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699 F.2d 1219·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-02-01
·cited 17×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing ITT's ultra vires claim for lack of standing and ripeness, and that subject matter jurisdiction was proper. It also modified the FOIA disclosure order, reversing it in part and affirming it in part.
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683 F.2d 353·
11th Cir.·
1982-08-16
·cited 17×
The court held that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's decision limiting Medicare reimbursement for administrator compensation was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.
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536 F.2d 1171·
7th Cir.·
1976-06-22
·cited 17×
A district court's "trial de novo" review under the Food Stamp Act is limited to determining the validity of the agency's administrative action, not modifying the penalty imposed if it is within statutory limits and not arbitrary or capricious.
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429 F.2d 1332·
9th Cir.·
1970-07-29
·cited 17×
The court held that the government complied with administrative procedures and its action was supported by substantial evidence, thus affirming the summary judgment.
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435 F.2d 1133·
7th Cir.·
1970-07-15
·cited 17×
The court held that the Secretary's emergency suspension order was subject to judicial review and was an arbitrary exercise of authority.
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349 F.2d 182·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-06-16
·cited 17×
The court held that the appellant was not given adequate notice of the specific 'immoral conduct' used to disqualify him from federal employment.
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143 Fla. 424·
Fla.·
1940-06-21
·cited 17×
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a mandamus petition by Biscayne Stevedoring Company against the Broward County Port Authority for denying its renewal permit to operate as a stevedore and offering only a restrictive permit limited to two shipping lines. The court held that the
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987 F.2d 1017·
4th Cir.·
1993-02-12
·cited 16×
The court should not reach the issue of the appropriate scope of review for ERISA plan administrator decisions when plans do not vest discretionary powers.
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974 F.2d 631·
5th Cir.·
1992-10-12
·cited 16×
The court held that a district court is not confined to the administrative record when reviewing an ERISA plan administrator's decision under an abuse of discretion standard, and that the lower court erred in limiting its review.
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951 F.2d 739·
7th Cir.·
1991-12-18
·cited 16×
The court held that employers must adhere to ERISA's procedural requirements, and employees can enforce disclosed plan terms when violations prevent them from knowing their rights.
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919 F.2d 158·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-11-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the EPA's regulations governing the closure of hazardous waste facilities were consistent with congressional intent and not arbitrary or capricious. The EPA acted within its statutory authority in promulgating these regulations.
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906 F.2d 1525·
11th Cir.·
1990-07-30
·cited 16×
Claims for benefits under an ERISA plan are equitable in nature, and thus do not entitle plaintiffs to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, even when reviewed de novo. Postpartum depression, without proof of underlying organic causation, is classified as a mental illness und
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899 F.2d 151·
2d Cir.·
1990-03-26
·cited 16×
The court assumed jurisdiction for the purpose of the appeal only, without deciding the jurisdictional questions, and found that BFI's legal and equitable claims must fail on the merits.
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875 F.2d 1008·
2d Cir.·
1989-05-12
·cited 16×
The court held that PBGC's decision to restore terminated pension plans was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to adequately consider the competing policies of ERISA, bankruptcy, and labor law, and lacked sufficient support in the administrative record.
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867 F.2d 458·
8th Cir.·
1989-02-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has primary jurisdiction to interpret its own motor carrier certificates and that its finding that Matlack's transportation of chemicals was part of a continuous interstate operation was supported by substantial evidenc
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851 F.2d 1035·
8th Cir.·
1988-07-08
·cited 16×
The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution because their alleged injury was too speculative and not redressable by the requested relief.
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851 F.2d 229·
9th Cir.·
1988-06-24
·cited 16×
The court held that the Secretary's interpretation of Medicare regulations allowing the use of contractual allocation figures to establish fair market value for asset depreciation basis was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
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839 F.2d 933·
3d Cir.·
1988-02-10
·cited 16×
The court held that the writ of habeas corpus was issued in error and Marshall must be returned to prison, but the majority erred in voiding the penalty for Marshall's first prison infraction.
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810 F.2d 493·
5th Cir.·
1987-02-20
·cited 16×
The EPA may not commence or collect penalties under § 7420 if its Notice of Noncompliance is issued more than four months after a state submits a SIP revision, unless and until the EPA formally rejects that revision.
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809 F.2d 847·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-01-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the Secretary of Transportation exceeded her statutory authority by failing to provide an adequate explanation of how the "payback rule" serves the objectives of the Merchant Marine Act, rendering the rule arbitrary and capricious agency action.
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807 F.2d 1025·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-12-23
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the ICC's orders, holding that the agency acted rationally and within its authority in granting exemptions for Iowa Interstate Railroad to operate over abandoned Rock Island lines, and in denying a transition period or labor protective conditions.
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806 F.2d 995·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-22
·cited 16×
The Civil Monetary Penalties and Assessment Act (CMPAA) is constitutional on its face and as applied, and the administrative determination of civil penalties against the Mayers is upheld.
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794 F.2d 737·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-07-08
·cited 16×
The court held that the FCC's decision to retroactively change its policy and refuse to resolve franchise fee disputes arising before the Cable Act was arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of reasoned explanation. However, the court deferred ruling on the Cable Act issues to a
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793 F.2d 338·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-06-17
·cited 16×
The District Court did not err in asserting jurisdiction over Pearson's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, nor did it abuse its discretion in denying the Commission's motion to transfer the case.
