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432 F.2d 1293·
7th Cir.·
1970-07-31
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy convictions and that most searches were lawful or any errors were harmless. It affirmed the convictions of the appellants.
-
431 F.2d 319·
2d Cir.·
1970-07-24
·cited 30×
The court held that the defendants' conspiracy to distribute counterfeit credit cards and their substantive violations thereof constituted mail fraud, and that evidence admitted subject to connection was not reversible error.
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403 F.2d 507·
9th Cir.·
1968-11-14
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court erred by failing to make an independent determination of the voluntariness of the confessions, instead leaving the issue to the jury.
-
525 F.2d 252·
2d Cir.·
1975-10-22
·cited 29×
The court held that the mistrial was declared in the sole interest of the defendants and within the bounds of discretion, thus not barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds. It also held that the trial judge did not err in submitting an additional tape to the jury beyond their s
-
492 F.2d 104·
5th Cir.·
1974-04-04
·cited 29×
The court held that a co-defendant's confession, initially inadmissible against another defendant, becomes admissible if the co-defendant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, curing any Bruton violation.
-
904 F.2d 936·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-19
·cited 28×
The court held that the superseding indictment was timely and that the evidence was sufficient to convict most appellants, but reversed one conviction due to Bruton error.
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888 F.2d 300·
3d Cir.·
1989-10-30
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the pretrial motion for severance, and any prejudice from the co-defendant's attorney's summation did not rise to the level of plain error.
-
777 F.2d 52·
1st Cir.·
1985-11-14
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings on severance, informant testimony, jury instructions, admission of statements, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
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631 F.2d 616·
9th Cir.·
1980-10-29
·cited 28×
The court held that subsequent searches of a vehicle after an initial border crossing can be considered valid 'extended border searches' if reasonably related in time and distance to the border, and that brief detentions and questioning during such searches do not require Miranda
-
623 F.2d 1165·
6th Cir.·
1980-07-02
·cited 28×
The admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's extrajudicial statements, made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, is permissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule and does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
-
349 So. 2d 1224·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1977-09-23
·cited 28×
Russell and Jolly were convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and grand larceny. The appellate court reversed all convictions for Russell and reversed Jolly's robbery and larceny convictions, finding that the admission of Jolly's extrajudicial confession violated Russell's Si
-
323 So. 2d 297·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1975-12-09
·cited 28×
Ballard and Curtis, co-defendants tried jointly for murder and robbery, appealed their convictions. Curtis challenged the denial of severance and mistrial motions when co-defendant testimony became admissible; Ballard challenged the admission of his statements to police without a
-
295 So. 2d 114·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-05-22
·cited 28×
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the arrests of the defendants were lawful due to probable cause and that any evidence obtained was admissible.
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476 F.2d 37·
2d Cir.·
1973-03-26
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that under circuit precedent, Bruton v. United States does not apply when codefendants' confessions interlock.
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458 F.2d 217·
10th Cir.·
1972-04-03
·cited 28×
The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the collective knowledge of the police and that the denial of the severance motion was not an abuse of discretion.
-
409 F.2d 77·
4th Cir.·
1969-04-08
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying pretrial discovery motions, motions to sequester witnesses, motions for severance, or motions for acquittal, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.
-
405 F.2d 1381·
D.C. Cir.·
1968-11-15
·cited 28×
The court held that the trial judge should have granted severance due to the prejudice caused by admitting co-defendants' incriminating statements with limiting instructions.
-
398 F.2d 507·
5th Cir.·
1968-06-25
·cited 28×
The court held that the admission of McCurley's statement was improper under Miranda v. Arizona, and even if properly admitted as to McCurley, its admission against Atwell violated Bruton v. United States. Therefore, both convictions must be reversed.
-
698 So. 2d 593·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1997-08-01
·cited 27×
John Pacheco was convicted of first-degree arson, but the appellate court reversed because the trial court improperly admitted a taped statement from a non-testifying codefendant, violating both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. The court remanded for a new trial on
-
792 F.2d 1019·
11th Cir.·
1986-06-30
·cited 27×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying severance motions, denying a motion to suppress, admitting certain testimony, denying a motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, or in its handling of prosecutorial misconduct claims, and that sufficient evidence s
-
499 F.2d 29·
1st Cir.·
1974-06-28
·cited 27×
A witness's prior statement used for impeachment, if claimed to be coerced, requires a judicial inquiry into its voluntariness, but the issue of voluntariness need not be submitted to the jury.
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848 F.2d 1036·
10th Cir.·
1988-06-02
·cited 26×
The court held that while some evidence was improperly admitted and jury instructions were flawed, these errors were harmless and did not warrant reversal of the conspiracy conviction.
-
811 F.2d 1232·
9th Cir.·
1987-02-26
·cited 26×
The court held that evidence discovered after an initial arrest, even if the arrest was illegal, is admissible if the illegality was not the 'but for' cause of the discovery. It also held that a conspiracy conviction cannot stand if all co-conspirators are acquitted.
-
809 F.2d 1097·
5th Cir.·
1987-01-29
·cited 26×
The court held that a scheme to bribe public officials can constitute a scheme to defraud for wire fraud purposes, and that a variance between the indictment and proof of fraud was not prejudicial where evidence supported conspiracy to bribe.
