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832 F.2d 676·
1st Cir.·
1987-11-02
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of mail fraud and that the jury instructions and evidentiary rulings were not reversible error.
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828 F.2d 1286·
8th Cir.·
1987-09-14
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, but reversed convictions for several defendants due to prejudicial error in denying severance motions.
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822 F.2d 946·
10th Cir.·
1987-06-25
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support convictions on all counts and that the jury instructions, including the Allen charge, were not erroneous.
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813 F.2d 499·
1st Cir.·
1987-03-11
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the criminal venture and sought to make it succeed.
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811 F.2d 804·
3d Cir.·
1987-02-18
·cited 30×
The court held that a district court's grant of a new trial motion is jurisdictional and must be made within the time limits prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, while a judgment of acquittal may be entered under the court's inherent power outside those limits.
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806 F.2d 535·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 30×
The court affirmed convictions for labor leaders and union members under RICO, Taft-Hartley, Hobbs Act, and obstruction of justice charges, finding sufficient evidence for each conviction.
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802 F.2d 553·
1st Cir.·
1986-09-29
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings on continuances, probable cause, search warrants, sufficiency of evidence, hearsay, prosecutorial comments, severance, or witness retaliation charges.
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797 F.2d 1485·
9th Cir.·
1986-08-22
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for conspiracy, aiding and abetting importation, making false statements to a government agency, and mail fraud, and affirmed the denial of his sentence modification petition.
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790 F.2d 392·
5th Cir.·
1986-05-22
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, restrictions on cross-examination, contempt citation of counsel, or in refusing to grant a mistrial. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and sentencing did not violate the double jeopa
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787 F.2d 799·
2d Cir.·
1986-04-04
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to link the appellant to the conspiracy to commit extortion, and that co-conspirator statements were admissible.
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779 F.2d 606·
11th Cir.·
1986-01-10
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy convictions for appellants Quarterman, Prather, and McTeer, but reversed Jenkins' conviction due to insufficient evidence. The court also found no prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof o
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777 F.2d 973·
5th Cir.·
1985-12-02
·cited 30×
The court held that evidence was insufficient to support convictions for aiding and abetting attempted exportation for Ojeda-Avila and Garcia, but sufficient for other convictions. Jury instructions on materiality and intent were proper, and ATF Form 4473 is constitutional.
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776 F.2d 1091·
2d Cir.·
1985-11-14
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of conspiracy and aiding and abetting the use of counterfeit credit cards, and that the government's conduct did not deprive the defendants of due process or improperly manufacture federal jurisdiction.
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772 F.2d 1382·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-05
·cited 30×
The court held that the admission of a defendant's spontaneous post-arrest statement was not a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and that comments on his post-arrest silence, while potentially improper, were either invited by the defense or harmless error given the overwhe
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754 F.2d 1202·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-26
·cited 30×
The court held that while the errors below were harmless, the extended detention periods without a probable cause determination violated the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, collateral estoppel may apply to overt acts in a conspiracy case if specific intent was necessarily decided
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460 So. 2d 1024·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1984-12-28
·cited 30×
A minor was convicted of burglary and loitering/prowling after being observed with a companion who stole a tire iron from a car lot. The appellate court affirmed the loitering conviction but reversed the burglary conviction, holding that mere presence at the scene and knowledge o
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751 F.2d 128·
2d Cir.·
1984-12-26
·cited 30×
The court's opinion is concurred with, but the precise effect of joining lesser convictions with a greater conviction is unclear.
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739 F.2d 885·
3d Cir.·
1984-07-12
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, affirming the convictions.
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738 F.2d 538·
2d Cir.·
1984-06-20
·cited 30×
The court held that eavesdropping via a hole in the wall of a hotel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the search warrant was valid. However, the evidence against Sally Edith was insufficient for her conviction.
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726 F.2d 344·
7th Cir.·
1984-01-27
·cited 30×
The court held that evidence of prior drug dealings was admissible to prove knowledge and intent, and that post-arrest statements made voluntarily after Miranda warnings were also admissible. The evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction.
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712 F.2d 126·
5th Cir.·
1983-08-03
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for possession with intent to distribute, the prosecutor's closing argument was permissible, and the court did not err in denying severance or a James hearing.
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704 F.2d 554·
11th Cir.·
1983-05-02
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove a single conspiracy and that the Travel Act's 'distribution' requirement was met through the interstate wire transfers and subsequent receipt of funds. Cole's conviction for aiding and abetting was also supported by suffici
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684 F.2d 380·
6th Cir.·
1982-08-02
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court committed reversible error by failing to give a requested alibi instruction for Counts One and Two, but found no error in the admission of identification evidence or prior act evidence.
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671 F.2d 75·
2d Cir.·
1982-01-27
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the indictment was not defective, duplicitous, or unconstitutionally vague, and that prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice the grand jury.
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668 F.2d 489·
10th Cir.·
1982-01-14
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court's preliminary indication regarding the admissibility of prior convictions was not prejudicial error, and that the denial of the motion to disclose the informant was proper.