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791 F.2d 803·
10th Cir.·
1986-05-19
·cited 16×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission acted within its authority in ordering retroactive modification of a minimum commodity bill and in rejecting a non-compliant filing, as the minimum bill was integral to the rate structure and the Commission's interpreta
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782 F.2d 182·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-12-20
·cited 16×
The court held that the FCC's expedited procedures, comparative criteria, and ultimate license award were lawful, not arbitrary, and supported by substantial evidence.
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778 F.2d 869·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-12-13
·cited 16×
The FCC is entitled to adopt a strict 'complete and sufficient' standard for LPTV applications due to administrative burdens, but must provide explicit notice of all requirements. Salzer did not receive adequate notice regarding amendment timing and form, while Garnerlynn did.
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773 F.2d 517·
3d Cir.·
1985-09-23
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the citizens' suit as seeking money damages, but that the suit must be dismissed because the EPA Administrator was not under a nondiscretionary duty to review the application within 45 days. However, the district court ha
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772 F.2d 640·
10th Cir.·
1985-09-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the EPA promulgated the regulations within the statutory deadline by making them public on September 30, 1983, and that AMAX lacked standing to challenge the designation of molybdenum as a hazardous constituent.
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771 F.2d 1149·
8th Cir.·
1985-08-30
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the EPA's penalty assessment, finding it supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion, and rejected the argument that a two-and-a-half-year delay in the administrative appeal violated statutory or regulatory requirements.
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772 F.2d 1282·
7th Cir.·
1985-08-27
·cited 16×
The court held that the FCC's exceptions to the separate-subsidiary rule, including joint billing, single-line phone installation, and dial-tone referral, were permissible exercises of the Commission's discretion, despite potential competitive disadvantages for independent provid
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767 F.2d 556·
9th Cir.·
1985-07-29
·cited 16×
The court held that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's (PRRB) reasons for denying reimbursement were not supported by substantial evidence or were legally incorrect. However, the concurring opinion argues the majority improperly went beyond its scope of review.
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766 F.2d 182·
5th Cir.·
1985-07-05
·cited 16×
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757 F.2d 8·
1st Cir.·
1985-03-21
·cited 16×
The court held that the disability benefit plan does not require the availability of an alternative job for benefits to be denied, and Prudential's interpretation of the plan was not arbitrary.
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757 F.2d 265·
Fed. Cir.·
1985-03-15
·cited 16×
The court held that the agency's stated reason for the reduction-in-force (RIF), 'workload and skills imbalances,' was a proper basis under the applicable regulation, and that the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) did not err in its decision.
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753 F.2d 1006·
11th Cir.·
1985-02-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation, requiring comparison of an intermediate care unit's services to other special care units within the same hospital, was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
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750 F.2d 1394·
7th Cir.·
1984-12-21
·cited 16×
The court held that the Reed Report is an agency record subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and that General Electric failed to demonstrate substantial competitive harm or that the Commission's decision to release the report was arbitrary or capricious.
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751 F.2d 209·
8th Cir.·
1984-12-12
·cited 16×
The court held that the FDIC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ordering a cease and desist remedy for conduct that no longer violates the Truth in Lending Act due to legislative amendments, and that the FDIC lacked the statutory authority to order reimbursement for such viola
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747 F.2d 583·
10th Cir.·
1984-10-29
·cited 16×
The Secretary of Health and Human Services has a statutory duty to develop and implement a system that ensures nursing facilities receiving federal funds provide high-quality patient care, not just theoretical capability.
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745 F.2d 1166·
8th Cir.·
1984-10-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to grant Greyhound permission to discontinue bus service on three routes was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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742 F.2d 629·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-08-17
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the FCC's order establishing low power television service and its interim processing procedures, finding no infirmity in either the procedures or the channel allocation.
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727 F.2d 1574·
Fed. Cir.·
1984-03-02
·cited 16×
The court held that the MSPB erred in finding the agency proved the appropriateness of the penalty without considering mitigating factors.
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445 So. 2d 639·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1984-02-13
·cited 16×
The Florida Department of Administration's Division of Retirement adopted a rule requiring a $250 minimum monthly salary to earn full monthly retirement service credit, effectively creating a class of part-time workers ineligible for full credits despite meeting statutory require
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726 F.2d 839·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-02-03
·cited 16×
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) unreasonably interpreted ERISA by failing to give adequate consideration to its remedial purpose when denying pension benefits to former factory workers.
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721 F.2d 170·
7th Cir.·
1983-11-01
·cited 16×
The court held that the Secretary acted within his statutory authority in promulgating the 1979 regulations under the Hill-Burton Act, and these regulations were not arbitrary or capricious.
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720 F.2d 124·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-10-14
·cited 16×
The concurring opinion suggests the agency consider implementing an arbitration procedure and a bond requirement for reimbursement claims against aftermarket parts manufacturers.
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719 F.2d 436·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-10-11
·cited 16×
The court held that the EPA's definition of 'nearby' must apply to demonstrations for determining good engineering practice stack height, and remanded for regulations to reflect this. The court also found the 40% definition of 'excessive concentrations' to be a reasonable exercis
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711 F.2d 233·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-06-17
·cited 16×
The court held that Section 2 of the Safety Appliance Acts mandates specific safety equipment, not operating procedures, and thus does not prohibit employees from going between cars during coupling operations.
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708 F.2d 1329·
8th Cir.·
1983-06-06
·cited 16×
The court held that the Farmers Home Administration's denial of a loan application based on collateral and repayment ability is an agency action committed to agency discretion by law, and thus not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also h
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705 F.2d 343·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the FAA's denial of exemptions from medical standards was not a violation of due process, statutory requirements for findings of fact, or the arbitrary and capricious standard.