-
670 So. 2d 932·
Fla.·
1996-03-28
·cited 70×
The Florida Supreme Court held that the Department of Banking and Finance need not prove violations by clear and convincing evidence to deny a securities registration application, but must apply that heightened standard when imposing administrative fines for alleged securities la
-
398 F.2d 111·
8th Cir.·
1968-06-27
·cited 69×
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812 F.2d 834·
3d Cir.·
1987-02-19
·cited 66×
The court held that the district court misallocated the burdens of proof regarding mixed-motive employment decisions under ERISA § 510 and that the applicable statute of limitations is six years, not six months.
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756 F.2d 524·
7th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 66×
The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that while the trial judge may have erred in some particulars regarding statistical evidence, the overall result was justified.
-
657 F.2d 962·
8th Cir.·
1981-07-21
·cited 66×
Race-conscious affirmative action plans designed to remedy racial imbalance are permissible under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the standards for reviewing such plans under Title VII govern review under Section 1981.
-
796 So. 2d 522·
Fla.·
2001-09-20
·cited 64×
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a district court decision invalidating Florida Statute 787.025, which criminalizes luring a child under twelve into a structure by persons with prior sexual offense convictions. The Court held the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overb
-
459 F.2d 1393·
Ct. Cl.·
1972-05-12
·cited 64×
The Court of Claims held that the Renegotiation Act and subsequent legislation leave the allocation of the burden of proof to judicial resolution, and that the Government bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in excessive profits redetermination cases.
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976 F.2d 393·
8th Cir.·
1992-09-17
·cited 62×
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's sentencing decision, finding that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to sentencing proceedings and that the district court's reliance on hearsay evidence was permissible. The majority concluded t
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582 F.2d 628·
C.C.P.A.·
1978-08-24
·cited 62×
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the International Trade Commission's determination that there was no violation of Section 337, finding the patent claims invalid as obvious.
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746 F.2d 998·
3d Cir.·
1984-10-29
·cited 61×
The court held that the district court erred in placing the burden of persuasion on the defendants regarding the plaintiff's qualifications for hiring, but this error was not reversible. The court also affirmed the deduction of unemployment and public assistance benefits from the
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839 F.2d 302·
7th Cir.·
1988-01-14
·cited 60×
The court held that the majority opinion overstated the significance of some shortcomings in the EEOC's case and overlooked flaws in Sears' argument, particularly regarding the 'interest' defense.
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580 F.2d 1193·
3d Cir.·
1978-07-17
·cited 60×
The court held that while the district court's definition of 'accident' was correct, the evidence presented was insufficient to support a jury finding of an accident. However, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to trial errors, including the exclusion of expert t
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733 F.2d 1511·
11th Cir.·
1984-06-08
·cited 59×
The court held that the "bursting bubble" theory does not apply to the presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b), and the employer bears the burden of persuasion on rebuttal. The court also affirmed the constitutionality of the presumption.
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658 F.2d 326·
5th Cir.·
1981-10-05
·cited 58×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims for discriminatory transfer and demotion were time-barred under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 due to failure to file within the applicable limitations periods. The court also affirmed the district court's findings that the plaintiff fail
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657 F.2d 750·
5th Cir.·
1981-09-30
·cited 58×
The burdens of proof in Title VII disparate impact cases remain unaltered by the Supreme Court's decision in Burdine, which applies only to disparate treatment cases. In disparate impact cases, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that challenged employment
-
731 F.2d 465·
8th Cir.·
1984-03-23
·cited 57×
-
745 F.2d 1468·
Fed. Cir.·
1984-10-17
·cited 56×
The court held that the Board of Appeals erred in dismissing rebuttal evidence of secondary considerations and in treating the prima facie case of obviousness as immutable. The court found the rebuttal evidence persuasive, establishing that the claimed invention would not have be
-
728 F.2d 1322·
11th Cir.·
1984-03-15
·cited 56×
The court held that the trial judge's jury instruction on intent, while erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant's intent to kill was not a contested issue. The court also found that the statutory aggravating circumstance was properly applied and th
-
714 F.2d 1144·
Fed. Cir.·
1983-08-15
·cited 56×
The court held that offering a product made by a method invention for sale more than one year before filing a patent application constitutes placing the method 'on sale,' thereby invalidating the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and that a post-judgment hearing can cure a procedu
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618 F.2d 1062·
4th Cir.·
1980-04-09
·cited 56×
The court held that the employer presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employee's termination, and the plaintiff failed to show age was a determining factor.
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645 F.2d 127·
2d Cir.·
1981-03-25
·cited 54×
The court held that the employer's argument that liquidated damages under the ADEA are discretionary based on good faith, as under the FLSA, is incorrect because the ADEA selectively incorporates FLSA procedures and does not include the Portal-to-Portal Act's good faith defense f
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584 F.2d 1306·
3d Cir.·
1978-10-05
·cited 53×
The court held that Pennsylvania's choice of law rules would extend its modern flexible conflicts methodology to contract actions, and under that analysis, Delaware law, not New York law, should govern the presumption against suicide in this insurance policy dispute.
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594 So. 2d 275·
Fla.·
1992-02-06
·cited 51×
Section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes, requiring a defendant to prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, does not violate the Due Process Clause because entrapment is an affirmative defense and the State retains its burden to prove all elements of the crime charged bey
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803 F.2d 261·
6th Cir.·
1986-10-14
·cited 50×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of age discrimination, as the employer's layoff decisions were based on legitimate business reasons and not age.
