-
874 F.2d 1145·
7th Cir.·
1989-04-21
·cited 78×
The court held that the evidence presented at the first trial was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions, and therefore, their retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also found sufficient evidence presented at the second trial to support the conv
-
805 F.2d 210·
7th Cir.·
1986-10-22
·cited 46×
The admission of hypnotically induced testimony does not require reversal, but courts should establish standards for its admissibility.
-
686 F.2d 298·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-20
·cited 40×
The Court held that the defendant's reprosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the prosecutor's conduct, while improper, did not demonstrate an intent to provoke a mistrial, and the court reporter's negligence in losing a transcript did not trigger double jeop
-
705 F.2d 745·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-23
·cited 34×
The court held that a prior conviction reversed on grounds other than evidentiary insufficiency does not preclude a double jeopardy claim if the evidence at the first trial was legally insufficient.
-
600 F.2d 414·
3d Cir.·
1979-05-29
·cited 34×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the conspiracy continued into the statutory period, and therefore, the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was affirmed.
-
739 F.2d 885·
3d Cir.·
1984-07-12
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, affirming the convictions.
-
665 F.2d 90·
6th Cir.·
1981-11-25
·cited 24×
A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to prevent retrial if a state appellate court, despite finding evidence sufficient, reversed a conviction on other grounds, and the defendant raises a double jeopardy claim based on insufficiency.
-
592 F.2d 283·
6th Cir.·
1979-01-18
·cited 24×
The Court held that petitioners are not entitled to pre-trial habeas corpus relief on double jeopardy grounds because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit exposing them to the risk of a death sentence on retrial, even if the death penalty was not sought in the first trial
-
901 F.2d 522·
6th Cir.·
1990-04-24
·cited 23×
The court held that the admission of a witness's prior testimony without a sufficient showing of unavailability violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, and this error was not harmless.
-
741 F.2d 805·
5th Cir.·
1984-09-17
·cited 23×
The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State from seeking the death penalty again because the evidence presented at the first trial was legally insufficient to support a finding that the defendant killed or intended to kill the victim, as required by Enmund v. Fl
-
952 F.2d 866·
5th Cir.·
1992-01-23
·cited 22×
Retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when prior convictions were reversed due to errors in indictment or jury instructions, not insufficient evidence. The government's cross-appeal is dismissed for failure to timely file a required certificate.
-
607 F.2d 265·
9th Cir.·
1979-10-23
·cited 20×
The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause, as interpreted in Burks v. United States, bars a second trial when the evidence presented at the first trial was legally insufficient to support a conviction, even if the first trial resulted in a hung jury.
-
599 F.2d 113·
6th Cir.·
1979-05-09
·cited 20×
The court held that insufficient evidence was presented to sustain the conviction for causing the transportation of fraudulent checks in interstate commerce.
-
685 F.2d 369·
10th Cir.·
1982-08-09
·cited 17×
The court affirmed the district court's decision, with the concurring opinion agreeing with the result but disagreeing with one of the majority's rationales.
-
760 F.2d 1097·
11th Cir.·
1985-05-03
·cited 16×
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as interpreted by Burks and Bullington, prevents the state from seeking the death penalty on retrial when a prior federal habeas court found insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factors for the death sentence.
-
701 F.2d 670·
7th Cir.·
1983-03-02
·cited 16×
The court held that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the banks were federally insured at the time the false statements were made, an essential element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
-
673 F.2d 681·
3d Cir.·
1982-03-01
·cited 16×
The court held that it has jurisdiction to hear an intermediate appeal on a double jeopardy claim based on the insufficiency of evidence from a prior trial, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the convictions.
-
854 F.2d 412·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-02
·cited 14×
The court held that a retrial on a lesser included offense is permissible after a conviction on a greater offense is reversed for insufficient evidence, and that federal courts must defer to state court interpretations of state statutes in habeas proceedings.
-
807 F.2d 21·
1st Cir.·
1986-12-18
·cited 14×
A defendant cannot raise a double jeopardy claim based on alleged insufficiency of evidence from a first trial if the conviction was reversed due to trial error, not evidentiary insufficiency.
-
658 F.2d 383·
5th Cir.·
1981-10-07
·cited 14×
A state court's explanation that a prior reversal was based on 'trial error' rather than insufficient evidence permits retrial, and resentencing for manslaughter on a murder conviction is permissible if the risk of jury compromise is absent.
-
667 F.2d 1239·
5th Cir.·
1982-02-19
·cited 13×
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit retrial when a conviction is reversed due to trial error, such as the admission of inadmissible evidence.
-
790 F.2d 368·
3d Cir.·
1986-05-16
·cited 12×
The court held that the second trial's conviction, reversed due to insufficient evidence of sanity under the law at the time, barred retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that Burks v. United States applies retroactively.
