-
122 F.2d 675·
5th Cir.·
1941-09-11
·cited 287×
The court held that evidence of similar offenses is admissible to prove criminal intent when intent is an element of the charged offense, and that the completion of an entire fraudulent scheme is not necessary for a violation of the mail fraud statute.
-
603 F.2d 535·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-01
·cited 226×
A RICO conspiracy indictment adequately alleges an essential element when it charges defendants with willfully and knowingly conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) and describes the nature of the racketeering activities composing the alleged pattern. The definition of 'enter
-
294 F.2d 928·
2d Cir.·
1961-08-22
·cited 188×
The court held that while the shares should have been registered, there was insufficient proof to infer wilfulness and criminal intent for the broker defendants on the unregistered securities counts. However, the evidence against the 'management' defendants was sufficient.
-
471 F.2d 128·
7th Cir.·
1972-03-03
·cited 142×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the key witness's testimony, denying severance motions, or in its handling of the indictment's duplicity, but found Count III to be duplicitous and reversed convictions on that count.
-
462 F.2d 1205·
3d Cir.·
1972-05-22
·cited 139×
The court held that the indictment was not vague, duplicitous, or fatally varied, and that the joinder of offenses and defendants was proper, affirming the convictions.
-
378 F.2d 751·
9th Cir.·
1967-05-05
·cited 131×
The court held that the jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, were not misleading, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also held that a 'mail cover' procedure did not violate the relevant statutes or the Constitution.
-
77 Fla. 505·
Fla.·
1919-04-23
·cited 131×
D.E. Griswold was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses through a bogus telegraph operation and horse race betting scheme. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the indictment and claiming the continuance of his trial denied his constitutional right to a speedy tr
-
168 F.2d 846·
9th Cir.·
1948-06-21
·cited 107×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the evidence supported the convictions for conspiracy and false claims, and that alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant reversal.
-
618 F.2d 892·
2d Cir.·
1980-01-30
·cited 105×
The court held that the indictment was not duplicitous, the jury selection was proper, evidentiary rulings were correct, the government was not required to prove non-registration, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
-
515 F.2d 112·
3d Cir.·
1975-06-24
·cited 103×
The court held that the indictment was duplicitous by charging conspiracy and attempt in a single count, and that the erroneous admission of a tape recording without proper authentication and chain of custody, along with other trial errors, required reversal and a new trial.
-
809 F.2d 397·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-13
·cited 95×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions for interstate transportation of stolen securities, but affirmed convictions for conspiracy and misapplication of bank funds. The court also found no reversible error in the denial of severance motions or
-
122 F.2d 660·
8th Cir.·
1941-08-30
·cited 93×
The court held that the Anti-Racketeering Act is constitutional and applicable to labor officials extorting money for personal profit, even in the context of wage negotiations.
-
678 F.2d 1234·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-21
·cited 88×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a single conspiracy, not multiple independent ones, and that the convictions should be affirmed.
-
654 F.2d 319·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-24
·cited 85×
The court held that a conviction on count one must be reversed because the trial judge constructively amended the indictment by allowing the jury to convict based on aiding and abetting a misapplication by any bank officer, not just the one named in the indictment. Convictions on
-
175 F.2d 994·
D.C. Cir.·
1949-01-24
·cited 84×
The court held that appellants were not immune from prosecution based on their congressional testimony and that the indictment was not duplicitous. The court also found no error in the admission of evidence or the grand jury's composition.
-
522 F.2d 641·
7th Cir.·
1975-09-04
·cited 83×
The court held that the defendant's conduct, involving a scheme to defraud the city by concealing his financial interest in a contract awarded by the city and using the mails in furtherance of that scheme, constituted mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
-
160 F.2d 757·
8th Cir.·
1947-04-10
·cited 80×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the evidence supported the conviction, and the government's arguments were not prejudicial misconduct.
-
666 F.2d 469·
11th Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 78×
The court held that the indictment was not duplicitous or vague, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and any variance between the indictment and proof was harmless error.
-
464 F.2d 648·
10th Cir.·
1972-07-12
·cited 78×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts and rejecting numerous procedural and evidentiary challenges raised by the appellants.
-
331 F.2d 390·
5th Cir.·
1964-05-05
·cited 76×
The court held that while materiality was sufficiently alleged and other claims lacked merit, counts one and two of the indictment were duplicitous, violating Rule 8(a) by charging multiple offenses in a single count without proper instruction or election.
-
55 Fla. 167·
Fla.·
1908-01-01
·cited 76×
James N. Strobhar was convicted of embezzling $7,500 from the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and challenged his conviction on multiple grounds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the indictment was sufficiently detailed despite technical defects, that his prio
-
692 F.2d 565·
9th Cir.·
1982-10-27
·cited 75×
The court held that the indictment was not defective and that the district court properly rejected the duplicity claim on the merits. It also reversed summary dismissal of the Brady claim.
-
418 F.2d 71·
7th Cir.·
1969-09-18
·cited 74×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the admission of Elia's statement was not plain error despite Miranda issues due to lack of specific objection, and co-conspirator statements and state conviction records were admissible or harmless error.
-
381 F.2d 37·
9th Cir.·
1967-05-03
·cited 74×
The court held that the majority's decision to reverse the lower court's judgment was correct, but disagreed with the majority's reasoning regarding a violation of Rule 5(a).
-
717 F.2d 1238·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-19
·cited 72×
The court held that while the indictment was not duplicitous, the jury instructions were flawed because they did not require unanimous agreement on the specific scheme to defraud, thus requiring reversal.
-
226 F.2d 227·
9th Cir.·
1955-10-05
·cited 72×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the single witness's testimony regarding the falsity of the defendant's statements, and that the business records were admissible.
