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511 F.2d 985·
1st Cir.·
1974-12-26
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant's various claims, including Brady violations, insufficient indictment, denial of severance, improper prosecution mode, and ex post facto law application, did not warrant reversal of the habeas corpus petition dismissal.
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492 F.2d 1110·
5th Cir.·
1974-04-19
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions for continuance and severance, nor in refusing a tendered guilty plea, and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict.
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491 F.2d 337·
6th Cir.·
1974-02-13
·cited 18×
The court held that the admission of co-defendants' confessions, even with limiting instructions, violated the confrontation clause unless the statements were adopted by the defendant or the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Silence in custody does not constitute adop
-
487 F.2d 846·
6th Cir.·
1973-12-04
·cited 18×
The court held that the FBI agent did not violate appellant's constitutional rights by questioning him without his state-appointed counsel present, and any potential Bruton violation was harmless error.
-
452 F.2d 419·
5th Cir.·
1971-12-03
·cited 18×
The court held that the search of the station wagon constituted a valid border search, and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, nor in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment.
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437 F.2d 207·
10th Cir.·
1971-01-27
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus and discharging the petitioners because the Bruton rule was either inapplicable or the violation was harmless error.
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418 F.2d 1028·
7th Cir.·
1970-01-08
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court properly denied the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the denial of relief for both the 1953 and 1963 convictions.
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418 F.2d 363·
5th Cir.·
1969-11-06
·cited 18×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the trial court did not err in denying severance motions, and the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion.
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406 F.2d 741·
2d Cir.·
1969-02-11
·cited 18×
The court held that the admission of a co-conspirator's statement, even if inadmissible hearsay, did not require reversal because the risk of jury prejudice was too remote given ample other evidence.
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596 So. 2d 1197·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1992-04-07
·cited 17×
Samuel Velez appeals his convictions for manslaughter of a police officer, armed burglary, grand theft, and attempted manslaughter. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirms both the convictions and the departure sentences, upholding the trial court's innovative use of d
-
952 F.2d 98·
5th Cir.·
1992-01-16
·cited 16×
The court held that while convictions for drug and firearm offenses are affirmed, the sentences for the firearms counts must be vacated and remanded because multiple firearms counts cannot be based on a single drug trafficking offense.
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799 F.2d 842·
2d Cir.·
1986-08-25
·cited 16×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that evidentiary rulings were proper and sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
-
773 F.2d 386·
1st Cir.·
1985-09-26
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion for severance, admitting the FDIC certificate, sustaining a codefendant's Fifth Amendment privilege, or refusing to grant a judgment of acquittal.
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698 F.2d 581·
2d Cir.·
1983-01-18
·cited 16×
The court held that the erroneous admission of unreliable eyewitness identification testimony was not harmless error because there was a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction.
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622 F.2d 298·
8th Cir.·
1980-04-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the admission of codefendants' statements in a joint trial can be reversible error if it contributes to a defendant's conviction, but may be harmless error if the defendant's own statement is sufficiently inculpatory. The court also affirmed the validity of th
-
585 F.2d 164·
6th Cir.·
1978-10-05
·cited 16×
The admission of a codefendant's prior grand jury testimony, which directly implicated the defendant, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and this error was not harmless.
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569 F.2d 1053·
9th Cir.·
1978-01-06
·cited 16×
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519 F.2d 144·
2d Cir.·
1975-06-24
·cited 16×
The court held that the defendants' guilty pleas were validly entered and that the district court did not err in denying their motions to withdraw those pleas.
-
516 F.2d 883·
2d Cir.·
1975-05-14
·cited 16×
The court held that a codefendant's flight from trial does not violate Bruton v. United States if the flight does not directly inculpate the remaining defendant.
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488 F.2d 1·
9th Cir.·
1973-11-20
·cited 16×
The court held that statements made by a coconspirator during the course of the conspiracy are admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, even if the coconspirator does not testify, and do not violate the Confrontation Clause.
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426 F.2d 1236·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-03-20
·cited 16×
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413 F.2d 256·
9th Cir.·
1969-06-06
·cited 16×
The admission of a codefendant's confession implicating Leroy, and Leroy's silence in response, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Bruton rule does not apply to bench trials, so Ivy's confrontation claim fa
-
450 F.2d 599·
5th Cir.·
1971-10-08
·cited 15×
The court held that even if the co-defendant's guilty plea before the jury violated the petitioner's confrontation rights, the error was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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642 So. 2d 828·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1994-09-23
·cited 14×
Robert Lee Stevens was convicted of delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, delivery of cocaine within 200 feet of a public housing facility, and possession of cocaine. The appellate court affirmed the first and third convictions but vacated the second conviction, find
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920 F.2d 1080·
2d Cir.·
1990-12-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the admission of redacted codefendant statements, the denial of severance, and the sufficiency of evidence were not grounds for reversal of the conviction.