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616 F.2d 1107·
9th Cir.·
1980-04-07
·cited 30×
The court held that the prosecution's inquiry into the petitioner's post-arrest silence was harmless error, the giving of an aiding and abetting instruction was not a due process violation, and newly-discovered evidence would not have likely produced an acquittal.
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603 F.2d 1022·
1st Cir.·
1979-08-08
·cited 30×
The court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
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603 F.2d 42·
8th Cir.·
1979-08-02
·cited 30×
The court held that the admission of out-of-court coconspirator statements was proper under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
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590 F.2d 785·
9th Cir.·
1979-02-01
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the denial of an injunction against the auditors, holding that the trial court did not err in applying the standard of care for auditors under the securities laws and that its findings were not clearly erroneous.
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581 F.2d 182·
8th Cir.·
1978-08-09
·cited 30×
The court held that the admission of Agent Buchholz's testimony repeating Mr. Lilley's statement was hearsay and not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B), and that Mr. Lilley's testimony against appellant violated the marital privilege.
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560 F.2d 1050·
2d Cir.·
1977-06-13
·cited 30×
The court held that the sentences for conspiracy and a continuing criminal enterprise violation did not constitute double jeopardy.
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553 F.2d 5·
2d Cir.·
1977-03-28
·cited 30×
The court held that a defendant cannot relitigate issues decided on direct appeal through a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that the alleged new evidence did not warrant a new trial.
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548 F.2d 1096·
2d Cir.·
1977-01-18
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the jury charge on guilty knowledge, while containing a potentially confusing term, was not reversible error.
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532 F.2d 199·
2d Cir.·
1976-02-13
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court's jury charge, by repeatedly referring to the checks as 'stolen' and failing to explicitly instruct the jury that it must find the checks were stolen as a separate element, effectively removed that essential issue from the jury's considerati
-
528 F.2d 625·
7th Cir.·
1976-01-16
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding that while some issues raised were substantial, the government met its disclosure obligations regarding electronic surveillance, the jury instructions were not prejudicially erroneous when considered as a whole, and the defendants were
-
322 So. 2d 543·
Fla.·
1975-09-24
·cited 30×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district court decisions regarding whether a middleman who arranges drug sales but does not personally sell the drugs can be convicted of selling cocaine. The Court held that under Florida's principal statute, one who aids, ab
-
522 F.2d 224·
2d Cir.·
1975-06-10
·cited 30×
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512 F.2d 1281·
5th Cir.·
1975-05-14
·cited 30×
The court held that while a jury instruction on intent contained language previously disapproved for potentially shifting the burden of proof, it did not necessitate reversal in this case because the evidence focused on the defendant's objective conduct rather than solely on his
-
495 F.2d 742·
8th Cir.·
1974-04-19
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the jury instructions were not plain error, and the refusal to give a lesser included offense instruction was proper.
-
495 F.2d 1166·
3d Cir.·
1974-04-16
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to aid and abet the bank officer's willful misapplication of funds or that he conspired with the officer to defraud the bank.
-
484 F.2d 176·
8th Cir.·
1973-07-24
·cited 30×
The court held that the appellants were not denied an impartial jury and that the trial court did not err in its instructions or evidentiary rulings.
-
477 F.2d 868·
10th Cir.·
1973-05-04
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to compel the government to produce an informant, in refusing to give instructions on presumption from non-production, in submitting the entrapment defense to the jury, or in instructing on aiding and abetting.
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478 F.2d 976·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-04-27
·cited 30×
The court held that a prosecutor's intimidation of a defense witness, leading to the witness's refusal to testify, constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
457 F.2d 95·
3d Cir.·
1972-03-13
·cited 30×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict and that the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for a new trial or the continuance.
-
455 F.2d 264·
9th Cir.·
1972-02-07
·cited 30×
The court held that the joinder of defendants and the joint trial were proper because they were alleged to have participated in the same series of acts constituting mail fraud, and the trial court took adequate steps to prevent prejudice.
-
440 F.2d 262·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-02-12
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial judge did not err in denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, nor in its jury instructions or handling of Jencks Act materials.
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424 F.2d 643·
9th Cir.·
1970-04-07
·cited 30×
A conspiracy acquittal does not collaterally estop a retrial for aiding and abetting if the acquittal did not necessarily resolve an issue of ultimate fact essential to the aiding and abetting conviction, and the defendant failed to provide a complete trial transcript.
-
414 F.2d 744·
2d Cir.·
1969-08-04
·cited 30×
The court held that the defendant's consent to search was voluntary and not coerced, despite his belief that agents would obtain a warrant, and that Miranda warnings were not required prior to his non-custodial questioning.
-
407 F.2d 1·
8th Cir.·
1969-02-13
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the jury could be instructed on aiding and abetting even if not explicitly charged.
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383 F.2d 610·
2d Cir.·
1967-10-03
·cited 30×
The court held that the invoices were properly admitted into evidence because the appellant lacked standing to challenge the legality of the seizure, and other contentions were without merit.