252 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 657 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Clemons v. Mississippi does not apply retroactively to this case, and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.
-
The court held that the admission of hypnotically influenced testimony, even if potentially unreliable, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights given the safeguards employed and the victim's consistent testimony. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assis
-
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting habeas relief as to the penalty phase, reversing that decision, but affirmed the denial of relief as to the guilt phase. The court found no constitutional error in the admission of the confession, the search of the
-
The dissenting judge would reverse the district court's denial of habeas corpus, finding the admission of an unconstitutionally obtained tape recording was not harmless error.
-
885 F.2d 1342·
8th Cir.·
1989-09-26
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the denial of relief on all grounds.
-
A federal court may not grant habeas relief for denials of due process or ineffective assistance of counsel unless the petitioner demonstrates prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
-
A federal habeas court should presume that a defendant was informed by his attorney of the elements of the crime charged when the defendant indicates this during the plea proceeding and offers no contrary evidence.
-
The court held that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable, violating due process, and affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief.
-
The court held that the district court properly granted the writ of habeas corpus because the state court's finding of no bona fide doubt as to the petitioner's competence was not supported by the record.
-
The Arizona Supreme Court's construction of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) to find aggravating circumstances was not unconstitutional, and federal courts should apply a deferential standard of review to such findings.
-
824 F.2d 1551·
11th Cir.·
1987-08-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the inmate's claims of procedural due process, Eighth Amendment, substantive due process, and equal protection violations were without merit, emphasizing deference to prison administrators' decisions.
-
The dissenting judge holds that the district court properly found the guilty plea involuntary due to the prosecution's broken promise regarding a sentencing recommendation.
-
The court held that the petitioner failed to present substantial facts to doubt his competency, and therefore, the restoration hearing procedures were adequate and the conviction stands.
-
The court held that a federal evidentiary hearing was not required because the petitioner's claims were incredible and unsupported by specifics, and the state court's findings of historical fact were entitled to a presumption of correctness. The court also held that the failure t
-
The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court's denial of a continuance to secure a witness violated the appellant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, warranting a grant of habeas corpus relief.
-
The court held that while the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from enacting a capital murder crime without an intent-to-kill element, the death sentence requires a showing that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, and that ineffective assistanc
-
The court held that the conviction was fundamentally unfair due to inadequate notice in the bill of particulars and jury instructions.
-
The court affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, finding no violation of due process from the admission of evidence regarding the victim's will, the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence, or the jury charge.
-
The court held that the district court correctly denied the habeas corpus petition because the lineup identification was not unconstitutional and the rule of lenity did not apply to the sentencing issue.
-
-
706 F.2d 1408·
6th Cir.·
1983-05-05
·cited 8×
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective counsel does not constitutionally mandate a broad attorney-client privilege for psychiatric experts retained by the defense, which is waived only by calling that expert as a witness.
-
The court held that the state's acquisition and use of a defendant's confidential statement prepared for his attorney violated the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and this violation was not harmless error.
-
The court held that the pretrial photographic identification procedures used were so impermissibly suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, violating the defendant's due process rights.
-
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that the defendant failed to prove the jury was aware of the victim's pregnancy, and thus was not denied a fair trial.
-
The court held that the Georgia 'fighting words' statute is not facially unconstitutional, but reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether it was unconstitutionally applied.
-
The court held that the district court correctly granted habeas corpus relief because the state court applied an incorrect legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and the evidence supported findings of constitutionally inadequate representation.
-
A defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary absence from trial and sentencing constitutes a waiver of their Sixth Amendment right to be present, and such absence can be inferred under Rule 9.1 if the defendant had notice and warning.
-
The court held that the district court correctly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the denial of relief.
-
653 F.2d 362·
8th Cir.·
1981-07-16
·cited 8×
The court held that while a prisoner must exhaust state remedies for claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement, a claim for damages under section 1983 is not subject to the same exhaustion requirement and may be subject to a statute of limitations issue.
-
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that the petitioner's confession was voluntary and not obtained in violation of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.
-
The court held that a federal district court errs in denying a habeas corpus petition without reviewing the state trial court transcript, relying solely on a state appellate court's summary.
-
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding no constitutional error in the state court convictions.
-
The dissenting judge argues that the bring-up proceeding, authorized by a judicial officer, constituted a critical stage requiring counsel, making the subsequent confession inadmissible.
-
The dissenting judge would have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the right to challenge the search and seizure was waived and, if not, whether the search was valid.
-
The court held that the majority's distinction between de jure and de facto guilty pleas, focusing on labels rather than substance, is flawed and undermines constitutional protections.
-
882 F.2d 160·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-01
·cited 7×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition, finding no constitutional violations in the state court proceedings.
-
The court held that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it in his first state habeas proceeding and affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief.
-
A guilty plea induced by the fear of a heavier sentence if a jury trial is chosen, or by the perceived leniency of a judge in a non-jury trial, does not render the plea involuntary or unconstitutional, provided it is made intelligently and with competent legal advice.
-
The court denied the petition for rehearing, adhering to its prior ruling that the State must prove a lack of bad faith to invoke the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.
-
The court held that the state court's evidentiary hearing was not full and fair, requiring a remand for further proceedings.
-
The court held that the exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior sexual history was not a constitutional violation because the defense theory was not presented at trial and the defendant denied making the statement at issue. The court also found no ineffective assistanc
-
The court denied the application for a certificate of probable cause and the motion for a stay of execution.
-
The court held that a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence must demonstrate that a constitutional violation prevented them from presenting this evidence earlier, and that claims not raised in the first federal habeas peti
-
The court held that the majority opinion created an erroneous rule of constitutional law by presuming juror bias based on past abuse and alleged dishonesty, rather than requiring proof of fixed opinions preventing impartial judgment.
-
The court held that the petitioner's second habeas petition constituted an abuse of the writ because the claims raised could have been presented in the first petition and no cause or prejudice was shown, nor was there a showing of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
-
The court held that the state prosecutor's failure to disclose the extensive criminal record and deals made with a key witness violated the petitioner's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.
-
The dissenting judge would grant the writ of habeas corpus, finding that the admission of Purvis's confession violated Miranda, either due to custody issues or the improper admission of details obtained after custody began.
-
The court held that a habeas court need only examine relevant portions of the state court record for harmless error analysis of a defective jury instruction on aiding and abetting, not the entire record. It also held that extensive pretrial publicity did not violate the defendant
-
The dissenting judge holds that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to consult psychiatrists regarding mitigating circumstances.
-
922 F.2d 390·
7th Cir.·
1991-01-08
·cited 6×
The admission of the victim's statements, identified as 'Little Gage,' did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they qualified as excited utterances and a dying declaration, which are firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.