18 U.S.C. § 844(I)

56 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · browse and sort

• United States v. Sadik Xheka and Beha Xheka
  704 F.2d 974· 7th Cir.· 1983-04-06 ·cited 188×
  The court held that gasoline and its fumes can constitute an 'explosive' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and that the timing of certain disclosures did not violate Brady v. Maryland, as the information was revealed during trial and did not prevent a fair trial.
• United States v. Franks
  511 F.2d 25· 6th Cir.· 1975-02-12 ·cited 116×
  The court held that the joinder of defendants and offenses was proper, and that the admission of evidence, including tape recordings and voiceprint analysis, did not constitute reversible error. The court also found no violation of speedy trial rights or grounds for recusal.
• United States v. Michaels
  726 F.2d 1307· 8th Cir.· 1984-02-10 ·cited 74×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction and the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, and that the challenged evidentiary rulings and searches were proper.
• United States v. DeLUCA
  692 F.2d 1277· 9th Cir.· 1982-11-22 ·cited 68×
  The court held that convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) must be reversed due to a prior definition of 'explosive' and that a multiple-object conspiracy conviction fails if any object is legally insufficient. However, other convictions were affirmed.
• United States v. Katsougrakis
  715 F.2d 769· 2d Cir.· 1983-08-12 ·cited 52×
  Convictions under the Explosive Control Act are reversed because uncontained gasoline is not an 'explosive' as defined by the Act, but conspiracy and mail fraud convictions are affirmed if supported by independent evidence.
• United States v. Ilija Zabic and Ivan Siprak
  745 F.2d 464· 7th Cir.· 1984-09-28 ·cited 50×
  The court held that the rental apartment building was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce, making it subject to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and that evidence of flight and concealment was properly admitted.
• United States v. Anne C. Voss
  787 F.2d 393· 8th Cir.· 1986-03-26 ·cited 48×
  The court held that the jury instruction on the interstate commerce element of the arson charge was erroneous because it did not require the jury to find sufficient facts to establish a nexus between the property and interstate commerce. The court reversed the arson convictions b
• United States v. Grover Stanley Monholland and Orville Glenn Russell
  607 F.2d 1311· 10th Cir.· 1979-07-11 ·cited 42×
  The court held that mere preliminary discussions and the presentation of simulated explosives do not constitute an "attempt to transport or receive" an explosive under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) because no overt act proximately leading to the commission of the crime was shown.
• United States v. Sweet
  548 F.2d 198· 7th Cir.· 1977-01-17 ·cited 42×
  The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power as applied to intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce. The court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions, the handling of witness statements, or t
• United States v. Keen
  508 F.2d 986· 9th Cir.· 1974-11-27 ·cited 42×
  The court held that a wiretap obtained with one party's consent, even if violating state law, is admissible in federal court if it does not violate the Fourth Amendment or federal law.
• United States v. Evans
  526 F.2d 701· 5th Cir.· 1976-02-02 ·cited 38×
  The court held that technical deviations in jury selection procedures did not constitute a substantial failure to comply with the Jury Selection and Service Act, and other contentions regarding grand jury secrecy, Brady material, evidence of unindicted acts, and severance were wi
• United States v. Conway
  507 F.2d 1047· 5th Cir.· 1975-02-12 ·cited 37×
  The court held that the defendant's conviction for attempting to bomb a building and for interstate travel to promote arson was supported by sufficient evidence, and that various trial errors, including the admission of tape recordings and a prosecutor's improper remark, did not
• United States v. Podolsky
  798 F.2d 177· 7th Cir.· 1986-07-31 ·cited 34×
  The court held that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit arson was valid despite the conditional nature of the agreement, and that the government did not improperly 'manufacture' federal jurisdiction.
• United States v. Gelb
  700 F.2d 875· 2d Cir.· 1983-02-15 ·cited 34×
  The court should have permitted the jury to find that gasoline vapors mixed with air constitute an explosive under 18 U.S.C. § 844(j).
• United States v. Gere
  662 F.2d 1291· 9th Cir.· 1981-11-13 ·cited 34×
  The dissenting judge would reverse the mail fraud convictions due to instructional errors affecting substantial rights.
• United States v. Triplett
  922 F.2d 1174· 5th Cir.· 1991-01-18 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for arson and for being an accessory after the fact, and that the district court did not err in admitting certain statements or excluding other testimony.
