-
511 F.2d 25·
6th Cir.·
1975-02-12
·cited 116×
The court held that the joinder of defendants and offenses was proper, and that the admission of evidence, including tape recordings and voiceprint analysis, did not constitute reversible error. The court also found no violation of speedy trial rights or grounds for recusal.
-
579 F.2d 980·
6th Cir.·
1978-06-20
·cited 114×
The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard, not the prima facie case standard, applies under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for determining the admissibility of co-conspirator statements, but the trial court's use of the latter was not plain error. The court
-
499 F.2d 9·
7th Cir.·
1974-05-09
·cited 109×
The court affirmed convictions for some defendants on certain counts, while the dissenting judge argued for reversal on others due to insufficient evidence of mailing or scheme participation.
-
487 F.2d 112·
5th Cir.·
1973-10-16
·cited 109×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings regarding speedy trial rights, evidence admission, co-conspirator testimony, photographic displays, or evidentiary rulings.
-
532 F.2d 1182·
8th Cir.·
1976-03-31
·cited 100×
The court did not reverse the decision because there is no current rule requiring recording of grand jury testimony.
-
692 F.2d 1352·
11th Cir.·
1982-12-06
·cited 94×
The court held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of informants, denying severance motions, or admitting hearsay statements made in furtherance of a continuing conspiracy.
-
552 F.2d 435·
2d Cir.·
1977-03-10
·cited 94×
The court held that the appellants' speedy trial rights were not violated by the delay between state and federal arrests, and that the search and seizure claims were without merit.
-
666 F.2d 353·
9th Cir.·
1982-01-07
·cited 81×
The court held that the defendants were brought to trial within the seventy-day limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, as certain delays, including those caused by an intervening trial and continuity of counsel, were properly excluded.
-
540 F.2d 503·
10th Cir.·
1976-06-29
·cited 81×
The court held that the exchange of gambling information and lay-off bets established a single illegal gambling business, wiretap authorizations were proper, and voice identifications and searches were lawful.
-
550 F.2d 732·
2d Cir.·
1977-02-03
·cited 80×
The dissenting judge would affirm the convictions, finding no violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act or Barker v. Wingo.
-
628 F.2d 297·
5th Cir.·
1980-09-24
·cited 73×
The court held that while appellate delay can violate due process, the county was not liable because the judge, not the commissioners' actions, was the proximate cause of the delay. Individual defendants were immune.
-
542 F.2d 403·
7th Cir.·
1976-09-24
·cited 66×
The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, and that the prosecutor's comments and the trial court's refusal of a special interrogatory did not constitute reversible error.
-
536 F.2d 827·
9th Cir.·
1976-05-24
·cited 62×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment with prejudice under both the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right and Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-
591 F.2d 1195·
5th Cir.·
1979-03-26
·cited 59×
The court held that the search was a valid border search justified by reasonable suspicion, and that the appellant was not denied her constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial.
-
866 F.2d 1343·
11th Cir.·
1989-03-02
·cited 56×
The court held that pretrial restraints on assets under 21 U.S.C. § 853 do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice or the Due Process Clause, as the government's claim to the assets relates back to the time of the offense.
-
615 F.2d 1223·
9th Cir.·
1980-02-22
·cited 56×
The court held that the initial x-ray scan of the briefcase was a valid search under the Fourth Amendment due to implied consent and the reasonableness of the procedure, and the subsequent physical search was also valid based on the defendant's voluntary consent.
-
491 F.2d 616·
10th Cir.·
1973-12-06
·cited 56×
The court affirmed the convictions for mail and securities fraud but remanded the case for reconsideration of the sentences, finding them unconscionably excessive.
-
897 F.2d 1300·
5th Cir.·
1990-03-26
·cited 54×
The court held that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated, the pat-down search was justified under Terry v. Ohio, the district court did not err in refusing a duress/necessity jury instruction, and the upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was permissibl
-
600 F.2d 368·
2d Cir.·
1979-05-22
·cited 54×
The court held that the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, and a slight variance between the indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and did not cause prejudice.
-
563 F.2d 1352·
9th Cir.·
1977-11-03
·cited 52×
The court held that the stop and arrest of the appellants were lawful, and that the trial court did not err in denying motions for severance, excluding prior convictions, or failing to grant a speedy trial.
-
526 F.2d 848·
5th Cir.·
1976-02-04
·cited 50×
The court held that the search of the appellant's vehicle was valid under the border search doctrine applicable at the time, and that the prosecutor's remarks regarding the appellant's silence and inconsistent statements were permissible.
-
476 F.2d 1050·
10th Cir.·
1973-04-10
·cited 45×
The court held that the trial court did not err in qualifying a seven-year-old witness, denying a motion for continuance, refusing a proposed jury instruction, excluding certain character evidence, or denying a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.
-
584 F.2d 1185·
2d Cir.·
1978-09-20
·cited 44×
The court held that the detective's continued interrogation after the suspect invoked his right to remain silent violated Miranda and Massiah principles.
-
577 F.2d 539·
9th Cir.·
1978-06-23
·cited 44×
The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar appellate review of a judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict, and that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find willful misapplication of bank funds.
-
534 F.2d 964·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-03-31
·cited 44×
The court affirmed convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, and sale of unregistered securities, finding no reversible error in the speedy trial claims, indictment sufficiency, evidence, jury instructions, or Brady disclosures.
