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631 F.2d 642·
9th Cir.·
1980-11-03
·cited 93×
The court held that the Tax Court's findings that the transactions lacked economic substance were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the disallowed deductions were proper.
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273 F.2d 867·
2d Cir.·
1959-12-17
·cited 50×
The court held that the elaborate transactions did not create genuine indebtedness or the payment of compensation for the use of money, and thus the purported interest deductions were not allowable.
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364 F.2d 734·
2d Cir.·
1966-07-22
·cited 48×
The court held that Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code does not permit a deduction for interest paid or accrued on loan arrangements that lack purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences.
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294 F.2d 56·
9th Cir.·
1961-08-28
·cited 46×
Prepayments on asserted loans for securities transactions, lacking economic substance and real indebtedness, are not deductible as interest. However, out-of-pocket losses incurred in such transactions are deductible as capital losses under Section 117(g)(2).
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198 F.2d 214·
2d Cir.·
1952-07-07
·cited 46×
The court held that the Commissioner could reallocate expenses under I.R.C. § 45 to clearly reflect income, even without tax evasion motivation, and that certain claimed interest deductions were improperly accrued retroactively.
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868 F.2d 851·
6th Cir.·
1989-02-27
·cited 44×
The court held that the taxpayers' purchase of art reproduction masters lacked economic substance and was motivated by tax benefits, thus disallowing deductions and credits and affirming additional interest.
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862 F.2d 400·
2d Cir.·
1988-11-23
·cited 35×
The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the crude oil futures straddle trades were sham transactions and their losses were not deductible. The court also upheld the imposition of a negligence penalty and the retroactive application of a higher interest rate for
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804 F.2d 1441·
9th Cir.·
1986-11-25
·cited 35×
The court held that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, collateral estoppel did not bar the conspiracy conviction, the evidence was sufficient, and convictions did not violate due process.
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864 F.2d 1214·
5th Cir.·
1989-02-08
·cited 32×
The court held that the straddle transactions lacked economic substance and were not entered into primarily for profit, thus disallowing the claimed tax deductions.
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348 F.2d 932·
Ct. Cl.·
1965-07-16
·cited 28×
The court held that the taxpayers' loss from an annuity transaction was not deductible under I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) because the primary motive was tax avoidance, not profit.
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892 F.2d 199·
2d Cir.·
1989-12-18
·cited 27×
The court held that summary judgment enforcing the indemnity agreements was improper because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether these agreements were part of an overall contract induced by fraud. However, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on
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861 F.2d 494·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-08
·cited 27×
The court held that the taxpayers' option straddle transactions lacked economic substance and were not entered into for profit, thus disallowing the claimed deductions.
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832 F.2d 403·
7th Cir.·
1987-10-20
·cited 26×
The court held that the partnerships were passive investors and the purported debts lacked economic substance, thus disallowing tax deductions for research expenditures and interest.
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328 F.2d 634·
7th Cir.·
1964-03-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the taxpayers' out-of-pocket expenses and claimed losses from sham securities transactions were not deductible as losses, professional fees, or capital losses because the transactions lacked economic substance and were entered into solely for tax benefits.
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304 F.2d 766·
7th Cir.·
1962-06-28
·cited 26×
The court held that a purported indebtedness was not valid because the transaction lacked economic substance beyond tax benefits, and therefore, no interest deduction was allowed.
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865 F.2d 1088·
9th Cir.·
1989-01-13
·cited 24×
The court held that the Tax Court correctly determined that the London option transactions lacked economic substance and were therefore not eligible for loss deductions under I.R.C. section 108.
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287 F.2d 429·
7th Cir.·
1961-02-27
·cited 24×
The court held that tax benefits are only available when the commercial substance of a transaction corresponds to its form, and that the petitioner's transactions lacked independent commercial significance.
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865 F.2d 97·
6th Cir.·
1989-01-06
·cited 22×
The Tax Court did not err in concluding that the straddle transactions were shams in substance, and therefore, the losses incurred are not deductible.
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145 F.2d 456·
10th Cir.·
1944-11-03
·cited 22×
The court held that the partnership and trust arrangement did not change the petitioner's economic status or control, and thus the income was taxable to him.
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820 F.2d 1543·
9th Cir.·
1987-07-08
·cited 21×
The court held that interest deductions for loans used in a scheme to create artificial tax deductions are not allowable, even if the loans themselves appear to create a legal obligation, if the transactions lack economic substance and business purpose.
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322 F.2d 733·
3d Cir.·
1963-08-29
·cited 20×
Interest prepayments on annuity policy loans, lacking economic substance and not constituting true indebtedness, are not deductible from gross income under I.R.C. § 163(a).
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314 F.2d 337·
5th Cir.·
1963-03-06
·cited 20×
Interest deductions were properly disallowed because the transactions lacked economic substance and did not involve bona fide indebtedness.
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287 F.2d 40·
9th Cir.·
1961-02-15
·cited 20×
The court held that the transactions did not create a genuine indebtedness, and therefore the claimed interest payments were not deductible.
-
765 F.2d 643·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-18
·cited 18×
The court held that the purported nonrecourse loan in the 1978 tax shelter was not a true loan for tax purposes, but rather a joint investment, and that the proceeds from the 1979 'gold option' constituted income in the year of receipt.
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756 F.2d 569·
7th Cir.·
1985-03-06
·cited 18×
The court held that the economic substance of the transactions, rather than their nominal form, determined whether the plaintiff qualified as a lessee for investment tax credit purposes. The court reversed the district court's decision, finding the plaintiff was entitled to the c
-
696 F.2d 1232·
9th Cir.·
1983-01-17
·cited 18×
The court held that the income, expenses, and deductions attributed to the trust were properly attributable to the taxpayers, and that the negligence penalty was appropriate.
