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238 F.2d 852·
8th Cir.·
1956-12-18
·cited 34×
The All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)) does not provide a means to review a district court's order transferring a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if the transfer is erroneous.
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805 F.2d 834·
9th Cir.·
1986-12-01
·cited 33×
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that Montana had personal jurisdiction and venue over Commonwealth Edison, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining Edison's later-filed Illinois action.
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318 F.2d 822·
10th Cir.·
1963-06-13
·cited 31×
A corporation is considered 'doing business' for venue purposes if its activities in the forum state are substantial, continuous, and regular, meeting the minimum contacts standard for amenability to service of process.
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907 F.2d 277·
2d Cir.·
1990-06-27
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court's injunction, channeling all litigation concerning the Consent Decree to the Southern District of New York, was a valid exercise of authority under the All Writs Act to protect its jurisdiction.
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624 F.2d 726·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-22
·cited 8×
The court held that the transferee district court, after a § 1404(a) transfer, must apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court, which would have applied Ohio's statute of limitations in this case.
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826 F.2d 923·
10th Cir.·
1987-03-25
·cited 7×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a "pattern of racketeering activity" and the conduct of an "enterprise" as required by RICO, thus affirming the dismissal of their claims.
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843 F.2d 319·
9th Cir.·
1987-12-02
·cited 6×
The court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus, as the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in changing venue due to prejudicial publicity and juror financial interest, nor did it commit clear legal error.
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781 F.2d 39·
3d Cir.·
1986-01-13
·cited 4×
The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Kutner Buick was a holder in due course. The court found that Pennsylvania law does not recognize the 'close-connection' doctrine as a basis to defeat holder in due course status and that there is no affirma
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549 F.2d 93·
8th Cir.·
1977-02-17
·cited 4×
The court held that venue for individual tax refund suits against the United States is proper only in the plaintiff's district of residence, and a transfer for convenience is not permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2).
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724 F.2d 707·
8th Cir.·
1984-01-12
·cited 3×
The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction and venue, and did not err in granting a preliminary injunction to enforce restrictive covenants.
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956 F.2d 963·
10th Cir.·
1992-02-11
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions for a change of venue, that the fraud and breach of contract claims were supported by sufficient evidence, and that the jury instructions and punitive damages award were proper.