-
290 F.2d 751·
3d Cir.·
1961-05-01
·cited 135×
The dissenting judge would affirm the conviction and commitment, believing the traditional insanity charge did not prejudice the defendant and that the defendant would receive beneficial psychiatric treatment under the Youth Correction Act.
-
239 F.2d 52·
D.C. Cir.·
1956-11-09
·cited 134×
The court held that the evidence presented, particularly the expert psychiatric testimony, created a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the robberies, thus precluding conviction.
-
44 Fla. 32·
Fla.·
1902-01-01
·cited 129×
A trial court properly admits evidence that a homicide victim died in another state when the indictment alleges only that the mortal wound was inflicted in the county where the court has jurisdiction, without specifying the place of death. A trial court may exclude evidence of a
-
450 F.2d 1032·
5th Cir.·
1971-10-25
·cited 90×
The court held that the admission of testimony from court-appointed doctors regarding competency, the use of medical reports for impeachment, jury instructions on the presumption of sanity, and the sufficiency of evidence were all proper.
-
489 F.2d 1145·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-10-04
·cited 84×
The court held that the intermediate appellate court should apply existing Supreme Court precedent regarding the burden of proof for sanity, leaving reconsideration to the Supreme Court.
-
488 F.2d 406·
5th Cir.·
1974-01-17
·cited 79×
The court held that the trial judge committed harmful error by instructing the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would result in the defendant's immediate release, as this improperly allowed the jury to consider punishment and was based on a flawed understan
-
232 F.2d 274·
5th Cir.·
1956-04-20
·cited 76×
The court held that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding the presumption of sanity and the elements required to prove insanity.
-
148 F.2d 665·
D.C. Cir.·
1945-02-26
·cited 74×
The court held that a jury's verdict on the sanity of a defendant, when properly instructed, should not be disturbed on appeal simply because it conflicts with expert psychiatric opinion.
-
284 F.2d 168·
D.C. Cir.·
1960-01-21
·cited 66×
The court held that the trial court erred in not directing a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity, as the evidence presented a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity.
-
241 F.2d 640·
9th Cir.·
1957-02-06
·cited 66×
The court held that it is bound by Supreme Court precedent and its own prior decisions to apply the M'Naghten rule, as supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, for determining criminal responsibility, and cannot adopt the Durham rule.
-
431 F.2d 907·
8th Cir.·
1970-07-17
·cited 62×
The court held that the defendant, an indigent, was entitled to an independent psychiatric examination and testimony under the Criminal Justice Act to support his defense of lack of mental competency.
-
340 F.2d 696·
10th Cir.·
1965-01-26
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the presumption of sanity and in admitting a psychiatric opinion report under the Federal Shop Book Act. The court also noted that a confession obtained without effective waiver of counsel rights should b
-
26 Fla. 11·
Fla.·
1890-01-01
·cited 58×
Green Hodge was convicted of murdering his brother-in-law Jesse Marlow by shooting. On writ of error, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant must prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
-
645 F.2d 1269·
8th Cir.·
1981-02-09
·cited 56×
The court held that the district court did not err in its application of the Speedy Trial Act, its rulings on the insanity defense and expert witness qualifications, or its jury instructions. However, the court vacated the sentence imposed on count I due to a potential due proces
-
396 So. 2d 184·
Fla.·
1981-04-09
·cited 55×
Gary Eldon Alvord was convicted in 1974 of three first-degree murders and sentenced to death. On his third appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, he sought post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, among other constitutional violations.
-
297 So. 2d 22·
Fla.·
1974-02-21
·cited 55×
The court held that the jury's determination of sanity is a question of fact and that the evidence presented was insufficient to create a reasonable doubt requiring the State to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
454 F.2d 885·
9th Cir.·
1971-10-20
·cited 54×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, the handling of the insanity defense, or the jury misconduct claims.
-
344 F.2d 508·
D.C. Cir.·
1964-11-09
·cited 48×
The dissenting judge would affirm the convictions, disagreeing with the majority's reversal based on the interpretation of murder statutes and evidentiary rulings.
-
399 F.2d 730·
9th Cir.·
1968-08-19
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for acquittal, as the evidence did not support an insanity defense based on pathological intoxication, and voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense.
-
129 Fla. 421·
Fla.·
1937-10-14
·cited 42×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a conviction for grand larceny because the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury that a prior adjudication of insanity creates a presumption of continuing insanity. This presumption can only be overcome by evidence of restored sani
-
325 F.2d 697·
5th Cir.·
1963-12-30
·cited 40×
The court reversed and remanded the perjury conviction, finding that the jury charge on the insanity defense was inadequately adjusted to the specific facts of the case. While the court found no merit in the assignments of error regarding the sufficiency of evidence for criminal
-
307 F.2d 597·
D.C. Cir.·
1962-03-29
·cited 38×
The court's holding is not explicitly stated as this is a dissenting opinion proposing a jury charge. However, it implies that expert testimony concluding whether an act was a 'product' of mental disease is improper and usurps the jury's function.
