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760 F.2d 1045·
9th Cir.·
1985-05-20
·cited 57×
The court held that an attorney's motion to disqualify opposing counsel, based on the attorney potentially being a witness, was meritless and brought in bad faith, justifying sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The court also affirmed the reasonableness of the fee award and granted
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766 F.2d 1342·
9th Cir.·
1985-07-23
·cited 36×
The court held that an attorney who fails to disclose a potential conflict of interest, leading to trial delay and disqualification, can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for multiplying proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously.
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809 F.2d 419·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-13
·cited 26×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board erred by failing to address the central issue of whether the average difficulty of work had decreased, which would justify grade reductions under the collective bargaining agreement.
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931 F.2d 340·
5th Cir.·
1991-05-20
·cited 10×
The court held that an award of attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against a party (Dr. Kramer) was improper, and remanded for specific findings regarding an award against an attorney (Ms. Kramer) for vexatious multiplication of proceedings.
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899 F.2d 250·
3d Cir.·
1990-03-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the appeal was frivolous and awarded attorney's fees and costs to the appellees under Fed. R.App.P. 38, to be paid by appellant's counsel.
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710 F. Supp. 2d 1301·
M.D. Fla.·
2010-05-05
·cited 7×
The court held that the debt collector's calls, which were clearly intended for the plaintiff's daughter and did not falsely represent the debt, did not violate the FDCPA, and granted summary judgment for the defendant.
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966 F.2d 1181·
7th Cir.·
1992-07-10
·cited 6×
The court held that while the attorneys' negligent failure to make a timely jury demand could be considered sanctionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as extreme negligence, the awarded amount of $5,546.25 was excessive due to a lack of specificity in the fee petition and the district c
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938 F.2d 230·
D.C. Cir.·
1991-07-09
·cited 6×
The court affirmed the district court's damage awards except for the cost of capital, which was remanded for recalculation, and sanctioned Williams's counsel for procedural misconduct.
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783 F.2d 341·
2d Cir.·
1986-02-13
·cited 6×
The court held that the appellant's repeated assertion of frivolous tax arguments warrants sanctions, including double costs on appeal and attorney's fees for the government's expenses incurred due to his vexatious conduct.
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M.D. Fla.·
2025-01-27
The court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to sanction plaintiff's attorney for filing duplicative and vexatious motions, holding him jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees, and admonished him for failing to uphold professional standards.
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S.D. Fla.·
2023-09-12
The court held that sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or its inherent powers were unwarranted because the plaintiff's actions, while prolonging litigation and violating court orders, did not rise to the level of objective bad faith required for such sanctions.
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M.D. Fla.·
2022-11-21
The court denied defendants' motion for sanctions against plaintiff's counsel, finding the conduct was not egregious or in bad faith.
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M.D. Fla.·
2022-07-08
The court denied the defendant's motion for sanctions and stated it would address the motion to preclude expert testimony separately.
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M.D. Fla.·
2020-07-13
The court held that while sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 were not warranted, defendants were entitled to attorney's fees and costs for defending against plaintiffs' civil theft and RICO claims.
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S.D. Fla.·
2020-02-24
The court denied plaintiffs' motions for a deposition to perpetuate testimony and for an injunction pending appeal, and granted sanctions in part against plaintiffs' counsel.
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S.D. Fla.·
2019-10-29
The court held that Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against Defendants' Counsel was baseless and denied it, finding no evidence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct.
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S.D. Fla.·
2015-05-01
The court denied defendants' motion for sanctions, finding that the law firm's conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith or recklessness required for sanctions.