• United States v. Muza
  788 F.2d 1309· 8th Cir.· 1986-04-10 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and did not err in denying motions for dismissal on double jeopardy grounds or for a mistrial based on prejudicial comments.
• United States v. Ozzie Lee Avery, Jr.
  717 F.2d 1020· 6th Cir.· 1983-09-29 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the combination of propane and gasoline constituted an 'explosive' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(j), and that the defendant's statement about restitution was a voluntary utterance admissible at trial.
• United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad
  675 F.2d 905· 7th Cir.· 1982-04-14 ·cited 30×
  The court held that naphtha-soaked newspapers, when ignited, constitute an 'explosive' or 'incendiary device' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and thus defendants were properly convicted.
• United States v. Mennuti
  639 F.2d 107· 2d Cir.· 1981-01-09 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the destruction of private residences by explosives, even if financed or insured by entities involved in interstate commerce, does not fall under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) because the residences themselves were not 'used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any ac
• United States v. Fiore
  821 F.2d 127· 2d Cir.· 1987-06-09 ·cited 28×
  The court held that the defendant's sentence was validly imposed, as the consecutive sentence for arson in the course of a federal felony was permissible and did not result in additional punishment beyond the cumulated sentences for mail fraud and other arson counts.
• United States v. Poulos
  667 F.2d 939· 10th Cir.· 1982-01-07 ·cited 28×
  The court held that the portion of 18 U.S.C. § 844(j) defining 'explosive' was not void for vagueness and that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict.
• United States v. Stillwell
  900 F.2d 1104· 7th Cir.· 1990-04-25 ·cited 26×
  The court held that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), applies to the arson of a private residence if it receives natural gas from out-of-state, as this satisfies the interstate commerce requirement under the Commerce Clause.
• United States v. BOS
  917 F.2d 1178· 9th Cir.· 1990-10-26 ·cited 25×
  The court held that the district court properly applied the arson sentencing guideline based on stipulated facts, even though the conviction was for mail fraud, and that the refusal to grant a continuance for a psychological evaluation was not an abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Bader
  956 F.2d 708· 7th Cir.· 1992-02-12 ·cited 24×
  The court held that the defendant's sentence was appropriate because he knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, regardless of which version of the sentencing guidelines applied.
• United States v. Levasseur
  846 F.2d 786· 1st Cir.· 1988-05-09 ·cited 23×
  The government is judicially estopped from retrying 'open counts' as predicate acts in a RICO indictment because it previously represented to another court that it would not retry those counts, thereby gaining an advantage.
• United States v. Reed
  726 F.2d 570· 9th Cir.· 1984-02-24 ·cited 22×
  The court held that the gasoline-filled cans used in the October 1 fire constituted an 'explosive' or 'incendiary device' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), but the method used in the October 15 fire did not. The court also held that the cans were not 'destructive devices' under the Natio
• The United States v. Barboa
  777 F.2d 1420· 10th Cir.· 1985-11-29 ·cited 20×
  A conviction for conspiracy cannot stand if the sole co-conspirator was a government informant, and such an allegation warrants an evidentiary hearing. Allowing natural gas to escape from an open line does not constitute an 'explosive' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
• United States v. Andrini
  685 F.2d 1094· 9th Cir.· 1982-08-27 ·cited 18×
  The court held that the construction of a commercial office building using out-of-state materials satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and that evidence of the defendant's knowledge of fire-starting techniques was admissible under Federal Rule of E
• United States v. Williams
  775 F.2d 1295· 5th Cir.· 1985-11-05 ·cited 17×
  The court held that the district court exceeded statutory limits by imposing a life sentence without a jury recommendation, and that the jury instructions on flight were proper.
• United States v. Irwin I. Grossman
  608 F.2d 534· 4th Cir.· 1979-10-26 ·cited 16×
  The court held that the backhoe's interstate connections were sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for the conspiracy to destroy it.
• United States v. Ferri
  778 F.2d 985· 3d Cir.· 1985-12-10 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on footprint identification and in refusing to imply bias to a juror whose husband was a firefighter. The court also found no Fourth Amendment violation regarding the grand jury subp
• United States v. Girard
  744 F.2d 1170· 5th Cir.· 1984-10-29 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the defendant's acceptance of the final payment under a contract secured through a fraudulent bidding process constituted a timely overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United States, thus making the indictment timely.
