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150 F.2d 768·
3d Cir.·
1945-07-06
·cited 24×
The court should order a new trial for Estep because he was denied due process and did not have an opportunity to prove it at his original trial.
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559 U.S. 506·
U.S.·
2010-04-21
·cited 23×
The dissent argues that trust law grants courts discretion to craft remedies after a trustee's abuse of discretion, and that the majority's interpretation of ERISA and trust law is flawed.
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119 F.3d 888·
11th Cir.·
1997-08-05
·cited 23×
Harry Hunt, a retired Eastern Air Lines pilot, sought to recover a lump-sum retirement benefit under the Eastern Air Lines Variable Benefit Retirement Plan for Pilots. Eastern, the Plan's administrator, had refused to pay the benefit after the Plan was amended during Eastern's ba
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859 F.2d 762·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-18
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court erred by not deferring to the Secretary's interpretation of attorneys' fees provisions and associated procedures, finding them to be within the Secretary's discretion and not contrary to statute or the APA.
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830 F.2d 1132·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-09-29
·cited 23×
The Trade Secrets Act does not qualify as a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3 because it does not leave agencies with no discretion and does not establish particular criteria for withholding. The Act's scope is not necessarily coextensive with Exemption 4.
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788 F.2d 372·
6th Cir.·
1986-04-17
·cited 23×
The court held that attorney's fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) must be calculated based on the claimant's net past-due benefits, after deduction of the SSI windfall offset.
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759 F.2d 684·
9th Cir.·
1985-04-24
·cited 23×
The court held that the Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA) Near Term Intertie Access Policy (IAP) is a reasonable interpretation of its statutory authority and is not arbitrary or capricious, thus upholding its validity.
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733 F.2d 605·
9th Cir.·
1984-03-12
·cited 23×
A 'worst case' analysis of a major oil spill is necessary at the lease sale stage under NEPA and its implementing regulation because the unknown consequences are important to the decision-maker's ability to refrain from leasing.
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716 F.2d 1369·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-11
·cited 23×
The court held that the ICC's policy statement was a rational exercise of its authority and properly issued as a statement of policy, not a rule.
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432 So. 2d 1359·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1983-06-07
·cited 23×
The court affirmed the Department of General Services' award of a construction contract to Bergeron, rejecting Capeletti's argument that a misrepresentation in the site drawings rendered all bids invalid and that Bergeron was not a responsible bidder.
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699 F.2d 157·
4th Cir.·
1983-01-20
·cited 23×
The court held that the EPA's determination that coal mine water discharge permits were unlikely to have a significant environmental impact was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus dismissed the petition for review.
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675 F.2d 367·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-04-09
·cited 23×
The court affirmed most of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal's distribution of cable royalty fees, finding the allocations supported by substantial evidence and within the zone of reasonableness, but remanded a portion concerning National Public Radio for further proceedings.
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588 F.2d 803·
Ct. Cl.·
1978-12-13
·cited 23×
The court held that the Civil Service Commission's denial of disability retirement was not subject to judicial review absent substantial procedural error, and the Air Force's actions were reasonable and supported by evidence.
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561 F.2d 1032·
2d Cir.·
1976-12-23
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiffs, including a city and its low-income residents, lacked standing to challenge the Department of Housing and Urban Development's waiver of a requirement in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
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512 F.2d 1082·
Ct. Cl.·
1975-02-19
·cited 23×
The court held that the Forest Service's refusal to extend the timber sale contract based on an "extraordinary conditions" standard, rather than its established policy of granting extensions unless disadvantageous to the United States, constituted a breach of contract. The court
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210 F.2d 874·
D.C. Cir.·
1954-02-25
·cited 23×
The court held that the administrative determination of cause for discharge, when substantially compliant with procedural requirements, is not subject to judicial review.
-
920 So. 2d 818·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2006-02-17
·cited 22×
Seminole County appealed a trial court's order certifying a class action brought by Tivoli Orlando Associates, which challenged the County's calculation of building permit fees and water/wastewater impact fees as arbitrary and capricious. The Fifth District Court of Appeal revers
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780 So. 2d 136·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2000-08-02
·cited 22×
Keith Sharick, a fourth-year medical student dismissed from Southeastern University of the Health Sciences one month before graduation, sued for breach of implied-in-fact contract. The jury found the dismissal arbitrary and capricious, but the trial court limited damages to tuiti
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936 F.2d 98·
2d Cir.·
1991-06-19
·cited 22×
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934 F.2d 327·
D.C. Cir.·
1991-05-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) did not change its policy regarding the ferry exemption and reasonably determined that Viking Starship's services were exempt from ICC regulation. The court also found that the ICC's decision did not trigger environment
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900 F.2d 1138·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-27
·cited 22×
The court held that the Trustees' denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant was correct.
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810 F.2d 1236·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-02-13
·cited 22×
The court held that the NGOs should be allowed to amend their complaint to affirmatively allege eligibility for AID funds, and that the case does not present a nonjusticiable political question.
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772 F.2d 1225·
5th Cir.·
1985-10-07
·cited 22×
The court held that the Corps of Engineers did not adequately analyze the cumulative impacts of the development project, but the district court erred in ordering the preparation of an environmental impact statement at that stage.
