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805 So. 2d 22·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2001-10-10
·cited 29×
The Board of Trustees appealed a quiet title judgment favoring Lost Tree Village Corporation regarding the conveyance of state-owned lands in the Indian River. The court affirmed that the 1956 supplemental deed unambiguously conveyed 571.51 acres but reversed and remanded on whet
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199 So. 3d 461·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2016-08-31
·cited 13×
The court held that the deeds, containing ambiguous language such as 'subject to,' allowed for the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the grantor's intent, and that such evidence supported the trial court's finding of an easement.
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306 So. 2d 537·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1975-01-28
·cited 12×
A deed, even with modifications and a reserved life estate, conveys the grantor's title if its language is clear and unambiguous, and it cannot be collaterally attacked as a testamentary disposition.
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251 So. 3d 249·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2018-06-22
·cited 6×
The 1934 quitclaim deed from the Clearwater Island Bridge Company to the City of Clearwater unambiguously conveyed all lands, including submerged lands, within the boundaries described in the deed extending eastwardly to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor. The trial court erred in
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219 So. 3d 900·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2016-12-21
·cited 4×
David Harkless appeals a summary judgment in favor of the Laubhans, claiming he reserved the right to receive rent from a Verizon lease when he sold property containing the leased parcel. The court reverses, holding that Harkless validly reserved his rental rights in the initial
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129 F.2d 94·
5th Cir.·
1942-06-26
·cited 4×
The court held that the prior state court decision, which relied on extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous deed, was not binding on the federal court's determination of the pleadings alone. Therefore, the dismissal for failure to state a claim was erroneous.
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588 So. 2d 622·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1991-10-14
·cited 3×
The appellate court reversed a lower court's decision to void a deed, finding that the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence to challenge the stated consideration of "love and affection" when the purpose was to defeat the deed's operation.
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908 F.2d 29·
5th Cir.·
1990-08-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the 1911 deed unambiguously conveyed only four specifically described tracts of land, and since the defendant oil companies had no interest in those tracts, summary judgment for the defendants was proper.
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126 So. 2d 148·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1961-01-16
·cited 2×
Lynch appealed a decree dismissing their quiet title action to a 25-foot parcel of land in Miami. The court affirmed the dismissal but modified the decree to clarify that the appellee Welan Investment Co. acquired only easement rights, not fee simple title, through a 1938 tax for
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249 F.2d 600·
4th Cir.·
1957-11-11
·cited 2×
The court held that the deed's provisions subordinating the surface rights of the coal owner to the surface owner's mining operations apply to any implied rights, thus preventing the coal owner from interfering with the surface owner's operations or imposing charges for using the
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2023-09-22
The court held that the DiStefanos, as owners of the servient estate, may continue to park vehicles on a portion of the easement, provided such use does not unreasonably interfere with Westminster Club's ingress and egress. The court granted the DiStefanos' motion for summary jud
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Fla. 3d DCA·
2023-09-06
An enhanced life estate deed was ambiguous where paragraph six incorrectly used the term "grantor" instead of "grantee," and the trial court properly reformed the deed to clarify that the grantee (life tenant) retained exclusive power to mortgage the property without the remainde
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Del. Ch.·
2012-06-29
The Court held that a deed altered after execution by the buyer's attorney without the seller's effective consent is a nullity. The executed deed, not the altered recorded deed, is the operative document. Because the executed deed's metes and bounds description excluded the resid
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999 F.2d 989·
6th Cir.·
1993-07-26
The dissenting judge believes the deeds at issue do not grant the right to strip mine, as they lack clear language demonstrating intent to waive subjacent support or permit surface destruction.