-
959 F.2d 1227·
3d Cir.·
1992-03-18
·cited 10×
The court held that a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief before a state retrial when the prior conviction was reversed for trial error, as double jeopardy does not bar such a retrial. The court also found that the petitioner had adequately exhausted her federal due
-
877 F.2d 481·
6th Cir.·
1989-06-13
·cited 10×
The en banc court held that the prosecution was based solely on the now-invalidated intangible rights theory of mail fraud, requiring reversal.
-
702 F.2d 1079·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-03-11
·cited 10×
The court held that a criminal defendant cannot appeal a trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of evidence or a related double jeopardy claim until after a final judgment is entered, as these issues do not fall within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.
-
698 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 10×
The court held that a defendant's election of a two-tier trial system does not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first-tier trial.
-
920 F.2d 287·
5th Cir.·
1991-01-04
·cited 8×
A guilty plea to bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 requires a factual basis demonstrating the defendant defrauded a financial institution or obtained funds by false pretenses; a plea lacking such basis can be vacated, and the defendant may be allowed to plead anew.
-
788 F.2d 1101·
5th Cir.·
1986-05-02
·cited 8×
The court held that while the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from enacting a capital murder crime without an intent-to-kill element, the death sentence requires a showing that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, and that ineffective assistanc
-
691 F.2d 777·
5th Cir.·
1982-11-18
·cited 8×
The court held that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal of Carter's conviction was based on evidentiary insufficiency, not weight, thus triggering the double jeopardy bar under Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey, as clarified by Tibbs v. Florida.
-
677 F.2d 422·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-01
·cited 8×
The court held that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of abandonment, even though the evidence supporting the defense was weak.
-
767 F.2d 1206·
7th Cir.·
1985-07-11
·cited 7×
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars retrial when a conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence, even if the insufficiency was caused by trial error that prejudiced the prosecution.
-
935 F.2d 213·
11th Cir.·
1991-07-09
·cited 6×
The court held that a trial judge's determination that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, even if framed as a grant of a new trial to allow for appeal, constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, barring retrial.
-
593 F.2d 944·
10th Cir.·
1979-03-08
·cited 6×
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial of defendants on a conspiracy count when the trial court dismisses the count based on the insufficiency of the government's evidence presented during trial.
-
811 F.2d 952·
6th Cir.·
1987-02-11
·cited 4×
The dissenting judge would deny the writ of habeas corpus, finding that the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial due to prejudice, rather than insufficient evidence, does not bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
-
713 F.2d 1080·
5th Cir.·
1983-09-06
·cited 4×
The court held that the defendant's reindictment on more serious charges after his guilty plea was withdrawn did not constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness because the charges were not more severe than those in the original indictment, and his retrial was not barred by double je
-
862 F.2d 1311·
8th Cir.·
1988-12-07
·cited 3×
The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting habeas corpus relief, as the prior state appellate court decision did not find the evidence legally insufficient to support the initial conviction, thus the double jeopardy clause did not bar a retrial.
-
977 F.2d 1259·
8th Cir.·
1992-10-19
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the habeas petition, holding that the appellant procedurally defaulted his Double Jeopardy claim by abandoning the sufficiency of evidence issue in state post-conviction proceedings.
-
979 F.2d 109·
8th Cir.·
1992-10-16
·cited 2×
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to Missouri's persistent offender sentencing proceedings, barring a second enhancement hearing after the state failed to prove prior convictions in the first instance.
-
889 F.2d 1187·
1st Cir.·
1989-11-21
·cited 2×
The court held that the defendant's confession, though initially deemed involuntary by the trial court, was not in fact involuntary and was therefore admissible for rebuttal purposes, and that the sentencing guidelines were applied correctly.
-
785 F.2d 131·
6th Cir.·
1986-03-05
·cited 2×
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a second trial for habitual criminal status when the first sentence was vacated due to a trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence that would have cured the insufficiency. Additionally, Tennessee's habitual criminal statutes do not
-
688 F.2d 575·
8th Cir.·
1982-09-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a mistrial was declared due to inadmissible evidence, especially when the mistrial was not intended to provoke the defendant.
-
964 F.2d 325·
4th Cir.·
1992-05-07
The court held that applying the sentence enhancement for committing an offense while on release did not violate due process or double jeopardy, and adequate notice was given. However, the district court erred by denying the government an opportunity to present evidence on the am
-
879 F.2d 1203·
3d Cir.·
1989-07-19
The court held that the warrantless entry into Singer's home was not justified by exigent circumstances, rendering the aggravated assault conviction unconstitutional. It also held that Singer was denied effective assistance of counsel for the simple assault charges.
-
799 F.2d 661·
11th Cir.·
1986-09-05
A criminal conviction reversed solely due to improper venue does not bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, as venue is a procedural matter distinct from the sufficiency of evidence on the merits of the charge.
-
644 F.2d 308·
7th Cir.·
1981-03-11
The Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when a state appellate court vacated a conviction for insufficient evidence but affirmed a conviction for a lesser included offense.