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288 F.2d 80·
2d Cir.·
1961-03-10
·cited 116×
The federal rule that concealment tolls the statute of limitations applies to actions for treble damages under the Clayton Act, even when a state statute provides the limitations period. However, the complaint here did not sufficiently allege concealment.
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731 F.2d 640·
10th Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 80×
The court held that a uniform characterization of all section 1983 claims is necessary to establish a consistent approach to selecting state statutes of limitations.
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372 F.2d 685·
5th Cir.·
1967-01-31
·cited 80×
The court held that claims of conspiracy and negligence against the sheriff and others are barred by Alabama's one-year statute of limitations, while claims against Judge Hildreth are barred by judicial immunity.
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663 F.2d 669·
6th Cir.·
1981-11-03
·cited 64×
The court held that the Kentucky Blue Sky law statute of limitations applies to claims under the federal securities acts, and that an amendment lengthening this period applies to viable claims at the time of amendment. The court also held that a one-year statute of limitations ap
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843 F.2d 1537·
3d Cir.·
1988-04-08
·cited 63×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's order, arguing that the majority's newly adopted federal statute of limitations rule should not be applied retroactively to this case.
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708 F.2d 96·
3d Cir.·
1983-05-13
·cited 50×
Members of a borough council, the mayor, and the borough attorney are entitled to absolute immunity for acts done in a legislative capacity, and the appropriate statute of limitations for suits against a municipality and its office holders in their official capacities is the stat
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510 F.2d 282·
2d Cir.·
1974-12-19
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff's claim was untimely because New York law, as applied under federal common law, does not permit 'tacking' of tolling periods after a release from imprisonment.
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699 F.2d 137·
3d Cir.·
1983-01-27
·cited 41×
The court denied the petition for rehearing, with a dissent arguing the panel erred in finding the six-month limitations period inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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537 F.2d 1289·
5th Cir.·
1976-08-30
·cited 39×
The court held that a civil rights action against state officials and their surety for injuries sustained during an arrest is governed by Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations for contract actions, not the one-year statute for intentional torts.
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642 F.2d 311·
9th Cir.·
1981-04-16
·cited 34×
The court held that the Arizona tolling statute should be applied to an imprisoned state prisoner's § 1983 claim, despite the majority's reasoning.
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611 F.2d 450·
3d Cir.·
1979-11-14
·cited 34×
The six-year statute of limitations applicable to common law fraud claims in New Jersey governs the federal securities fraud claim at issue.
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431 F.2d 863·
8th Cir.·
1970-08-12
·cited 34×
The court held that the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery or false imprisonment does not apply to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action; instead, a longer statute of limitations applies.
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259 F.2d 636·
2d Cir.·
1958-09-30
·cited 32×
The court held that the majority's application of laches to an action at law, rather than the state statute of limitations, was improper and would lead to uncertainty and congestion.
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541 F.2d 611·
6th Cir.·
1976-09-02
·cited 26×
The court held that Ohio's four-year statute of limitations for general fraud actions should be applied to federal securities law claims brought in federal court, as it best effectuates the policies of the federal securities laws.
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788 F.2d 1500·
11th Cir.·
1986-05-09
·cited 25×
Federal law governs the characterization of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for statute of limitations purposes, and a single, most appropriate state statute of limitations must be selected for all such claims within a state. The Georgia blue sky law is the most analogous statute,
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869 F.2d 989·
6th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 22×
The Supreme Court's decision in Owens v. Okure mandates that state general or residual statutes of limitations for personal injury actions apply to section 1983 claims, rejecting the intentional tort analogy previously used by this court.
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557 F.2d 300·
2d Cir.·
1977-05-25
·cited 20×
The court held that New York's one-year limitations period for actions against sheriffs does not apply to federal law enforcement officers, and that the single publication rule does not bar claims based on separate publications of defamatory material. The court also held that a c
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765 F.2d 102·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-19
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff's civil rights suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds of the defendant's lack of personal liability.
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771 F.2d 184·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-25
·cited 18×
A dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction due to an enforceable forum selection clause qualifies as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the Illinois tolling statute, allowing a new action within one year. A motion to vacate such a dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6) requires
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816 F.2d 45·
2d Cir.·
1987-04-06
·cited 17×
The court held that the three-year statute of limitations for general personal injury actions in New York, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5), applies to all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia.
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350 F.2d 936·
9th Cir.·
1965-09-17
·cited 17×
The court held that actions under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act are governed by the relevant state statute of limitations, not the equitable doctrine of laches.
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659 F.2d 105·
9th Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 16×
The court held that the Oregon Tort Claims Act's two-year statute of limitations applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. The court affirmed the dismissal of the actions.
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614 F.2d 260·
10th Cir.·
1980-01-30
·cited 16×
A state statute of limitations does not apply to an action brought by the Secretary of Labor under § 11(c) of the OSH Act, even if no federal limitations period is provided.
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957 F.2d 961·
2d Cir.·
1992-01-06
·cited 15×
The court held that the statute of limitations for claims against Indenture Trustees did not begin to run until the debenture payment default occurred, as no remedy was available to plaintiffs before that time. It also found that the Trustees' reliance on counsel opinions was a v
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839 F.2d 1369·
9th Cir.·
1988-02-24
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiff's section 10(b) action was barred by the statute of limitations because he knew or should have known of the alleged fraud by February 1983.
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802 F.2d 229·
7th Cir.·
1986-09-16
·cited 14×
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 governs when an action is commenced for statute of limitations purposes in federal question cases lacking an express federal limitations period, and this rule is a valid procedural rule that applies regardless of contrary state law regarding serv
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818 F.2d 1257·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-12
·cited 11×
The court held that its decision applying a one-year statute of limitations to § 1981 claims should not be applied retroactively when a plaintiff reasonably relied on a prior decision applying a longer statute of limitations.
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702 F.2d 849·
10th Cir.·
1983-03-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the most appropriate Kansas statute of limitations for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 is K.S.A. § 60-513, which governs actions for injury to the rights of another.
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709 F.2d 335·
5th Cir.·
1983-07-11
·cited 8×
State statutes of limitations do not apply to suits brought by the Secretary of Labor under Section 11(c) of OSHA, as such application would frustrate national policy.
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970 F.2d 1030·
2d Cir.·
1992-06-30
·cited 5×
The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for rescission actions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is the one-year/three-year period borrowed from the federal securities laws, and that the continuing wrong theory does not apply to this type of claim.
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751 F.2d 1162·
11th Cir.·
1985-01-28
·cited 5×
The court held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and alternatively, by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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984 F.2d 850·
7th Cir.·
1993-01-28
·cited 4×
The court held that the amended version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) should be applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal, as indicated by the Supreme Court's order.
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896 F.2d 395·
9th Cir.·
1990-02-15
·cited 4×
The court held that Krug's claims are barred by the statute of limitations or are meritless, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
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952 F.2d 781·
3d Cir.·
1992-01-02
·cited 2×
The court held that the six-month statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) applies to private causes of action under the Employee Protection Program of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).
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992 F.2d 119·
7th Cir.·
1993-04-27
A federal court complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 306 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 is governed by the doctrine of laches, not state statutes of limitations, because the relief sought is purely equitable.
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872 F.2d 772·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-19
The court vacated its prior decision and remanded, recognizing that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Ohio should have been the two-year general personal injury statute, not the one-year statute previously applied.