-
826 F.2d 1208·
3d Cir.·
1987-07-10
·cited 41×
The majority erred in ordering the discharge of convictions based on a flawed 'law of the case' finding of prejudice from sentencing delay.
-
714 F.2d 234·
2d Cir.·
1983-08-09
·cited 40×
The court held that the state waived its right to raise the speedy trial exhaustion issue by failing to object to the magistrate's recommendation and consenting to the entry of judgment.
-
474 F.2d 522·
2d Cir.·
1973-02-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict Kurtz of transporting stolen securities, but sufficient to convict Infanti. Venue was proper, and speedy trial rights were not violated.
-
744 F.2d 1245·
6th Cir.·
1984-10-04
·cited 37×
A defendant is deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney refuses to participate in the trial, even if this is a deliberate tactic, because such a tactic fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.
-
622 F.2d 36·
2d Cir.·
1980-05-19
·cited 36×
The court affirmed the district court's judgments, holding that the appellants' speedy trial rights were not violated, the search warrants were valid, and the wiretap evidence was admissible. The court also found that the appellant waived his objection to the playing of a composi
-
578 F.2d 648·
5th Cir.·
1978-08-21
·cited 36×
The court held that prosecutorial comments, even if improper, did not affect substantial rights given overwhelming evidence of guilt, and that the defendants were not denied their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
-
515 F.2d 642·
2d Cir.·
1975-04-09
·cited 36×
-
603 So. 2d 1167·
Fla.·
1992-06-04
·cited 35×
The Florida Supreme Court held that section 39.048(7) of the Florida Statutes, which mandates dismissal of delinquency petitions if adjudicatory hearings are not commenced within 90 days, establishes a procedural time period that serves as a 'triggering mechanism' for presumptive
-
782 F.2d 1442·
7th Cir.·
1986-02-11
·cited 34×
Pre-indictment delay did not violate due process as the defendant failed to show actual prejudice, and post-indictment delay did not violate the Sixth Amendment or the Speedy Trial Act due to the defendant's evasion and procedural delays.
-
756 F.2d 1342·
9th Cir.·
1984-06-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that joinder of defendants and offenses was proper, severance was not required, venue changes were unwarranted, evidence was properly admitted, and speedy trial rights were not violated.
-
450 So. 2d 305·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1984-05-17
·cited 34×
Jose Guadalupe Vela was convicted of both DWI/Manslaughter and vehicular homicide arising from a single automobile accident. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of his speedy trial motion despite a five-year delay between filing and trial, but reversed his vehi
-
552 F.2d 257·
8th Cir.·
1977-04-05
·cited 34×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury, the indictment was valid, and the defendant's rights were not violated by discovery procedures or delays.
-
502 F.2d 300·
8th Cir.·
1974-08-29
·cited 34×
The court held that the defendant's convictions for possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun and for possessing a firearm made without paying the required tax were valid, and the sentences, running concurrently, did not violate double jeopardy or statutory limits.
-
469 F.2d 735·
5th Cir.·
1972-11-07
·cited 34×
The court held that the defendant's statutory right to an expeditious trial was violated by an excessive and unexplained delay, requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
568 F.2d 1246·
6th Cir.·
1977-12-30
·cited 33×
The court held that the admission of rebuttal testimony regarding prior bad acts was proper to show intent and knowledge, and that the jury instructions, while containing a minor error, did not constitute plain error. The admission of hospital records was also proper. Finally, th
-
865 So. 2d 605·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2004-01-21
·cited 32×
This case clarifies the juvenile speedy trial rule under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090, holding that the State must bring a juvenile to trial within 90 days of arrest or the filing of a petition, whichever is earlier, and that failure to serve or arraign within that pe
-
782 F.2d 1462·
9th Cir.·
1985-11-13
·cited 32×
The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, and his sentence was not improperly enhanced by a void conviction.
-
562 F.2d 144·
2d Cir.·
1977-08-30
·cited 32×
The court held that the 34-month delay between the filing of the information and the commencement of trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
-
545 F.2d 557·
7th Cir.·
1975-08-20
·cited 31×
The court held that the wiretap evidence was properly admitted, the defendants were not deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy trial, and Lawson's trial did not violate double jeopardy protections.
-
622 F.2d 900·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-01
·cited 30×
The court held that the defendant's conviction should be affirmed because no reversible error was committed regarding the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, speedy trial rights, or jury instructions.
-
556 F.2d 630·
2d Cir.·
1977-02-08
·cited 30×
The court held that a claim under Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is a pre-trial defense that is waived if not raised before trial, and the defendant had sufficient knowledge to be on notice of this claim.
-
546 F.2d 1298·
7th Cir.·
1976-12-21
·cited 28×
-
526 F.2d 842·
5th Cir.·
1976-02-04
·cited 28×
The court held that dismissal with prejudice was an unwarranted sanction for noncompliance with the District Court's Rule 50(b) Plan when delays were caused by defendant's requests or justifiable judicial circumstances.
-
465 F.2d 408·
5th Cir.·
1972-07-24
·cited 28×
The court held that the appellant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and was not prejudiced by the joinder with other defendants.
-
935 F.2d 1223·
11th Cir.·
1991-07-17
·cited 26×
The court held that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated because various delays, including interlocutory appeals and motions filed by codefendants, were properly excluded from the seventy-day calculation under the Speedy Trial Act.