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762 F.2d 1053·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-05-31
·cited 22×
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752 F.2d 670·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-01-11
·cited 22×
The court held that the Committee to Save KQED raised a substantial and material question of fact regarding KQED's intent, compelling the FCC to hold an evidentiary hearing.
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749 F.2d 113·
2d Cir.·
1984-11-02
·cited 22×
The FCC's time-channeling regulation for dial-a-porn services is set aside because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and less restrictive alternatives were not adequately considered.
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745 F.2d 412·
7th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 22×
The court held that the Navy's decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) for Project ELF was not arbitrary or capricious, as the new information presented did not significantly alter the environmental picture envisioned by the original EIS.
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728 F.2d 1276·
9th Cir.·
1984-03-23
·cited 22×
Inclusion on a preliminary list of potential relocatees does not confer eligibility for relocation benefits under the Settlement Act.
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724 F.2d 668·
8th Cir.·
1984-01-03
·cited 22×
The court should have remanded the case to the ICC for further development of the record concerning the burdens on interstate commerce caused by continued operation of the rail line.
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720 F.2d 958·
7th Cir.·
1983-11-08
·cited 22×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had the authority to conditionally certify state regulatory bodies under the Staggers Act, and that the petition for review was timely filed due to the unusual circumstances of the case.
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720 F.2d 278·
3d Cir.·
1983-10-13
·cited 22×
The court held that the Marshals Service's erroneous decisions and delays in converting a term deputy to a career position were sufficiently inordinate to be unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act.
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715 F.2d 1248·
7th Cir.·
1983-08-30
·cited 22×
The court held that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required as a matter of law for the federally funded sewage treatment facility, and that the appellants were not entitled to special notice of the public hearing based on their property's distance from the site.
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715 F.2d 237·
6th Cir.·
1983-08-12
·cited 22×
The court enforced the National Labor Relations Board's order, finding substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusions that the company engaged in unfair labor practices and that a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy.
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715 F.2d 732·
2d Cir.·
1983-08-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the Department of Transportation's (DOT) conclusion that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary for implementing HM-164 was arbitrary and capricious.
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703 F.2d 1104·
9th Cir.·
1983-04-12
·cited 22×
The court held that while Oakland violated CETA by failing to audit subgrantee expenditures, the DOL's decision to order repayment or face grant termination lacked sufficient justification for the sanction, requiring a remand for a hearing on appropriate sanctions.
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699 F.2d 1185·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-01-25
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge argues that the Commission's action was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the majority's demand for a more precise rule is unwarranted.
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687 F.2d 644·
2d Cir.·
1982-09-02
·cited 22×
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims against local defendants but reversed the dismissal of claims against federal defendants.
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684 F.2d 86·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-07-27
·cited 22×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission arbitrarily granted an application to broaden a carrier's authority because it failed to consider whether the applicant was fit, willing, and able to provide the expanded service.
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679 F.2d 1184·
5th Cir.·
1982-07-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the Department of Transportation's regulations imposing a "perimeter rule" on flights to and from Washington National Airport were valid and not arbitrary or capricious.
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679 F.2d 668·
7th Cir.·
1982-05-06
·cited 22×
The court affirmed the ICC's decision, holding that its findings regarding the inadequacy of the rail line for 100-ton cars and the justification for abandonment were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary or capricious.
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671 F.2d 119·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-22
·cited 22×
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the authority to refer to private contract pricing provisions to identify natural gas eligible for special incentive prices, and its use of this authority in establishing the 'negotiated contract price requirement' was neither a
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672 F.2d 732·
9th Cir.·
1982-03-22
·cited 22×
The court held that the Federal Labor Relations Authority's interpretation that 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) authorizes official time, travel expenses, and per diem for employee representatives engaged in midterm collective bargaining negotiations is reasoned and supportable and thus entit
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673 F.2d 514·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-03-16
·cited 22×
The court held that the ICC's order granting Greyhound authority was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to adequately consider the systemwide anticompetitive impact on Trailways.
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668 F.2d 1185·
11th Cir.·
1982-02-22
·cited 22×
The Board's decision was reasoned and rational, not arbitrary or capricious, and should be affirmed.
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671 F.2d 528·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-01-15
·cited 22×
The ICC's informal rulemaking to simplify passenger broker licensing procedures by substituting a general finding of public interest for case-by-case evaluations was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
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653 F.2d 681·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-06-02
·cited 22×
The court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) treatment of Accumulated Deferred Investment Tax Credits (ADITC) by allowing them to earn the overall rate of return, rather than the higher common equity rate, and excluding them from capitalization, was consi
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642 F.2d 916·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-17
·cited 22×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission could use informal rulemaking to establish general licensing criteria for motor carriers transporting government traffic, and that promoting competition was a valid basis for such rules.
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645 F.2d 1028·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-02-20
·cited 22×
The court held that the Postal Service was not arbitrary or capricious in removing an employee for a theft conviction, and that a state pardon did not bar the removal action.
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636 F.2d 1190·
10th Cir.·
1980-10-28
·cited 22×
The court held that the Parole Commission's interpretation of its own regulation regarding 'new information' was not arbitrary or capricious, thus the reopening of the appellant's case was permissible.
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624 F.2d 1132·
2d Cir.·
1980-06-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to pension benefits under ERISA or estoppel theory because he forfeited his credits before the ERISA vesting provision became effective and failed to prove reliance or injury for estoppel.