12,666 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 447 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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789 F.2d 554·
7th Cir.·
1986-04-24
·cited 30×
The district court erred in dismissing the federal civil rights suit under the Younger doctrine because there were no pending state court proceedings in which the plaintiff could vindicate his rights.
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787 F.2d 714·
1st Cir.·
1986-03-31
·cited 30×
The court held that the state's failure to protect a victim from a third-party perpetrator, even with knowledge of the danger, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless a special custodial relationship exists, and thus is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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785 F.2d 781·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-25
·cited 30×
The court held that res judicata barred claims arising from conduct prior to the state court judgment, but not claims arising from subsequent conduct.
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785 F.2d 862·
10th Cir.·
1986-03-10
·cited 30×
The court held that Saye's discussion of student aide time with parents was not constitutionally protected speech, but a fact issue exists regarding whether her union activities motivated the nonrenewal decision.
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483 So. 2d 809·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-02-18
·cited 30×
Public officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims for statements made within the scope of their duties, and state agencies are immune from § 1983 actions unless immunity is waived.
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779 F.2d 631·
11th Cir.·
1986-01-10
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court erred in refusing to admit a witness's prior statement and testimony as direct evidence of racial discrimination, and that such evidence, if credible, could have established the plaintiff's claim.
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779 F.2d 409·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-18
·cited 30×
A prison regulation that establishes procedural guidelines but does not use mandatory language to limit discretion does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest for inmates regarding transfers.
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781 F.2d 155·
9th Cir.·
1985-12-10
·cited 30×
Probation officers preparing presentencing reports are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from personal damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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777 F.2d 143·
3d Cir.·
1985-11-21
·cited 30×
The plaintiff prisoner's fear of assault due to unlocked cells does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
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775 F.2d 1551·
11th Cir.·
1985-11-15
·cited 30×
Denial of qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order, and the complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the alleged injuries did not violate clearly established federal rights.
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775 F.2d 1349·
5th Cir.·
1985-11-08
·cited 30×
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774 F.2d 168·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-18
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that four defendants were aware of a strong likelihood of an attack on the plaintiff, but that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the fifth defendant, Steele, had such knowledge. The court
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771 F.2d 277·
7th Cir.·
1985-08-21
·cited 30×
The court held that a police officer may be held liable under § 1983 for an arrest based on a warrant affidavit that the officer knew or should have known contained false information or omissions, even if a magistrate approved the warrant.
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769 F.2d 160·
3d Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 30×
The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, which mandates that all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims be characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes, applies retrospectively to bar claims filed after the applicable two-year statute
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769 F.2d 195·
4th Cir.·
1985-07-31
·cited 30×
The jury's special verdict answers were irreconcilably contradictory, requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial.
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768 F.2d 226·
8th Cir.·
1985-07-15
·cited 30×
Transfers of property by a prisoner in custody to a law enforcement officer violate public policy and are void. The district court abused its discretion in denying sanctions for discovery violations.
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767 F.2d 471·
8th Cir.·
1985-07-11
·cited 30×
The majority opinion holds that the dismissal of road-graders is not excepted from the Elrod-Branti rule as a matter of law due to insufficient evidence to raise a factual issue.
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764 F.2d 1466·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-09
·cited 30×
The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and exercised pendent jurisdiction over related summary judgment issues. The grant of partial summary judgment and dissolution of a preliminary restraint were vacated, while the
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762 F.2d 815·
9th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants because the plaintiff's civil rights action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
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761 F.2d 975·
4th Cir.·
1985-05-09
·cited 30×
The court held that the magistrate clearly erred in finding no pervasive risk of harm, significant mental pain, or unnecessary infliction of pain, and that the evidence demonstrated a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment.
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761 F.2d 360·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-26
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the jury's award of damages, holding that the exclusion of documents was not an abuse of discretion, the plaintiff's refusal to take other job assignments did not constitute a failure to mitigate damages as a matter of law, the compensatory damages award was no
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758 F.2d 468·
10th Cir.·
1985-03-19
·cited 30×
The court held that a due process claim for intentional property deprivation is not barred by postdeprivation remedies when the state's actions are planned and not random, and that collateral estoppel does not bar a Fourth Amendment claim when the state court's suppression ruling
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753 F.2d 840·
10th Cir.·
1985-01-28
·cited 30×
The court held that a police officer's actions in placing a person on a mental hold without probable cause and a prosecutor's participation in obtaining an involuntary confession can state constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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753 F.2d 479·
6th Cir.·
1985-01-23
·cited 30×
The dissent argues that a consent decree, like a court-ordered remedy, must be limited by Title VII's § 706(g) and cannot provide relief beyond what could be ordered after trial.
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747 F.2d 838·
3d Cir.·
1984-11-02
·cited 30×
The court held that an upward adjustment to attorney's fees for the contingent nature of the fee or perceived case difficulty was not justified when liability was clear and no specific hurdles were demonstrated.
