53 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 511 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order appealed from is interlocutory and does not decide the issue of arbitrability.
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The court held that an interlocutory denial of a permanent injunction is not an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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The court held that the district court lacked the authority to appoint a monitor to supervise a union election absent specific statutory authorization or demonstrated need.
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The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, disagreeing with the majority's reversal.
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act impliedly modifies the Arbitration Act, granting bankruptcy judges discretion to stay proceedings pending arbitration, and this discretion was not abused in this case.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of certain grand jury transcripts to opt-out plaintiffs, as the need for disclosure outweighed the need for secrecy.
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The court held that the district court's summary proceedings in the receivership did not afford the appellants due process by denying them a meaningful opportunity to present their claims and defenses.
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The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order denying the surety's motion for quia timet and exoneration relief, as the order was neither a final decision nor an appealable interlocutory injunction.
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The court held that the district court did not err in granting the preliminary injunction or in denying the motion for contempt, as reasonable steps were taken to ensure the inmate's access to the courts.
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The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal from an order declining to enjoin the turnover of a law firm's work product to successor counsel.
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The court held that the district court's orders regarding the duty to defend were not final and therefore not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, even with Rule 54(b) certification, because the determination of the pollution exclusion's applicability could alter the duty to defend
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The NLRB has primary jurisdiction to determine successorship issues, and a Chapter 7 discharge does not shield a debtor or their alter ego from liability for pre-petition corporate unfair labor practices.
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The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate regarding contract modification due to genuine factual disputes over the interpretation of the June 10, 1985 letter, and affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claim.
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The court held that the March order constituted a new or modified injunction, not merely a contempt finding for violating the July injunction, and thus vacated the contempt judgment.
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A district court judge exceeded lawful authority by ordering a law firm, against its will, to represent a nominal party when the real party in interest was a bankruptcy trustee in another court.
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The court held that an order denying a motion to prohibit a party from consulting with a former employee is not an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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The court held that the dismissal of Count I, which sought a permanent injunction, did not grant jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal because other counts remained for trial and there was no pressing need for immediate review.
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The court held that the district court's order granting partial summary judgment on the enforceability of a restrictive covenant is not an appealable interlocutory order denying injunctive relief because the appellant failed to demonstrate serious, irreparable consequences and th
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The district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining railroads from implementing a published tariff rate after the Interstate Commerce Commission declined to suspend it.
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606 F.2d 234·
8th Cir.·
1979-09-18
·cited 8×
The court held that the transfer order was appealable, there was no personal jurisdiction over Limited, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case.
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The court held that an order refusing to enter a consent decree in a Title VII class action is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as a denial of injunctive relief.
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The court held that the district court should discontinue its retained jurisdiction and dismiss the case because the original objectives of the lawsuit have been accomplished and state mechanisms now exist to address jail conditions.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because the balance of hardships favored the plaintiffs, and the case should be tried and decided without further delay.
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The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the Frank Group from asserting ownership interests in the Mansion House properties in bankruptcy proceedings, as the properties were not subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.
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The court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) permits the Secretary of Labor to extend overtime coverage to employees performing the work of strikers, and the district court properly enjoined future violations and established a framework for back pay.
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The court held that an interlocutory appeal would be permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district court's order finding intentional segregation and directing remedial plan formulation.
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The Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and federal intervention in state criminal proceedings was unwarran
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The court held that the denial of class certification and preliminary injunctive relief for pretrial detainees is appealable and that the district court erred in applying precedent for convicted prisoners and in denying severance.
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512 F.2d 915·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-02-13
·cited 8×
The court held that it could not conclude the district judge abused his discretion in denying an injunction pending appeal, given the narrow scope of review and the scanty record.
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437 F.2d 1020·
7th Cir.·
1971-01-29
·cited 8×
The court held that the absence of a personal hearing, right to counsel, or cross-examination in the Army's appeal process for involuntary active duty orders did not violate the reservist's constitutional rights or contractual obligations.
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The court held that the district court's order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum, which also modified the subpoena and required affirmative action in a foreign country, was an appealable interlocutory order.
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The court affirmed the decision, finding that abstention was not appropriate in this diversity case.
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An order staying an action at law pending arbitration is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and the dispute over whether the arbitration clause covers a total breach claim is itself arbitrable.
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The court held that the order denying the motion to dismiss was not appealable because it was an interlocutory order and the prerequisites for an interlocutory appeal were not met, nor was it an order refusing to dissolve an injunction.
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The court held that venue for patent infringement requires proof of completed acts of infringement within the district, not merely threats or demonstrations insufficient to establish such acts. A defendant does not waive venue by filing a special appearance to contest it, nor is
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The dissenting judge believes the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action and properly stayed state court proceedings related to the limitation of liability action.
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The crime-fraud exception applies to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine even when the alleged criminality is solely that of the law firm, but the district court's application of the exception was too broad.
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The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration because the motion did not encompass all claims and parties involved in the underlying dispute, thus violating the policy against piecemeal litigation.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the investors' motion to lift the receivership stay or to require the receiver to post a bond.
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The bankruptcy court lacked summary jurisdiction to enjoin payment on irrevocable letters of credit because the bank and the beneficiaries were adverse claimants, and the letters of credit were not property of the bankrupt estate.
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The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the magistrate judge's order directing Sherri's transfer to community housing, affirming that order. However, it declined to hear appeals on other interlocutory matters.
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The court held that the district court's stay order was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and thus the appeal should be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus.
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The court held that the partial summary judgment order was appealable as an injunction, that the Fund waived its venue challenges, and that the withdrawal liability rules were unenforceable.
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The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from hearing constitutional claims by parties who were not participants in the prior state supreme court proceedings, even if those proceedings addressed similar issues.
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A road does not "constructively use" park land under Section 4(f) if the road and park were jointly planned from the outset.
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An order dismissing counterclaims seeking injunctive relief is not an order refusing an injunction for purposes of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) unless the district court specifically denied the injunction, and the collateral order doctrine does not apply if n
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The court held that the district court's orders requiring security and interim distributions were appealable mandatory injunctions and were lawful under Rhode Island law.
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The court held that a pretrial order restraining assets under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act is appealable as a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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The court held that the district court's findings of contempt were deficient and that the prior judgment of infringement and all injunctive orders must be vacated due to the Supreme Court's ruling on the § 271(e)(1) exemption.