-
670 F.2d 583·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-19
·cited 188×
Appellants voluntarily consented to accompany agents to the DEA office, making their subsequent detention lawful.
-
366 F.2d 923·
9th Cir.·
1966-09-16
·cited 128×
The dissenting opinion argues that the appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a pretrial lineup. Furthermore, the opinion contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the potential taint of an initial, possibly coerced, interrogation on a s
-
750 F.2d 307·
5th Cir.·
1984-12-26
·cited 110×
The court held that Clarence Royalston's second statement was not the fruit of an illegal arrest, but his first statement was. The court affirmed convictions except for Royalston's, which was reversed due to evidence from an illegal arrest.
-
897 F.2d 1099·
11th Cir.·
1990-04-02
·cited 103×
The court held that while the government violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by recording post-indictment conversations, the proper remedy was to exclude the evidence from the trial of the indicted charges, not to dismiss the indictment or suppress evidence
-
761 F.2d 1448·
10th Cir.·
1985-05-10
·cited 95×
The court held that the defendant's consent to search his vehicle was tainted by his unlawful seizure and detention, and therefore the evidence found must be suppressed.
-
324 F.2d 879·
D.C. Cir.·
1963-09-26
·cited 93×
The dissent argues that evidence derived from illegal detention, including witness testimony, should be excluded under the McNabb-Mallory rule.
-
690 F.2d 869·
11th Cir.·
1982-11-01
·cited 86×
The court held that the defendant's consent to accompany the agent to an office was not voluntary, rendering his subsequent arrest illegal and the discovered cocaine inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
-
791 F.2d 1512·
11th Cir.·
1986-06-24
·cited 82×
The court held that while the arrest was illegal, the subsequent confession and consent to search were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and therefore admissible.
-
581 F.2d 535·
5th Cir.·
1978-10-06
·cited 81×
The court held that the testimony of illegal aliens discovered during an illegal stop of a vehicle was inadmissible, requiring reversal of the conviction due to lack of other evidence.
-
866 F.2d 1071·
9th Cir.·
1988-04-22
·cited 80×
The dissenting judge believes the warrantless protective sweep of the apartment was not justified by exigent circumstances and that evidence seized should be excluded.
-
315 F.2d 241·
D.C. Cir.·
1962-10-04
·cited 78×
The court, in a concurring opinion, argues that a post-arraignment confession is inadmissible if it is tainted by a prior confession obtained in violation of Rule 5(a), and that evidence derived from such a confession is also inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" d
-
625 F.2d 1211·
5th Cir.·
1980-09-17
·cited 77×
The court held that the magistrate erred in finding that voluntary consent automatically purged the taint of an illegal seizure, and that the issue of taint requires further factual findings. The court affirmed the finding of voluntary consent to accompany officers and to the sea
-
926 So. 2d 1139·
Fla.·
2006-02-09
·cited 74×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether evidence seized in a search incident to an arrest based on an outstanding warrant should be suppressed when the arrest warrant was discovered during an illegal traffic stop. The Court held tha
-
842 So. 2d 754·
Fla.·
2003-01-23
·cited 74×
Darryl Moody was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death based on evidence discovered during an illegal traffic stop. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer's knowledge of Moody's suspended driver's license was stale (up to three years old),
-
617 F.2d 677·
D.C. Cir.·
1979-10-26
·cited 69×
The court held that grand jury testimony given pursuant to a plea agreement, even if the defendant later withdraws from the agreement, is not inadmissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) and can be admitted if voluntary and not the fruit of prior illegal conduct
-
634 F.2d 1182·
9th Cir.·
1980-10-14
·cited 68×
Suppression of evidence is required when the government illegally seizes evidence and continues that seizure while procuring a search warrant, even if the warrant is supported by an independent source.
-
609 F.2d 1284·
9th Cir.·
1979-10-23
·cited 64×
A prolonged detention for custodial interrogation, even if voluntary consent to search is obtained during that detention, requires probable cause; otherwise, evidence obtained is fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed.
-
602 F.2d 726·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-17
·cited 59×
The court held that the evidence obtained from the defendant was the fruit of an illegal stop and seizure, and therefore should have been suppressed.
-
662 F.2d 628·
9th Cir.·
1981-11-30
·cited 58×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress statements, admitting live-witness testimony, admitting evidence of other acts, excluding evidence on typical collector activity, or giving an Allen charge.
-
821 F.2d 546·
11th Cir.·
1987-06-25
·cited 56×
The court held that the defendant had standing to challenge the search of a borrowed car and that the initial traffic stop was a pretext for an illegal search, rendering the subsequent consent invalid.
-
626 F.2d 753·
9th Cir.·
1980-09-02
·cited 54×
Statements made by a defendant following an illegal arrest are inadmissible as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' if they are not sufficiently attenuated from the illegality, even if Miranda warnings were given.
-
403 F.2d 190·
9th Cir.·
1968-11-08
·cited 54×
The court held that the May 5 search was unlawful due to insufficient probable cause in the affidavit, requiring suppression of evidence seized then. However, the counterfeit note used for conviction was not suppressible as fruit of that search.
-
525 F.2d 943·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-12
·cited 51×
The court held that only defendants with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the wiretapped conversations or premises have standing to challenge the wiretaps, and that the convictions of those with standing were based on evidence tainted by illegal wiretaps.
-
448 F.2d 963·
9th Cir.·
1971-09-13
·cited 50×
The court held that the defendants' due process rights were not violated by an inadvertent pretrial confrontation with witnesses, nor by a lawful investigatory stop and seizure of evidence, and affirmed the convictions.