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741 F.2d 1342·
11th Cir.·
1984-09-18
·cited 30×
The court held that a post-termination 'name-clearing' hearing, providing notice and an opportunity to refute charges, satisfies due process for a public employee terminated for reputational damage, even without a pre-termination hearing.
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740 F.2d 350·
5th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 30×
The Association was properly denied intervention of right because its interests were adequately represented by the existing parties, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.
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736 F.2d 1392·
9th Cir.·
1984-07-10
·cited 30×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1986, but reversed the award of attorney's fees to one defendant.
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730 F.2d 1002·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-30
·cited 30×
A prisoner's failure to move for a directed verdict on certain claims at trial precludes him from raising the sufficiency of the evidence for those claims on appeal, and jury verdicts will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
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729 F.2d 903·
2d Cir.·
1984-02-28
·cited 30×
The court held that a conflict of interest arising from joint representation of a police officer and the municipality by the same county attorney prejudiced the officer, requiring a new trial. It also held that federal claims against Angela Pfeiffer were insubstantial, divesting
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727 F.2d 669·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-13
·cited 30×
Prison disciplinary committee members are not entitled to absolute immunity, as their functions and procedures do not meet the standards required for such immunity, and public policy does not necessitate it.
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725 F.2d 482·
9th Cir.·
1984-02-06
·cited 30×
The majority opinion is flawed in holding that the use of the word 'lust' in defining prurient interest renders a statute facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
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724 F.2d 818·
9th Cir.·
1984-01-24
·cited 30×
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective relief against state officials in their individual capacities, and procedural regulations do not create a constitutionally protected property interest in tenure unless they impose significant substantive limitations on di
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721 F.2d 1442·
5th Cir.·
1984-01-03
·cited 30×
Assuming probable cause for arrest, a constable's financial incentive under a fee system does not violate constitutional rights, as arrest is executive action not requiring judicial impartiality.
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720 F.2d 1542·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-15
·cited 30×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for Dixon, Kelley, and Latham, as genuine issues of material fact existed regarding state action and qualified immunity. However, Floyd, the clerk, was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
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720 F.2d 1173·
10th Cir.·
1983-11-07
·cited 30×
The court held that a class of handicapped persons is not a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and that a state civil rights division director is absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in an adjudicatory or prosecutorial capacity.
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719 F.2d 1317·
7th Cir.·
1983-09-26
·cited 30×
The court held that the jury's finding that the plaintiff's article was a substantial motivating factor in his termination was supported by substantial evidence, and that the admission of certain statements by an employment analyst was proper.
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713 F.2d 292·
7th Cir.·
1983-07-22
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the county's motion to modify the consent decree to allow double-bunking and in ordering the release of low-bond pretrial detainees to comply with the population cap.
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705 F.2d 789·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-27
·cited 30×
The court held that the reporter's qualified privilege to protect confidential sources had not yet been overcome because the plaintiff had not yet established a prima facie case for denial of a name-clearing hearing, which is a prerequisite for compelling disclosure for punitive
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704 F.2d 954·
7th Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 30×
The state may require male prison inmates, even those with religious objections, to submit to frisk searches by women guards, and the punishment for refusal was not excessive.
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704 F.2d 491·
10th Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 30×
The court held that a prison guard's unauthorized beating of an inmate can violate the Eighth Amendment if it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and that a prisoner's claim must allege intent to harm, excessive force, and resulting severe pain or lasting inju
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702 F.2d 836·
9th Cir.·
1983-04-01
·cited 30×
The court held that an inmate who obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his transfer to a dangerous prison, and whose case later became moot due to parole, was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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703 F.2d 317·
8th Cir.·
1983-03-30
·cited 30×
The court held that while the trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect of admitting prior convictions for impeachment, the error was harmless given other impeachment evidence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excludi
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693 F.2d 911·
9th Cir.·
1982-12-01
·cited 30×
The court held that abstention was appropriate in the case.
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690 F.2d 1098·
4th Cir.·
1982-10-07
·cited 30×
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689 F.2d 1286·
7th Cir.·
1982-09-27
·cited 30×
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681 F.2d 965·
5th Cir.·
1982-08-02
·cited 30×
The court held that school policies regulating literature distribution (KIA and KIB) were unconstitutional both facially and as applied due to vagueness and overbreadth, but policies regulating visitors (KM and GBRBB) were not facially unconstitutional.
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670 F.2d 507·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-15
·cited 30×
The court held that a physician's medical staff privileges, when established by contract and hospital by-laws, constitute a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring procedural due process before termination.
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The federal 'essential person' provision in the SSI statute was intended to ensure the federal government, not the state, covers the cost of 'essential person' allowances for recipients who received them in 1973, and does not implicitly require states to pass through these federa
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671 F.2d 30·
1st Cir.·
1982-02-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the Civil Rights Act claims were time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of notice of termination, and the Title VII claim was properly dismissed as the plaintiff failed to establish race discrimination.