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389 F.2d 231·
6th Cir.·
1968-02-09
·cited 69×
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812 F.2d 834·
3d Cir.·
1987-02-19
·cited 66×
The court held that the district court misallocated the burdens of proof regarding mixed-motive employment decisions under ERISA § 510 and that the applicable statute of limitations is six years, not six months.
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619 F.2d 99·
1st Cir.·
1980-03-31
·cited 51×
The court held that the plaintiff's equal protection claim was barred by the statute of limitations, applying the six-month period from the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute as the most analogous to federal civil rights actions. The court also affirmed the dismissal of th
-
694 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1982-11-26
·cited 48×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations in Count I were too conclusory to state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, and that the remaining counts were properly dismissed as time-barred.
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536 F.2d 222·
8th Cir.·
1976-05-11
·cited 46×
The court held that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-219, a three-year statute of limitations for actions based on federal statutes, applies to the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VI, and that the plaintiff's action was untimely filed.
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463 F.2d 337·
8th Cir.·
1972-03-30
·cited 46×
The court modified its opinion regarding the burden of proof for an employer refusing to rehire an applicant based on past unlawful conduct, emphasizing the need for objective evidence of job performance impact.
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629 F.2d 404·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-27
·cited 43×
The court held that the amended complaint adding the sheriff related back to the original filing under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), thus avoiding the statute of limitations defense.
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805 F.2d 741·
7th Cir.·
1986-11-06
·cited 41×
The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is the state's residual or 'catchall' statute of limitations.
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611 F.2d 450·
3d Cir.·
1979-11-14
·cited 34×
The six-year statute of limitations applicable to common law fraud claims in New Jersey governs the federal securities fraud claim at issue.
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572 F.2d 1233·
8th Cir.·
1978-03-07
·cited 34×
The court held that the 180-day statute of limitations for housing discrimination claims applied to §§ 1981 and 1982, but a three-year statute applied to the § 1983 claim. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim under the Fair Housing Act was untimely.
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940 F.2d 503·
9th Cir.·
1991-07-31
·cited 32×
The court held that the Feltons' state law claims were preempted by ERISA, but erred in applying a one-year statute of limitations, which should be two years for wrongful termination claims in Arizona.
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297 F.2d 268·
5th Cir.·
1962-01-02
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the libelant's claim for overtime wages, finding it barred by laches.
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622 F.2d 1209·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-04
·cited 26×
The court held that a non-negligent owner who abandons a sunken vessel is not liable for removal costs, and that a plaintiff's salvage expenses are recoverable if the conduct falls within the 'range of reason,' not necessarily the most prudent course.
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769 F.2d 362·
6th Cir.·
1985-07-31
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court erred by failing to give presumptive effect to the analogous statute of limitations when applying the equitable defense of laches in a trademark infringement case.
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486 F.2d 534·
8th Cir.·
1973-10-23
·cited 24×
The court held that the inmate's civil rights action was barred by the applicable Arkansas three-year statute of limitations, affirming the district court's dismissal.
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912 F.2d 1197·
10th Cir.·
1990-08-16
·cited 23×
The court held that the § 510 ERISA claim was time-barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations, but the claim for benefits due under the plan could not be resolved on summary judgment due to unresolved factual issues regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies.
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784 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1986-02-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the six-month statute of limitations from the NLRA does not apply to free-standing LMRDA Title I claims; instead, the most analogous state statute of limitations should be applied.
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760 F.2d 926·
9th Cir.·
1985-05-13
·cited 22×
The court held that former employees who have received distributions of their vested pension benefits still have standing to sue under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty and nondisclosure. The court also held that ERISA preempts state law claims related to employee benefit plans
-
17 F.4th 1316·
11th Cir.·
2021-11-12
·cited 21×
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims as time-barred, finding the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff's disability progressed to the point where he was actually denied ac
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729 F.2d 576·
8th Cir.·
1984-03-13
·cited 20×
The court held that both the RICO and common law fraud claims were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
-
828 F.2d 1348·
8th Cir.·
1987-09-21
·cited 16×
The court held that actions by employee benefit fund trustees to collect delinquent contributions under ERISA are most analogous to actions for breach of written contracts, not actions under state wage payment collection laws. Therefore, the longer statute of limitations for cont
-
802 F.2d 1416·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-09-05
·cited 16×
The court held that the reasoning in Section II of the majority opinion was flawed regarding the application of Wilson v. Garcia to section 1981 actions.
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850 F.2d 430·
8th Cir.·
1988-06-27
·cited 15×
The court held that an employee's action for recovery of benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is most analogous to a breach of contract action for statute of limitations purposes.
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585 F.2d 171·
6th Cir.·
1978-10-10
·cited 14×
The court held that filing a complaint with a state civil rights commission does not toll the statute of limitations for federal housing discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or the Fair Housing Act.
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576 F.2d 945·
1st Cir.·
1978-06-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the three-year Rhode Island statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the most analogous to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus barred the plaintiffs' suit.
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707 F.2d 817·
4th Cir.·
1983-05-23
·cited 12×
The court held that the appellants' claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they had sufficient notice of the facts forming the basis of their cause of action by 1976.