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857 F.2d 857·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-15
·cited 14×
The court held that bringing two suspects together, even with inconsistent prior statements, does not constitute custodial interrogation under Miranda unless police actions are designed to elicit an incriminating response. The court also held that newly discovered evidence of a w
-
836 F.2d 385·
8th Cir.·
1987-12-30
·cited 14×
The court held that a defendant's bare assertion of no members of his racial group on the venire panel does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination without proof of disproportionate impact or opportunity for discrimination. It also held that admitting a co-defendant's
-
818 F.2d 1427·
9th Cir.·
1987-06-03
·cited 14×
The court held that the statute should be read disjunctively, creating two separate prohibited acts with different mens rea requirements.
-
794 F.2d 1333·
8th Cir.·
1986-07-03
·cited 14×
The court held that admitting an edited confession that distorted the meaning of the original statement, particularly by excluding exculpatory information, constituted plain error.
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749 F.2d 993·
2d Cir.·
1984-11-30
·cited 14×
The court held that the Jencks Act does not require production of documents in the possession of foreign law enforcement officials, even in a joint investigation, absent a showing that those officials are agents of the United States. The court also held that the admission of inte
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736 F.2d 840·
2d Cir.·
1984-06-01
·cited 14×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction, the voir dire and jury instructions were proper, and the admission of a redacted statement and the handling of alleged juror misconduct did not constitute reversible error.
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662 F.2d 946·
2d Cir.·
1981-10-28
·cited 14×
The dissenting judge argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires reversal because the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity and viable alternatives existed.
-
590 F.2d 123·
5th Cir.·
1979-02-22
·cited 14×
The court held that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not apply because no detainer had been lodged, and a co-defendant's statement was not prejudicial.
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538 F.2d 1129·
5th Cir.·
1976-09-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the Bruton rule does not apply because the confessions admitted by each defendant related to the same crime, and any potential violation would constitute harmless error.
-
491 F.2d 1326·
2d Cir.·
1974-02-07
·cited 14×
Due process does not require a new trial based on a witness's recantation and a fingerprint expert's initial 'no value' designation, especially when other strong evidence supports the conviction.
-
446 F.2d 358·
9th Cir.·
1971-07-15
·cited 14×
The court held that the appellants were not denied a speedy trial, the evidence was lawfully seized, and confessions were properly admitted. The conviction for armed robbery was affirmed.
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445 F.2d 613·
2d Cir.·
1971-06-24
·cited 14×
-
430 F.2d 1089·
6th Cir.·
1970-08-07
·cited 14×
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is not violated when a codefendant's incriminating statement, which implicates the defendant, is used against the codefendant if the codefendant subsequently testifies at trial. A defendant's own confession is admissible if vol
-
422 F.2d 1095·
2d Cir.·
1970-03-03
·cited 14×
The court held that the search of the defendant's living quarters was reasonable as incident to a valid arrest under pre-Chimel standards, and that the jury's potential inference of co-defendants implicating the defendant was too remote to violate the Sixth Amendment confrontatio
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422 F.2d 652·
7th Cir.·
1970-02-10
·cited 14×
The court held that a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence, while improper, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given defense counsel's prior remarks and the court's curative instructions. The court also held that a warrantless search of a locker was permissible under
-
415 F.2d 570·
3d Cir.·
1969-08-29
·cited 14×
The admission of a co-defendant's confession in a joint trial does not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause if the co-defendant testifies and is available for cross-examination, even if the defendant chooses not to cross-examine. An unsigned confession is admissible i
-
414 F.2d 246·
2d Cir.·
1969-07-25
·cited 14×
The admission of co-defendants' confessions was not a Sixth Amendment violation, and the appellant's confession was admissible.
-
414 F.2d 943·
7th Cir.·
1969-06-26
·cited 14×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding that while certain identification procedures and confession admissions were constitutionally questionable, they constituted harmless error due to the overwhelming independent evidence of guilt.
-
409 F.2d 8·
6th Cir.·
1969-04-11
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motion for severance, as the co-defendant's testimony was given in court, allowing for confrontation and cross-examination.
-
404 F.2d 690·
2d Cir.·
1968-12-03
·cited 14×
The admission of a co-defendant's redacted confession, even with limiting instructions, violated the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and requires reversal of the conviction.
-
402 F.2d 380·
7th Cir.·
1968-08-15
·cited 14×
The court held that the government's failure to disclose certain reports and its alleged tailoring of evidence based on an illegally overheard conversation warranted reversal.
-
755 F.2d 1428·
11th Cir.·
1985-03-22
·cited 13×
The court held that the defendants' Speedy Trial Act claims were frivolous due to waivers and excludable delays, and that their actions constituted 'using' false documents under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(a).
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727 F.2d 1493·
11th Cir.·
1984-03-26
·cited 13×
The court held that the admission of hearsay statements for a non-hearsay purpose (to show why a witness remembered a conversation) was not an abuse of discretion, even without a limiting instruction, as it did not constitute plain error.
-
649 F.2d 534·
7th Cir.·
1981-06-01
·cited 13×
The court held that the indictment was sufficiently specific, evidence of prior home repair dealings was admissible, and the mailing of dividend checks was in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.
-
395 So. 2d 1223·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1981-03-24
·cited 13×
Joseph Libertucci, City Manager of Miami Springs, was convicted of grand theft and grand larceny for allegedly orchestrating a scheme with GSC owner Howard Herring to divert city funds. The appellate court reversed his conviction, finding that the admission of hearsay testimony a