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649 F.2d 1133·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-06
·cited 18×
The court held that the Tax Court's prior ruling in Dean v. Commission, which found interest-free loans did not constitute taxable benefits, should not be disturbed.
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272 F.2d 200·
9th Cir.·
1959-11-16
·cited 18×
The court held that the payments made by the taxpayers were not deductible interest because the annuity transactions were entered into solely to obtain a tax benefit and lacked economic substance.
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904 F.2d 477·
9th Cir.·
1990-05-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the lease payments covering the loan were not a "similar arrangement" to nonrecourse financing or guarantees under I.R.C. § 465(b)(4), and thus did not preclude the taxpayers from being considered "at risk."
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887 F.2d 577·
5th Cir.·
1989-11-02
·cited 16×
The court held that for an exchange of property to constitute a "realization event" for tax purposes, the properties exchanged must differ materially in kind or extent.
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857 F.2d 1383·
9th Cir.·
1988-09-30
·cited 16×
The court held that the taxpayers' mining development expenses were not deductible because the venture lacked economic substance and a profit motive, and upheld the imposition of negligence penalties.
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255 F.2d 128·
10th Cir.·
1958-04-23
·cited 16×
The court held that intra-family transactions designed to shift income lacked economic substance and were invalid for tax purposes, and that illegal or non-business expenses were not deductible.
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924 F.2d 1018·
11th Cir.·
1991-02-27
·cited 15×
The court held that the transactions lacked economic substance and were shams, thus the associated expenses were nondeductible, and the taxpayers were liable for additions to tax and additional interest.
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869 F.2d 135·
2d Cir.·
1989-02-23
·cited 14×
The court held that the defendants' tax loss schemes lacked economic substance and constituted sham transactions, and that their conduct was willful, supporting their convictions for tax fraud and conspiracy.
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678 F.2d 818·
9th Cir.·
1982-06-02
·cited 14×
The court held that interest deductions are not allowed when the purported nonrecourse debt significantly exceeds the property's fair market value, as such transactions lack economic substance and genuine indebtedness.
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562 F.2d 258·
3d Cir.·
1977-09-07
·cited 14×
The court held that the sale-leaseback transactions were not true sales but financing arrangements, and thus the rental payments were not deductible business expenses.
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335 F.2d 30·
2d Cir.·
1964-07-20
·cited 14×
Amounts paid as 'interest' on single-premium annuity policy loans, where the transaction lacked economic substance, are not deductible.
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305 F.2d 787·
8th Cir.·
1962-07-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the transactions lacked economic substance beyond tax reduction, rendering the corporate form a sham for tax purposes.
-
876 F.2d 616·
8th Cir.·
1989-05-25
·cited 12×
The court held that the Tax Court correctly determined that the cattle transactions lacked economic substance and were not recognized for federal income tax purposes, and that the penalties assessed were appropriate.
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364 F.2d 742·
2d Cir.·
1966-07-22
·cited 12×
The court held that a prepaid interest payment was not deductible as interest on indebtedness because the underlying loan transaction lacked economic substance and was a sham.
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332 F.2d 463·
7th Cir.·
1964-06-05
·cited 12×
The court held that the purported interest payments and other expenses related to complex securities transactions were not deductible as they lacked economic substance and constituted tax avoidance schemes.
-
331 F.2d 874·
Ct. Cl.·
1964-05-15
·cited 12×
Payments made as interest on a loan used to prepay insurance premiums are not deductible if the transaction lacks economic substance beyond tax reduction and is considered a sham.
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311 F.2d 894·
9th Cir.·
1962-12-28
·cited 12×
Deductions for payments made to an insurance corporation for annuity contracts do not constitute 'interest paid on indebtedness' if the transaction lacks economic substance.
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10 F.4th 1136·
11th Cir.·
2021-08-20
·cited 11×
David Greenberg, a certified public accountant involved in designing and promoting Son-of-BOSS tax shelter transactions, appealed the Tax Court's decision upholding the Commissioner's adjustments to his tax returns for 1999, 2000, and 2001, which disallowed substantial losses cla
-
939 F.2d 44·
3d Cir.·
1991-07-17
·cited 10×
Transactions devoid of economic substance are not recognized for federal taxation purposes and cannot form the basis for a deductible loss, even for commodities dealers under section 108(b).
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936 F.2d 736·
2d Cir.·
1991-06-26
·cited 10×
The court held that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys' fees for the 1981 petition and in refusing to recognize 'special factors' for a higher hourly rate, but erred in calculating cost of living adjustments from 1981 instead of 1986.
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915 F.2d 832·
2d Cir.·
1990-10-05
·cited 10×
The court held that the Tax Court erred in finding the film acquisition lacked economic substance based on a subjective, hindsight analysis of the film's quality and potential profitability. The court reversed and remanded for reconsideration based on objective factors present at
-
890 F.2d 848·
6th Cir.·
1989-12-04
·cited 10×
A savings association is not entitled to deduct losses from "reciprocal sales" of mortgage loans if the transaction lacks economic substance, even if technically realized and recognized.
-
897 F.2d 915·
8th Cir.·
1989-08-29
·cited 10×
The court held that the London option transactions lacked economic substance and were substantive shams, thus the claimed ordinary losses were wrongfully deducted.
-
804 F.2d 109·
8th Cir.·
1986-10-27
·cited 10×
The court held that the Tax Court properly denied innocent spouse relief for the Electronics Capital Building (ECB) deductions because the taxpayer's claim of ownership had a basis in fact or law, but erred in denying innocent spouse relief for the stock loss deduction, as there