-
419 F.2d 1315·
10th Cir.·
1969-12-17
·cited 70×
Convictions for aiding and abetting a riot under 18 U.S.C. § 1792 are reversed because the indictments failed to allege or prove that anyone instigated or caused the riot, and mere participation is insufficient. Convictions for assault are affirmed or reversed based on specific f
-
31 Fla. 428·
Fla.·
1893-01-01
·cited 67×
Elias J. Kennedy was convicted of larceny of $2,500 in gold and currency from William and Emma Kennedy in Walton County, Florida. He appeals his conviction on multiple grounds, including challenges to the indictment's duplicity, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on ownership
-
202 F.2d 830·
5th Cir.·
1953-03-11
·cited 65×
The court held that the indictment was not duplicitous, the offenses were distinct, the victim was competent to testify, and the statutory language regarding causing transportation was correctly interpreted.
-
852 F.2d 1522·
9th Cir.·
1988-07-06
·cited 64×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error in the pretrial, trial, or sentencing phases.
-
330 F.2d 205·
D.C. Cir.·
1963-12-12
·cited 64×
The court held that a conviction for rape requires corroboration of identity, and reversed the conviction of Franklin due to insufficient corroboration. The court affirmed the convictions of Brooks and Price.
-
136 F.2d 661·
7th Cir.·
1943-06-29
·cited 63×
Statements procured from defendants prior to being taken before a committing officer were improperly admitted, necessitating reversal, as the defendants' purported waivers did not negate the requirement of immediate arraignment under the applicable statutes.
-
415 F.2d 621·
5th Cir.·
1969-08-27
·cited 61×
The court held that the jury selection system was not illegal per se, the conspiracy count was not duplicitous, successive sentences were permissible, and the trial court did not err in denying motions to suppress evidence, grant a continuance, or in giving the Allen charge.
-
735 F.2d 461·
11th Cir.·
1984-07-02
·cited 60×
The court held that a single conspiracy charge with multiple objectives is not duplicitous, and a conviction can stand if evidence proves at least one objective. However, enhanced sentences require specific allegations in the indictment regarding the quantity or type of substance
-
386 F.2d 132·
9th Cir.·
1967-11-16
·cited 60×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for mail fraud, and that various trial court rulings, including the denial of motions to suppress evidence, dismiss the indictment, and exclude certain evidence, were not erroneous.
-
126 F.2d 81·
7th Cir.·
1942-02-17
·cited 58×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for mail fraud and violations of the Securities Act, and that the trial court did not err in its rulings.
-
617 F.2d 571·
10th Cir.·
1980-03-19
·cited 56×
The court held that the trial judge's jury instructions, which differed from the pretrial ruling on the required elements of proof for the scheme to defraud, did not prejudice the defendant.
-
546 F.2d 833·
9th Cir.·
1976-12-13
·cited 56×
The court held that charging both making a false statement and concealment of a material fact under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in a single count, based on a single document, does not render the indictment duplicitous.
-
275 F.2d 318·
7th Cir.·
1960-02-29
·cited 56×
The court held that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause because it relied on hearsay from an unreliable and undisclosed source, rendering the subsequent search and seizure unlawful. Additionally, count 2 of the indictment was fatally defectiv
-
675 F.2d 894·
7th Cir.·
1982-04-14
·cited 52×
The court held that a count charging obstruction of justice was not prejudicially duplicitous, joinder of counts was proper, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
525 F.2d 943·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-12
·cited 51×
The court held that only defendants with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the wiretapped conversations or premises have standing to challenge the wiretaps, and that the convictions of those with standing were based on evidence tainted by illegal wiretaps.
-
285 F.2d 567·
5th Cir.·
1960-12-28
·cited 51×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient and that the appellant's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the indictment, scienter, duplicity, judicial comments, prosecutorial remarks, and judicial disqualification were without merit.
-
171 F.2d 921·
1st Cir.·
1948-12-03
·cited 51×
The court held that overt acts, even if consisting of speech or preparation for speech, can constitute treason if done with intent to betray the enemy, and that motive is irrelevant if intent to betray is proven.
-
844 F.2d 1397·
9th Cir.·
1988-04-25
·cited 50×
The court held that Count I of the indictment was duplicitous, charging two conspiracies, and reversed convictions on that count due to the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. All other convictions were affirmed.
-
464 F.2d 424·
2d Cir.·
1972-07-07
·cited 50×
The court held that the jury charge on conspiracy to commit bribery was not misleading, and the appellant's conduct constituted an official act within the meaning of the bribery statute. The court also rejected the appellant's claims regarding duplicity in the conspiracy count an
-
896 F.2d 88·
5th Cir.·
1990-02-28
·cited 48×
The court held that a significant error in jury instructions, which allowed conviction based solely on omission rather than an affirmative act, requires reversal and remand for a new trial. Other claims of error were found to be without merit.
-
610 F.2d 1266·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-01
·cited 48×
The court held that while the government's deportation of potential witnesses violated defendants' constitutional rights, the convictions are affirmed because defendants failed to suggest how the witnesses' testimony would have been helpful and showed a lack of diligence in prese
-
622 F.2d 100·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-17
·cited 47×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the district court's rulings on venue, discovery, bill of particulars, suppression of statements, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or denial of acquittal/new trial motions.
-
114 Fla. 312·
Fla.·
1934-03-21
·cited 47×
C. A. Skipper was convicted of embezzling $15,000 from the Highlands County Bank while employed as an agent. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the indictment, the trial judge's impartiality, and the sufficiency of evidence.
-
361 F.2d 694·
2d Cir.·
1966-06-07
·cited 46×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for attempting to bribe a juror was supported by sufficient evidence and that her trial was not prejudiced by prosecutorial tactics or jury instructions.