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729 F.2d 541·
8th Cir.·
1984-03-06
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict against Judge Corrigan for sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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346 F.2d 696·
2d Cir.·
1965-06-09
·cited 50×
The court held that a taxpayer challenging a tax assessment in a collection case bears the burden of persuading the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment is incorrect.
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79 So. 3d 755·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2011-11-16
·cited 49×
This medical malpractice case involves the death of a pregnant woman during cesarean delivery. The court addresses whether a trial court's restriction on cross-examination of a defense expert regarding unusually high rates of amniotic fluid embolus (AFE) diagnoses at the hospital
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682 F.2d 515·
5th Cir.·
1982-08-13
·cited 49×
The court held that there was substantial evidence of intentional, age-based discrimination to support the jury's verdict, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
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999 So. 2d 1029·
Fla.·
2008-12-30
·cited 48×
The Florida Supreme Court held that prior uncounseled misdemeanor DUI convictions cannot be used to enhance a subsequent DUI from a misdemeanor to a felony without proof of valid waiver of counsel, reaffirming and modifying its Hlad/Beach framework based on Florida's independent
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753 F.2d 321·
3d Cir.·
1985-02-01
·cited 48×
The court held that the admission of evidence of non-prosecution for arson was reversible error, and that the trial court's comments on witness fees were also improper, necessitating a new trial.
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725 F.2d 910·
3d Cir.·
1983-12-30
·cited 47×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions, which focused solely on 'but-for' causation and failed to adequately explain the indirect method of proving discrimination through pretext, constituted plain error requiring a new trial.
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194 F.2d 598·
3d Cir.·
1952-02-29
·cited 47×
The court held that the District Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea after sentencing, as the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving manifest injustice.
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823 F.2d 937·
6th Cir.·
1987-07-09
·cited 46×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the employer's stated reason for discharge was pretextual and that age was the actual reason for termination.
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819 F.2d 134·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-18
·cited 46×
The court held that the burden of persuasion shifts to the director or employer to rebut the interim presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b).
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732 F.2d 1037·
1st Cir.·
1984-05-01
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial testimony alone was sufficient to support the finding that the defendants lacked discriminatory intent, and that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination
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442 F.2d 1154·
3d Cir.·
1971-04-20
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the presumption of the Commissioner's assessment correctness should be weighed as evidence against the taxpayer, especially on the issue of willfulness.
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313 F.2d 483·
4th Cir.·
1963-01-17
·cited 46×
-
785 F.2d 424·
4th Cir.·
1986-02-26
·cited 44×
The court held that the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis should be invoked upon a single qualifying medical opinion or test, and that rebuttal requires consideration of all relevant medical evidence.
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786 F.2d 758·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-12
·cited 44×
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 is constitutional and was properly applied to detain the defendant pending trial, as the evidence supported a finding of danger to the community and risk of flight.
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548 F.2d 998·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-11-10
·cited 44×
The court held that under FIFRA, the burden of persuasion in suspension hearings rests on the registrant, not the agency, as FIFRA's 1964 amendment shifted this burden.
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794 F.2d 598·
11th Cir.·
1986-07-23
·cited 43×
The court affirmed the district court's finding of retaliatory discharge and ordered reinstatement, holding that the employer failed to provide a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for the employee's termination.
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775 F.2d 1572·
11th Cir.·
1985-11-15
·cited 43×
The court held that the jury instructions and Fla.Stat. § 713.34(3) created an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption regarding intent to defraud, and this error was not harmless.
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747 F.2d 689·
11th Cir.·
1984-11-29
·cited 43×
The court held that collateral estoppel should not be applied when the burden of proof allocation differs between the prior arbitration and the subsequent insurance coverage litigation, as it unfairly allows one party to benefit from the other's failure to meet a burden of proof
-
682 So. 2d 1092·
Fla.·
1996-11-14
·cited 42×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict in peremptory challenge jurisprudence by clarifying that once an objecting party makes a timely objection and demonstrates the challenged juror is a member of a distinct racial group, the trial court must conduct an inquiry into the s
-
774 F.2d 786·
7th Cir.·
1985-10-03
·cited 42×
The court held that the district court's finding of intentional sex discrimination was clearly erroneous and vacated the judgment due to the wholesale adoption of the plaintiff's brief as the court's decision.
-
675 F.2d 83·
3d Cir.·
1982-04-07
·cited 42×
The National Labor Relations Board's Wright Line rule improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer in dual-motive discharge cases, contrary to statutory provisions requiring the General Counsel to prove unfair labor practices.
-
606 F.2d 800·
8th Cir.·
1979-10-01
·cited 42×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the veterans' complaint with prejudice based on the doctrine of laches, finding that the company suffered prejudice due to the veterans' delay in bringing suit.
-
457 F.2d 210·
7th Cir.·
1972-01-04
·cited 42×
The appellate court reversed and remanded a judgment for an employee who sued for the balance of his salary after termination, finding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the employer to present evidence of an alleged oral agreement to compromise the claim.
-
760 F.2d 618·
5th Cir.·
1985-05-17
·cited 41×
The court held that a temporary injunction was not supported by a sufficient showing of irreparable injury, which is a necessary prerequisite for such relief.
-
657 F.2d 1322·
3d Cir.·
1981-06-29
·cited 41×
The court affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the invoked civil rights statutes, even if a disparate impact test were applicable.