• United States v. Bunney
  705 F.2d 378· 10th Cir.· 1983-04-12 ·cited 14×
  The court held that gasoline used in an attempt to destroy property can be considered an "explosive" under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and that the defendant's detailed planning and preparatory actions constituted a "substantial step" toward committing the crime.
• United States v. Love
  482 F.2d 213· 5th Cir.· 1973-07-23 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to the taking of acetone swabs incident to a lawful arrest, and that the unintentional destruction of evidence does not require exclusion if the expert is available for cross-examination.
• United States v. Guadagno
  970 F.2d 214· 7th Cir.· 1992-07-08 ·cited 12×
  The court affirmed the district court's denial of a new trial and its application of sentencing enhancements, finding no error in the proceedings or sentencing.
• United States v. Dohn Ardell Patterson
  792 F.2d 531· 5th Cir.· 1986-06-24 ·cited 12×
  The federal arson statute applies to the intentional destruction of partially completed buildings that are part of a commercial residential condominium project intended for sale, even if not fully occupied or completed.
• United States v. Russell
  738 F.2d 825· 7th Cir.· 1984-06-27 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a two-unit apartment building used for rental income qualifies as property used in an activity affecting interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a psychiatric evaluation.
• United States v. Benny G. Shriver
  838 F.2d 980· 8th Cir.· 1988-02-03 ·cited 11×
  The court held that cumulative sentences for mail fraud and using fire to commit mail fraud are permissible, and that a building temporarily closed for repairs or rehabilitation is still considered 'used in an activity affecting interstate commerce' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
• United States v. Hansen
  755 F.2d 629· 8th Cir.· 1985-02-22 ·cited 10×
  The court held that the apartment building was used in interstate commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) jurisdiction, but reversed Hansen's life sentence due to lack of jury recommendation.
• United States v. Beldin
  737 F.2d 450· 5th Cir.· 1984-07-13 ·cited 10×
  The court held that the destruction of a building by uncontained gasoline ignited by a fuse can constitute destruction "by means of an explosive" under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and that a defendant's right to poll the jury can be waived by counsel's failure to object or request a reca
• United States v. Talbert
  706 F.2d 464· 4th Cir.· 1983-04-27 ·cited 10×
  The court held that the denial of a free transcript of a prior mistrial to indigent defendants, when no adequate alternative was provided, violated their due process rights. However, a separate appeal concerning juror misconduct allegations was dismissed.
• United States v. LEE
  726 F.2d 128· 4th Cir.· 1984-01-12 ·cited 8×
  The court held that gasoline used as an accelerant in arson qualifies as an 'explosive' under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) is permissible even if the 'crime of violence' is the same as the 'unlawful activity'.
• United States v. Vasilios Anagnostou
  974 F.2d 939· 7th Cir.· 1992-09-10 ·cited 6×
  The court held that the nearly five-year delay between the explosion and indictment did not violate due process because the defendant failed to show actual prejudice and the government did not delay for tactical advantage. The court also affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence a
• United States v. Kamel Kamel and Musa Khabbas
  965 F.2d 484· 7th Cir.· 1992-06-16 ·cited 6×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
• United States v. Geane Doby
  872 F.2d 779· 7th Cir.· 1989-04-13 ·cited 5×
  The court held that the house, even though vacant and undergoing repairs, was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce, thus satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
• United States v. Mayberry
  896 F.2d 1117· 8th Cir.· 1990-02-22 ·cited 4×
  The court held that a temporarily closed sawmill still affects interstate commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and that a co-conspirator's statement made to a non-conspirator could be admitted under the co-conspirator exception if it furthered the conspiracy's objectives.
• United States v. Lorenz Vilim Karlic
  997 F.2d 564· 9th Cir.· 1993-06-23 ·cited 2×
  The court held that the defendant knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury for sentencing enhancement purposes and that consecutive sentences for using explosives to commit a felony and for maliciously damaging property did not violate the Double Jeo
• United States v. Markiewicz
  978 F.2d 786· 2d Cir.· 1992-11-03 ·cited 2×
  The court held that federal criminal jurisdiction extended to offenses committed by Indians on Indian territory, even if against other Indians, if the offenses were not enumerated under the Indian Major Crimes Act or if they were 'peculiarly federal' in nature. However, it revers
• United States v. Morrison
  972 F.2d 269· 9th Cir.· 1992-08-05 ·cited 2×
  A prior conviction for malicious destruction by use of explosives qualifies as a crime of violence for career offender sentencing, even if the defendant was an aider and abettor and the offense primarily involved property damage.