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568 F.2d 58·
8th Cir.·
1977-12-15
·cited 12×
The court held that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by failure to file a timely EEOC charge, and his § 1981 claim was barred by the Arkansas three-year statute of limitations for actions on liabilities created by statute.
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305 F.2d 170·
1st Cir.·
1962-07-06
·cited 12×
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the libel based on laches, as the respondent was not prejudiced by the delay in filing suit.
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710 F.2d 709·
11th Cir.·
1983-07-25
·cited 11×
The court held that the three-year statute of limitations in 46 U.S.C.A. § 763a does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued before its enactment.
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973 F.2d 122·
2d Cir.·
1992-08-19
·cited 10×
The court held that claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the state's personal injury statute of limitations, and that the district court abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over the pendent state law claim after dismissing the federal claim.
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942 F.2d 1260·
8th Cir.·
1991-08-21
·cited 10×
The dissenting judge would hold that the insurance policy in question does not contain a promise for the payment of money, and therefore the action is barred by the 5-year statute of limitations.
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896 F.2d 43·
3d Cir.·
1990-02-14
·cited 10×
The court held that the Trustees' failure to perform simple calculations on provided data and inform their agents constituted a lack of reasonable diligence, thus the statute of limitations was not tolled.
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776 F.2d 1546·
Temp. Emer. Ct. App.·
1985-10-01
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court correctly applied the two-year Texas statute of limitations to the federal overcharge claims, finding that the cause of action accrued at the time of the first overcharge and that the plaintiff failed to establish fraudulent concealment.
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703 F.2d 10·
1st Cir.·
1983-03-24
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is time-barred because the most analogous state statute of limitations is two years, applicable to defamation and 'false light' invasion of privacy claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the action.
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641 F.2d 227·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-30
·cited 8×
The court held that the prisoner's pro se suit was barred by the analogous Florida statute of limitations, as imprisonment does not toll the statute for civil rights claims.
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420 F.2d 954·
5th Cir.·
1969-12-17
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court's finding of laches was not clearly erroneous, affirming the dismissal of the action.
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602 F. Supp. 42·
M.D. Fla.·
1985-02-01
·cited 5×
The court held that the plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) fails for lack of a sufficiently defined class, but ERISA claims are not time-barred and the emotional distress claim is viable. The defamation claim also survives dismissal.
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729 F.2d 360·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-12
·cited 4×
The court held that the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-29 applies to actions alleging discriminatory termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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708 F.2d 862·
1st Cir.·
1983-06-03
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the race discrimination claims as time-barred, as the plaintiff failed to file her complaint within the statutory periods.
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690 F.2d 203·
Temp. Emer. Ct. App.·
1982-10-04
·cited 4×
The court denied the petition for leave to appeal an interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment, finding it did not involve a controlling question of law and would not materially advance the litigation's termination.
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355 F.2d 26·
2d Cir.·
1966-01-05
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in applying the wrong analogous state statute of limitations to the seaman's unseaworthiness claim, thus improperly granting summary judgment based on laches.
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977 F.2d 1129·
7th Cir.·
1992-10-20
·cited 3×
The court held that Tolle's state law claims were preempted by ERISA, but her ERISA Section 510 claim was not barred by the statute of limitations as initially determined by the district court, and remanded for further proceedings on her Section 502(a)(1)(B) and 503 claims.
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997 F.2d 1028·
2d Cir.·
1993-07-02
·cited 2×
The court held that arbitration under the Railway Labor Act does not preclude claims under the Rehabilitation Act, and that the statute of limitations for such claims is the analogous state personal injury statute. However, it affirmed dismissal for some plaintiffs based on facts
-
710 F.2d 1188·
6th Cir.·
1983-06-27
·cited 2×
The court held that the Suttons' housing discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 was barred by the 180-day statute of limitations found in the Ohio Fair Housing Act, as it was the most analogous state statute.
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428 F.2d 1221·
6th Cir.·
1970-01-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff's civil rights action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, as there was no tolling provision for incarceration in Tennessee.
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980 F. Supp. 1455·
M.D. Fla.·
1997-09-30
·cited 1×
The court held that Counts I-IV and VI of the complaint stated claims upon which relief could be granted, but Count V was barred by the statute of limitations.
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635 F.2d 954·
2d Cir.·
1980-10-22
·cited 1×
The court held that the town's management of the Arcadia Hills Water District by a board elected by all town residents satisfied the rational basis test, and that claims of discrimination in water rates and supply were insufficient.
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891 F. Supp. 583·
M.D. Fla.·
1995-06-27
The court held that actions for attorneys' fees under the IDEA are subject to a 30-day statute of limitations, analogous to appeals from administrative hearings.
-
990 F.2d 794·
4th Cir.·
1993-04-05
The court held that the employer was bound by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its employer association, and its defenses to the grievance committee's decision were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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970 F.2d 419·
8th Cir.·
1992-05-29
Removal to federal court was proper because the common law contract claim was preempted by ERISA, but the claim was timely filed under the analogous five-year statute of limitations for contract actions.