-
301 So. 2d 13·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1974-09-12
·cited 48×
Thomas Sheff was convicted of drug possession after police discovered marijuana in his motel room and vehicle. The court held that while the initial warrantless entry into his motel room by a police officer at the proprietor's invitation was illegal, the evidence obtained from hi
-
348 F.2d 22·
3d Cir.·
1965-06-30
·cited 48×
The court held that the petitioner's confession was admissible, as it was not tainted by an alleged illegal arrest and was made voluntarily despite the circumstances. The court also held that evidence obtained from a warrantless search was inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio, but Map
-
439 F.2d 1042·
5th Cir.·
1971-02-24
·cited 44×
The court held that the introduction of a driver's license found during a search of the appellant's apartment was permissible, and the denial of a severance motion was not an abuse of discretion.
-
385 F.2d 501·
7th Cir.·
1967-10-03
·cited 42×
The court held that the testimony of witnesses and the identification of defendants were not tainted by prior unlawful arrests, and that the government's calling of a witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment was not prejudicial error.
-
872 F.2d 1444·
10th Cir.·
1989-04-19
·cited 41×
A warrantless arrest conducted by surrounding a home with armed officers and coercing the occupant to exit violates the Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained thereafter is tainted unless sufficiently attenuated.
-
688 So. 2d 313·
Fla.·
1996-12-19
·cited 39×
Terance Valentine was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for a brutal crime committed in 1988 against his ex-wife Livia Romero and her new husband Ferdinand Porche. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction and death sentence while reversing th
-
566 F.2d 1027·
5th Cir.·
1978-01-30
·cited 39×
The court held that the testimony of codefendants, even if discovered through illegal wiretaps, was admissible because it was either from an independent source or so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar retrial after a conviction w
-
914 F.2d 950·
7th Cir.·
1990-09-28
·cited 38×
The court held that the defendant's statements were voluntary and admissible, and that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines applied to his ongoing conspiracy offense.
-
770 F.2d 1434·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-10
·cited 38×
A voluntary, unwarned admission does not automatically taint a subsequent confession made after proper Miranda warnings and waiver.
-
643 F.2d 54·
2d Cir.·
1981-02-10
·cited 38×
The court held that the trial judge properly applied the Geaney standard to admit coconspirator statements and that evidence seized from Garcia-Perez's apartment need not be suppressed, even with initial Fourth Amendment violations.
-
623 F.2d 746·
2d Cir.·
1980-04-17
·cited 38×
The court held that a witness's testimony is admissible even if discovered through an illegal search, provided the witness's decision to cooperate is voluntary and attenuated from the illegal conduct. The court also held that an in-court identification is admissible if the pretri
-
920 F.2d 940·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-11-27
·cited 36×
A government official cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2071 for altering documents if they reasonably believed their actions were legal.
-
686 F.2d 93·
2d Cir.·
1982-07-30
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence seized from apartment 7F was admissible because the agents had probable cause to arrest Martinez and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.
-
610 F.2d 372·
5th Cir.·
1980-01-25
·cited 36×
The court held that the defendants lacked automatic standing to challenge the November search and did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vessel, thus the evidence seized in December was not tainted by the earlier illegal search.
-
329 F.2d 238·
D.C. Cir.·
1964-02-06
·cited 36×
-
727 F.2d 407·
5th Cir.·
1984-03-07
·cited 34×
The court held that the roving border patrol agents lacked sufficient cause to justify the warrantless stop of the defendant's automobile, and the subsequent search was also illegal, rendering the conviction invalid.
-
446 F.2d 1283·
5th Cir.·
1971-05-19
·cited 33×
The court held that the search of the automobile was reasonable and its fruits admissible because probable cause existed at the time of the search, and any potential issue with the initial arrest was attenuated by subsequent events.
-
574 F.2d 1385·
5th Cir.·
1978-06-16
·cited 31×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict DeMatto of conspiracy, but sufficient to convict Streeter and Dyar. The court also held that Dyar and Streeter lacked standing to challenge the legality of the search.
-
590 F.2d 956·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-07-21
·cited 30×
The court should reverse the District Court's order suppressing evidence.
-
528 F.2d 625·
7th Cir.·
1976-01-16
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding that while some issues raised were substantial, the government met its disclosure obligations regarding electronic surveillance, the jury instructions were not prejudicially erroneous when considered as a whole, and the defendants were
-
344 F.2d 545·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-04-06
·cited 30×
The court held that testimony derived from an illegal search is inadmissible as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' if not sufficiently attenuated from the illegality.
-
674 F.2d 1093·
5th Cir.·
1982-05-07
·cited 29×
The court held that warrantless searches of Dunn's ranch violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of evidence and reversal of his convictions, but affirmed Carpenter's convictions due to insufficient evidence to support his appeal.
-
673 F.2d 1200·
11th Cir.·
1982-04-23
·cited 27×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the co-conspirator's statement and the cocaine found in the abandoned bag, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
674 F.2d 624·
7th Cir.·
1982-03-19
·cited 27×
-
583 F.2d 1161·
10th Cir.·
1978-09-20
·cited 27×
Federal courts are not precluded from considering Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus proceedings if state courts failed to recognize or apply controlling constitutional standards, such as those in Brown v. Illinois.
-
454 F.2d 813·
8th Cir.·
1972-01-13
·cited 26×
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the live testimony of witnesses or in refusing to produce the presentence report and psychiatric information of a co-defendant.