-
40 Fla. 459·
Fla.·
1898-06-01
·cited 38×
T. Ben Brown was convicted of manslaughter in the murder of John S. Weir and appealed, challenging five trial court rulings regarding jury selection, witness examination, and jury instructions on the insanity defense. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding no
-
92 Fla. 878·
Fla.·
1926-11-12
·cited 35×
L.S. Blocker was convicted of murder in the second degree after his first conviction for first-degree murder was reversed due to errors in the jury charge on insanity. On appeal from the second conviction, Blocker challenged the admissibility of expert testimony and the jury inst
-
57 Fla. 18·
Fla.·
1909-01-01
·cited 34×
Adam Johnson was convicted of murder in 1908 for a homicide allegedly committed in 1900. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by admitting an inadmissible certificate regarding Johnson's mental status at the time of d
-
366 F.2d 394·
9th Cir.·
1966-08-29
·cited 30×
The court held that the defendant was entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because his right to appeal was frustrated by his counsel's erroneous advice and the trial court's improper jury instruction on insanity constituted reversible error.
-
350 F.2d 408·
8th Cir.·
1965-09-08
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to consider the issue of sanity, that lay testimony regarding sanity was admissible, and that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
-
325 F.2d 162·
5th Cir.·
1963-12-12
·cited 30×
The court held that the defendant's evidence of being unable to refrain from doing wrong due to a mental defect, combined with the government's failure to meet its burden of proof on that issue, required acquittal.
-
165 So. 2d 436·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1964-06-17
·cited 29×
Charles Hixon was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his ex-wife but appealed on grounds of insanity. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the state failed to overcome the presumption of continuing insanity despite Hixon's prior commitment to m
-
270 F.2d 435·
9th Cir.·
1959-09-09
·cited 28×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gruesome photographs of the victim's dismembered body and in its jury instructions regarding the presumption of sanity.
-
767 F.2d 314·
7th Cir.·
1984-08-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendants' requests for psychiatric assistance or in refusing to instruct the jury on insanity defenses, as insufficient evidence was presented to warrant either.
-
583 F.2d 1288·
5th Cir.·
1978-11-13
·cited 26×
The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence of the defendant's sanity to allow the case to go to the jury, despite the defendant's expert testimony of insanity due to alcohol deterioration.
-
364 F.2d 572·
10th Cir.·
1966-08-17
·cited 26×
The court held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could decide whether the presumption of sanity had been overcome by evidence of insanity.
-
178 So. 2d 886·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1965-09-24
·cited 26×
James Robert Byrd was charged with assault with intent to commit murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Though committed to a state hospital as insane in 1961, he was declared mentally competent in 1964 and tried. The jury found him guilty of the assault, rejecting
-
98 So. 2d 795·
Fla.·
1957-12-11
·cited 26×
Willie Andrew Wells was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the presumption of insanity arising from Wells' 1937 judicial adjudicati
-
827 F.2d 889·
3d Cir.·
1987-08-25
·cited 25×
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 does not prohibit the use of evidence of mental abnormality to negate mens rea, but it does bar affirmative defenses like diminished capacity.
-
413 F.2d 411·
D.C. Cir.·
1969-05-08
·cited 25×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the trial judge could reasonably conclude the defendant's conduct was not the result of mental disease or defect.
-
243 So. 2d 144·
Fla.·
1971-01-06
·cited 23×
Jesse Daniels challenged his commitment to a mental institution pending trial on a rape charge, arguing the indictment lacked sufficient evidence and that the commitment statute violated due process and equal protection. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute and commitment
-
689 F.2d 128·
7th Cir.·
1982-09-23
·cited 22×
The court held that admitting evidence of a defendant's request for an attorney during custodial interrogation does not violate due process when used to prove sanity, as the deterrent effect on the right to remain silent is minimal and outweighed by the state's interest in provin
-
505 F.2d 774·
7th Cir.·
1974-11-14
·cited 22×
The court held that referring to a presumption of sanity in jury instructions is not reversible error when the jury is otherwise properly instructed on the government's burden of proof regarding insanity, and other trial errors were not prejudicial.
-
372 F.2d 629·
5th Cir.·
1967-02-14
·cited 22×
The court held that statements made by escaped convicts to the Warden after recapture were admissible, and that the trial court did not err in admitting the Warden's testimony regarding the defendants' apparent mental state.
-
731 F.2d 243·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-16
·cited 21×
The court should have permitted the defendant to submit his insanity defense to the jury.
-
330 So. 2d 110·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1976-03-09
·cited 20×
The court held that no reversible error was made to appear from the trial court's rulings and that the conviction should be affirmed.
-
520 F.2d 775·
6th Cir.·
1975-07-30
·cited 20×
The court held that a conviction based on no evidence of sanity, despite overwhelming expert testimony of insanity, violates due process.
-
494 F.2d 67·
9th Cir.·
1974-02-20
·cited 20×
-
87 Fla. 128·
Fla.·
1924-02-14
·cited 19×
L. S. Blocker was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after asserting an insanity defense. The Florida Supreme Court reversed because the trial court gave contradictory and prejudicial jury instructions on the burden of proof for the insanity defen
-
296 F.2d 422·
D.C. Cir.·
1961-10-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike government psychiatric testimony or the motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and that the robbery conviction was valid even if the intent to steal formed after the victim
-
805 F.2d 1458·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-15
·cited 16×
The court held that the retrospective application of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) did not violate the ex post facto clause and did not violate equal protection, as it rationally served a compelling government interest in ensuring jury determination of legal insanity.
-
804 F.2d 1574·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-04
·cited 16×
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, including its burden of proof and expert testimony restrictions, is constitutional. The defendant failed to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
-
701 F.2d 1228·
7th Cir.·
1983-03-09
·cited 16×
The court held that the Jackson v. Virginia standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence under due process does not apply to affirmative defenses like insanity, even if state law places the burden of proof on the prosecution.