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778 F.2d 581·
10th Cir.·
1985-12-02
·cited 26×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy and Travel Act violations, but remanded one count for further findings on the 'business enterprise' element. The court also held that the use of notes to refresh memory was permissible and that evidence obtained after illegal surveill
-
681 F.2d 990·
5th Cir.·
1982-08-04
·cited 26×
The court affirmed LeCompte's convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute the first marihuana load, but reversed his conviction for the second load due to insufficient evidence. Sudderth's convictions were affirmed.
-
590 F.2d 181·
5th Cir.·
1979-02-26
·cited 26×
The court held that the absence of counsel and a transcript at a preliminary hearing requires a remand to determine prejudice, and vacated a conviction based on Supreme Court precedent regarding multiple punishments for the same offense.
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583 F.2d 1173·
10th Cir.·
1978-10-11
·cited 26×
The court held that the introduction of codefendant's statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause and that a warrantless search of an automobile was reasonable under the circumstances.
-
583 F.2d 325·
7th Cir.·
1978-08-15
·cited 26×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying severance motions or restricting cross-examination, and that most convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. However, the court reversed and remanded the perjury convictions for Steven R. Hansen due to prejudicial
-
565 F.2d 129·
8th Cir.·
1977-10-31
·cited 26×
The court held that the appellant's conviction for aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery was supported by sufficient evidence and that his constitutional rights were not violated by pre-indictment delay, speedy trial issues, or the admission of other crimes evidence.
-
555 F.2d 308·
2d Cir.·
1977-05-06
·cited 26×
The court held that the informant's tip, corroborated by independent surveillance, provided probable cause for Costano's arrest, and that the admission of Costano's statement against Gonzalez violated Bruton v. United States because it was not harmless error.
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534 F.2d 578·
3d Cir.·
1976-04-07
·cited 26×
The court held that restricting voir dire questions about IRS employment and limiting cross-examination on unplayed tape recordings constituted reversible error.
-
517 F.2d 750·
2d Cir.·
1975-05-30
·cited 26×
The court held that LaBelle's arrest was lawful because probable cause existed for a felony, even though the arrest warrant was for a misdemeanor and invalid. The search of his car was also lawful.
-
506 F.2d 291·
2d Cir.·
1974-10-04
·cited 26×
A mistrial declared without the defendant's consent, even if to protect co-defendants from prejudicial statements, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause if not necessitated by a manifest necessity for the benefit of the defendant.
-
499 F.2d 1385·
6th Cir.·
1974-07-11
·cited 26×
The court held that a tandem trial procedure, where a single jury hears evidence against codefendants first and then hears evidence against the appellant, violates the appellant's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
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449 F.2d 649·
2d Cir.·
1971-09-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the admission of redacted confessions in a joint trial did not violate the Bruton rule when the confessions, as presented to the jury, did not directly incriminate co-defendants.
-
900 F.2d 1270·
8th Cir.·
1990-04-16
·cited 24×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that Speedy Trial Act calculations were correct, warrantless vehicle searches were permissible due to probable cause, and admission of a redacted co-defendant statement did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
-
892 F.2d 642·
7th Cir.·
1990-01-04
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant may be entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically concerning the handling of a codefendant's statement and an eyewitness identification. The conviction was vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
-
885 F.2d 1076·
3d Cir.·
1989-09-01
·cited 24×
The court held that while voluntariness of a waiver is subject to plenary review, a trial court's direct exposure to the evidence and the defendant can provide valuable insight, warranting a remand for its determination.
-
874 F.2d 1515·
11th Cir.·
1989-06-13
·cited 24×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction and that the redacted confession did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights.
-
813 F.2d 571·
2d Cir.·
1987-03-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a redacted statement, that the evidence was sufficient for conviction, and that jury instructions and joinder were proper.
-
737 F.2d 471·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-30
·cited 24×
The court held that the state judge's jury charge did not violate the accused's constitutional rights, and while the admission of a codefendant's statements violated the confrontation clause, it did not prejudice the defendant.
-
561 F.2d 1125·
5th Cir.·
1977-10-31
·cited 24×
The court held that evidence of state law violations was admissible to prove tax fraud and that a codefendant's statement, even if hearsay, was harmless error.
-
530 F.2d 257·
4th Cir.·
1975-12-03
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of post-conspiracy statements that incriminate co-defendants in a joint trial, despite limiting instructions, violates the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause and requires severance or exclusion of the statements.
-
465 F.2d 1310·
9th Cir.·
1972-09-05
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of a co-defendant's out-of-court statements, despite a Bruton violation, was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming admissible evidence of guilt. The court also found no merit in other procedural and constitutional claims.
-
462 F.2d 443·
3d Cir.·
1972-06-12
·cited 24×
The court held that the falsification of union financial records and the disbursement of funds, even if ultimately returned, violated the LMRDA, and that the statute provided adequate notice and that pretrial motions for severance, change of venue, and discovery were properly den
-
443 F.2d 443·
8th Cir.·
1971-06-03
·cited 24×
The court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or denial of a continuance.
-
439 F.2d 885·
5th Cir.·
1971-03-16
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of inadmissible hearsay testimony regarding an informant's statements was prejudicial error requiring reversal of Johnson's conviction, but affirmed Golub's conviction due to sufficient evidence and lack of reliance on invalid presumptions.
-
424 F.2d 657·
2d Cir.·
1970-04-16
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the consideration of co-conspirator statements, potentially violating due process by allowing hearsay to be used to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
423 F.2d 431·
9th Cir.·
1970-02-02
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the insanity defense, nor did it err in striking the testimony related to that defense. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of a tape recording, the curtailment of cros