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505 F.2d 790·
9th Cir.·
1974-10-21
·cited 68×
A bank borrower who was neither a party to any deceptive scheme nor negligent regarding circumstances giving rise to a defense to his note is not estopped from asserting such defense against the bank's receiver.
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658 F.2d 300·
5th Cir.·
1981-10-05
·cited 32×
The court held that the defendants, as makers of the note, could not assert the unjustifiable impairment of collateral defense under UCC § 3-606, and that the commercial reasonableness defense under UCC § 9-504 was waived by failure to plead it timely.
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138 So. 2d 352·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1962-03-01
·cited 32×
In this declaratory decree action, the court addresses the respective liability of a widow (co-maker of a mortgage note) and her stepchildren (remainder interest holders in homestead property) for a non-purchase money mortgage debt. The court held that the widow, as an accommodat
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766 F.2d 744·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-19
·cited 22×
A co-maker of a negotiable instrument who has a right of recourse against the primary obligor is considered a surety and can assert the defense of unjustifiable impairment of collateral under UCC § 3-606(1)(b).
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662 F.2d 354·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-30
·cited 19×
The court held that the Georgia long arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over a devisee who owns property in Georgia, and that the Cook County property devised to the daughter must bear the PCA indebtedness. The court also held that federal courts lack subject matter jurisd
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187 So. 2d 690·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1966-06-08
·cited 19×
The Marinellis appealed a judgment holding them liable as accommodation makers on a promissory note for the purchase price of an auto parts business. The court affirmed, finding the Marinellis clearly signed the note in their individual capacity and remained liable despite claimi
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171 So. 2d 1·
Fla.·
1964-12-16
·cited 16×
The Florida Supreme Court held that three daughters of a deceased property owner could be subrogated as contingent claimants against their father's estate if they paid off a mortgage on his homestead property. The court reversed the District Court of Appeal's application of the "
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76 Fla. 42·
Fla.·
1918-06-25
·cited 14×
Odlin gave a promissory note to the executors of Frank Simonton's estate in exchange for their promise to assume joint promissory notes on which Odlin was an accommodation maker and to release him from all liability. When the executors sued on the note without providing the promi
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336 F.2d 535·
10th Cir.·
1964-09-09
·cited 12×
The court held that a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over counterclaims seeking to recover voidable preferences or setoffs, but not over counterclaims wholly unrelated to the creditor's claim.
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860 F.2d 896·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-26
·cited 10×
The court held that a co-maker of an SBA loan note cannot assert the impairment of collateral defense under Idaho law, which was adopted as federal common law for SBA transactions.
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262 F.2d 826·
9th Cir.·
1959-01-02
·cited 10×
An accommodation maker is liable on a promissory note even if they personally receive no consideration, provided the principal maker received consideration.
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332 So. 2d 703·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1976-06-07
·cited 9×
In this appeal from summary judgment on a promissory note, the court reversed, holding that the defendants' allegations of being accommodation makers and the accommodated party relationship raise genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, even though oral evi
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974 F.2d 712·
6th Cir.·
1992-09-02
·cited 8×
The court held that Cordek was a principal maker of the note, not an accommodation maker, and affirmed that the Bank's claim should not be equitably subordinated. The court also affirmed the recovery of preferential transfers, holding that the preference period is calculated from
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149 F.2d 393·
6th Cir.·
1945-05-23
·cited 4×
The court held that the petitioners, as residuary legatees, were not entitled to a bad debt deduction for payments made on a joint note, as they did not stand in the shoes of the original accommodation maker and lacked a direct legal obligation to pay.
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155 Fla. 506·
Fla.·
1945-01-26
·cited 3×
The court held that an accommodation maker of a note secured by a wage assignment is considered a borrower under the statute, and the statute itself is constitutional.
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244 So. 2d 550·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1971-02-23
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff's second amended complaint sufficiently stated causes of action for both accommodation maker liability and breach of an indemnification agreement, making judgment on the pleadings improper.
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358 F.2d 488·
10th Cir.·
1966-04-01
·cited 2×
A pledgee bank can sue the makers of collateral notes without first exhausting other collateral pledged by the debtor, and makers cannot claim subrogation rights until they have paid the obligation and asserted them in a proper judicial proceeding.
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345 F.2d 994·
10th Cir.·
1965-05-20
·cited 2×
The court held that Sterling's acknowledgment of the assignment created a contract with the bank, and Cannon, as an accommodation maker, was subrogated to the bank's rights.
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164 F.2d 186·
4th Cir.·
1947-11-05
·cited 2×
The court held that the retention of a compromise note by a bank conservator and later by trustees, without explicit acceptance, did not discharge the original notes, and that the assignment of the compromise note to a liquidator did not constitute acceptance.
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269 So. 2d 735·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1972-11-28
Dorothy Stockett appealed the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the entry of summary judgment against her libel claim against Beneficial Finance Company. The court affirmed, finding the alleged collection practices insufficient to support
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265 So. 2d 88·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1972-08-01
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305 F.2d 515·
9th Cir.·
1962-08-27
The court held that the execution of a third note, accompanied by stamping the second note as 'Replaced by new note in like amount' and payments made according to the third note's schedule, demonstrated the parties' intent to discharge the second note, thereby releasing the accom
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278 F.2d 539·
9th Cir.·
1960-04-13
The court held that the appellant, as an accommodation co-maker, was liable on the promissory note because the corporation, the principal maker, received valid consideration for its promise, and this consideration was given in reliance on the appellant's signature.
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210 F.2d 161·
10th Cir.·
1954-02-03
The court held that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss for lack of diversity and correctly directed a verdict for the bank, as the maker of the check was liable to the bank as a holder for value, even if he was an accommodation party.