and abet the securities fraud perpetrated by Leston B. Nay.
-
120 F.3d 222·
11th Cir.·
1997-08-22
·cited 36×
David Hanna, an AT&T employee, filed an age discrimination claim under the ADEA after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the statute of limitations from two or three years to 90 days from EEOC termination. The Eleventh Circuit held that the new 90-day limitations period applied
-
750 F.2d 1447·
9th Cir.·
1985-01-11
·cited 36×
The court held that the six-month statute of limitations under the NLRA applies retroactively to Aragon's claims, barring them, and that her malpractice claim against counsel was improperly dismissed.
-
682 F.2d 714·
8th Cir.·
1982-07-02
·cited 36×
The court held that an employee's claim that he did not see a posted ADEA notice, standing alone, is insufficient to toll the statutory notice period when the employer has complied with posting regulations and the employee had reasonable access to the notice. The court also held
-
609 F.2d 583·
2d Cir.·
1979-08-29
·cited 36×
Summary judgment was improperly granted because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence to discover the alleged fraud within the statute of limitations period.
-
521 F.2d 632·
6th Cir.·
1975-09-04
·cited 36×
The court held that the notice requirement of the ADEA is a jurisdictional prerequisite and that the plaintiff's failure to provide timely notice to the Secretary of Labor requires dismissal.
-
901 F.2d 404·
5th Cir.·
1990-01-31
·cited 35×
The court modified its prior opinion, withdrawing specific findings of law and holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the retirement plan's effective date and a fiduciary duty to disclose.
-
742 F.3d 940·
11th Cir.·
2014-02-10
·cited 34×
Juan Carlos Chavez, a death row inmate scheduled for execution, appealed the district court's denial of his request for appointment of counsel to investigate and litigate claims based on Martinez v. Ryan. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Martinez creates onl
-
818 F.2d 1329·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-11
·cited 34×
The suit is barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud by November 1977, well before filing suit.
-
757 F.2d 548·
3d Cir.·
1985-03-12
·cited 34×
The court held that while the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statutes of limitation at issue, the doctrine of estoppel might, but the plaintiffs' offer of proof was insufficient to establish estoppel.
-
743 F.2d 1483·
11th Cir.·
1984-10-11
·cited 34×
The employer's failure to post notice of ADEA rights tolls the 180-day filing period only until the employee gains general knowledge of their right not to be discriminated against based on age, or the means to acquire such knowledge.